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This thesis presents three sets of analyses focused on market quality and price discovery 
in derivatives markets. Specifically, this thesis investigates the impact of macroeconomic 
information releases and asymmetric information on market quality and price discovery 
in futures and swap markets. The findings in this thesis addresses a number of important 
issues in the current literature which are of great importance for market participants, 
regulators and exchanges. This thesis provides a deeper understanding on the role of 
trading breaks in futures markets on information sensitive days, information flows across 
interest rate swap and futures markets on macroeconomic announcement days and the 
role of High Frequency Traders (HFTs) in influencing market quality around information 
releases.    
The first set of empirical tests examines the impact of releasing macroeconomic 
information during trading breaks versus during continuous trading in futures markets for 
the period from 1 July 2009 to 31 December 2015. During this period, the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME) changed its trading hours twice, while the United States 
Department of Agriculture changed the release time of its monthly report once. These 
changes provide a natural experiment for assessing the role of trading breaks in futures 
markets. Previous studies present contradictory predictions for determining whether 
information should be released before trading breaks or during continuous trading.  
Advocates of trading breaks argue that they provide an opportunity for information to be 
disseminated which reduces uncertainty, thereby reducing price volatility and improving 
liquidity. In contrast, others argue that trading halts deprive the market of the ability of 
 
 15 
“learning through trading”, thereby increasing uncertainty, exacerbating price volatility 
and reducing liquidity. This thesis explains the role of trading breaks when information 
is released by examining the two most liquid agricultural futures contracts traded at CME, 
corn and soybean futures contracts, and divides the sample period into two sub-periods, 
a “trading break” and “continuous trading” period. The two sub-periods provide a 
comparison of the role of trading breaks on days when substantial information is released 
to the market during a “trading break” and days when information is released on 
“continuous trading”. In this study, price volatility and bid-ask spreads are found to be 
abnormally elevated and market depth abnormally low for a longer period during the 
continuous trading period. These empirical results suggest that releasing macroeconomic 
information during trading breaks in futures markets improves market quality. These 
findings are consistent with theoretical propositions which suggest that trading breaks 
decrease information asymmetry and improve market quality in the market. The 
implications of these results should be of particular interest to regulators and exchanges 
since the selection of the time when information is released has a direct impact on market 
quality, liquidity and volatility.    
The second set of empirical tests examines price discovery at the short end of the yield 
curve by examining the lead-lag relationship in the prices of Australian interest rate swap 
and bank accepted bill futures contracts. The theories for the location of price discovery 
produce conflicting predictions about whether the swap market is expected to lead the 
futures market at the short end of the yield curve. A set of literature provides evidence 
that informed traders prefer to trade in markets that are opaque, since anonymity allows 
informed traders to trade without revealing their private information.  This theory would 
imply that swap prices are likely to lead futures prices, as the over-the-counter (OTC) 
swap market has limited pre-and-post trade transparency and therefore will attract 
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informed traders. Alternatively, another set of literature recognizes that price discovery 
occurs in markets where trading costs are lowest, as information-based trades are 
executed where they produce the highest profit.  Therefore, given that futures markets are 
likely to be cheaper to trade than swaps, this theory predicts that futures markets will be 
the location of price discovery in interest rate markets. The empirical results find strong 
bi-directional flow of information between swap and futures markets during daytime 
trading.  However, the swap market leads price discovery during overnight trading while 
futures markets lead swap markets on macroeconomic announcement days – both new 
findings.  These findings demonstrate that price discovery in derivatives at the short end 
of the yield curve is driven by transaction costs. The implication of these results should 
be of particular interest to market participants, as information asymmetry and price 
discovery across markets play an important role in deciding where to execute a trade.   
The final set of empirical tests investigates the impact of High Frequency Trading (HFT) 
on the intraday speed of adjustment and price discovery following scheduled 
macroeconomic announcements for interest rate derivatives. The current literature 
focuses on the overall impact of HFT on market quality during non-announcement 
periods, and finds an improvement in liquidity in general. Nevertheless, the impact of 
HFT on market quality during macroeconomic information releases remains unclear for 
both interest rate swaps and futures. Announcement periods represent a different 
informational environment characterized by an increase of information asymmetries 
across market participants. This thesis employs an exogenous event, the introduction of 
co-location at the Australia Security Exchange (ASX) in January 2012, to examine for 
the first time the effects of HFT activity on market quality and price discovery around 
macroeconomic information releases for the interest rate market. The results demonstrate 
that the speed of adjustment to new information, in terms of quoted spreads, volatility and 
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depth, has been improved for both interest rate derivatives, exchange-traded futures and 
over-the-counter (OTC) traded swaps, in the presence of HFTs. In addition, this thesis 
finds that HFT strengthens the lead effects of futures over swaps on scheduled 
announcement days. The implication of these results should be of particular interest to 
exchanges and regulators since HFT activity has an impact on information asymmetry, 












1.1 Overview  
This research examines three sources and effects of information asymmetry in modern 
derivative markets. Specifically, it studies the impact of the release of macroeconomic 
reports on market quality and liquidity in futures markets, price discovery across swap 
and futures markets in the presence of asymmetric information, and the effect of 
technology and information asymmetry on market quality, liquidity and price discovery 
in interest rate markets. Results in this study address a number of gaps in the current 
literature which are of significant importance to academics, regulators and market 
participants.  
Traditionally, fund managers were considered the main type of informed investors in the 
market (Chen, Jegadeesh and Werners, 2000; Baker, Litov, Wachter and Wurgler, 2010; 
Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 2004).1  However, in recent years, electronic trading venues 
have changed the way market participants access derivatives markets. These new 
electronic venues have increased the speed of transactions and created new type of 
 
1 A seminal research by Kyle (1985) shows that informed investors take advantage from their information 
to profit in the market.    
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informed investors, thus, having an impact on liquidity and efficiency in the market.2  For 
example, electronic trading overcame pit trading as the preferable medium for entering 
the futures market, causing an increase in algorithmic and high frequency trading 
(Kaufman, 2013). These new types of traders, who now represent a high proportion of 
the total volume traded, tend to widen spreads to compensate for high asymmetric 
information in the market, thus affecting market liquidity and volatility (Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000).3  Similarly, the OTC swaps market have 
transformed from a purely voice market to a semi-electronic market, causing high trade 
transparency and low information asymmetry (Bessembinder and Maxwell, 2008). 
Although a greater number of investors suggest beneficial effects of semi-electronic 
venues for the market, the current literature does not agree on the real impact of the 
increase in electronic trading and the entrance of new market participants on market 
quality and information asymmetry. Research such as Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld 
(2011), Hasbrouck and Saar (2013), Brogaard (2012) and Riordan and Storkenmaier 
(2012), find that the increase in high frequency trading (HFT) has a positive effect on 
market quality, liquidity and informational efficiency. However, Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi 
and Tuzun (2017) doubt the real benefit of these new investors based on the 6 May 2009 
market crash, which has been attributed to the increase in algorithmic trading. Under these 
new conditions, more research is necessary to explain information asymmetry in 
derivatives markets and its effects on liquidity and market quality.   
 
2 Fama (1970) presents three forms of market efficiency (weak, semi-strong and strong) and provides the 
theoretical framework on market efficiency under the famous “efficient market hypothesis”. Aitken and 
Harris (2011) divide market quality into market efficiency, which includes transaction costs and price 
discovery, and market integrity which relates to market manipulation and broker/client conflicts.  
3  In the United Stated (U.S.), HFT activity represented more than 60% of trading volume by 2010 
(Bloomberg, 2013).  
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Previous literature attempts to measure the cost of information asymmetry in financial 
markets or assumes that markets are efficient and free of any source of asymmetric 
information. One of the most important theoretical studies is Merton (1987) who proposes 
that information asymmetry can be divided into depth and breadth. The former refers to 
the asymmetric information between investors and managers which is moderated using 
information disclosures such as financial statements or analyst reports. The latter is the 
information asymmetry amongst shareholders which is constrained by financial markets. 
This thesis concentrates on the breadth component of information asymmetry since the 
microstructure of derivatives markets and the effectiveness of markets at mitigating 
information asymmetry are of significant importance to participants, regulators and 
exchanges. Specifically, the topics examined in this research focus on three important 
areas: (i) The relation between information asymmetry and the release of substantial 
information in an electronic market. In particular, this thesis investigates liquidity and 
volatility in a market with high information asymmetry; (ii) price discovery between the 
“lit” and “dark” markets during a period of high information asymmetry when 
information is released;4  and (iii) the impact of technology and HFT on market quality 
and price discovery on days with increased information asymmetry in the market.  
Macroeconomic announcements provide a different informational environment relative 
to normal trading days. A set of literature explains that, although macroeconomic releases 
usually bring new information to the market, this information might affect prices before 
 
4 A “lit” market is one where trades and orders are displayed on order books which increases pre-and-post 
trade transparency. The Australian Security Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange are considered 
as “lit” markets. On the contrary, the Over-the-Counter (OTC) market is regarded as a “dark” market 
because little information is available to traders and public. These OTC markets are usually managed by 
banks and provide a trading platform for their clients. Dark pools and voice trades amongst dealers are 
considered as “dark” markets (European Commission, 2015).  
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informed investors can benefit from it (French and Roll, 1986). Similarly, Fleming and 
Remolona (1999) explain that macroeconomic announcements usually do not increase 
the risk of trading for markets, and therefore, the liquidity provision around information 
releases is driven by inventory control rather than asymmetric information. Another set 
of theoretical literature suggests that the release of macroeconomic information increases 
information asymmetry around the announcement. This type of public announcement 
tends to increase market volatility on announcement days (Harvey and Huang, 1991; 
Ederington and Lee, 1993). Engle (1998) explains that negative news from 
macroeconomic announcements provide stronger information asymmetry than similar 
unscheduled announcements, and demonstrates a strong asymmetric effect in the futures 
market where negative information releases significantly increase volatility post 
announcement days. In the period after the release of information, macroeconomic 
announcement provides a medium in which information asymmetry can be moderated in 
derivatives markets since it provides market participants with substantial information 
about the true value of the security. The derivatives market, in particular the futures 
market, is an important part of the financial system since it provides risk transfer and a 
source of price discovery. In addition, derivatives trading takes place in a special trading 
environment with different market participants and high speed of trading relative to the 
equity market. In order to understand the impact of information releases on derivatives 
markets, this thesis explores how macroeconomic information is incorporated into prices 
and the effect that the release of information has on market quality and price discovery in 
these markets.    
The introduction of co-location facilities, which reduces latency, enables faster 
interaction with financial markets, and provides prompt access to the limit order book, 
has accelerated the entrance of new market participants such as HFTs and algorithmic 
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traders. 5   HFTs are considered a type of informed traders relative to other market 
participants given their superior speed advantage which enables them to revise their 
quotes much faster and keeps them informed compared to their counterparts (Menkveld, 
2011; Hoffman, 2014). The introduction of co-location facilities creates a barrier to entry 
in the market given the extensive and complicated infrastructure needed to facilitate such 
access, therefore, creating an information gap across market participants. Co-location 
benefits HFTs since it reduces latency and allows them to respond faster to new 
information releases (Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson and Vega, 2014; Brogaard, 
Hendershott and Riordan, 2014; Jiang, Lo and Valente, 2015; Frino, Mollica and 
Romano, 2013). Although, it is not possible to identify HFT activity directly using 
exchange level data, the introduction of co-location provides an exogenous opportunity 
to analyse the effect of latency on market quality, liquidity and price discovery around 
information releases. In terms of breadth in information asymmetry, the role and 
importance of institutional investors, usually categorized as informed traders, may 
diminish when trading against algorithmic and high frequency traders, both experts at 
trading in a low-latency environment. Consequently, this thesis explains in Chapter 5 the 
effects of increased HFT activity and computerised trading on market quality, liquidity 
and price discovery for interest rate markets.   
This thesis is motivated by a desire to explain the impact of macroeconomic 
announcement releases and information asymmetry on market quality and price discovery 
in derivatives markets, which is of great concern for market participants, exchanges and 
regulators. The first set of empirical tests aims to examine whether there is a right time 
 
5 Co-location is a new technology which permits HFTs to locate themselves within a short distance and 




when the release of substantial information does not extensively deteriorate market 
quality and liquidity given that macroeconomic announcements are related to an increase 
of information asymmetry in the market. This study provides a valuable contribution to 
market participants such as hedgers, liquidity providers and speculators, who are 
concerned about the effect of announcements on market quality as it may affect their 
trading strategies and risk. The second set of empirical tests investigates the effectiveness 
of swap and futures markets at incorporating information into prices in the presence of 
information asymmetry. This study provides a valuable contribution to investors who 
prefer to rebalance their interest rate portfolios in markets with low information 
asymmetry and high market liquidity as trading and execution costs are lower under these 
conditions. The third set of empirical tests examine how HFT activity improves the speed 
at which markets stabilize after the release of substantial information. This study provides 
a valuable contribution to exchanges and regulators as it is important to measure whether 
it is worthwhile to invest in these new technologies. The remainder of this chapter 
explains the objectives for each issue investigated in this thesis and concludes with an 
overall view of the structure of this thesis.      
1.2 The Role of Trading Breaks in the Futures Market 
Different macroeconomic information bureaus around the world exhibit considerable 
diversity in the typical release time of macroeconomic information. In many markets, 
macroeconomic information is released during normal trading – such as in Australia and 
South Africa where the Australian Bureau of Statistics and Statistics South Africa, 
respectively, release most macroeconomic information during typical futures markets 
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trading hours.6  In contrast in other markets, macroeconomic information is released 
during trading breaks – such as the World Agricultural Supply and Demand 
Estimates Report (WASDE) released by the U.S. Department of Agriculture prior to 2012, 
and key economic indicators (Inflation, Unemployment, GDP growth) released by the 
Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department. 7   This thesis examines whether it is better 
for the quality of markets to release such information during normal trading as opposed 
to trading breaks.8 
A related set of literature examines whether trading breaks should be instituted at the time 
that information is released. Advocates of trading halts argue that they provide an 
opportunity for information to be disseminated which reduces uncertainty, thereby 
reducing price volatility and improving liquidity (IOSCO, 2002).  In contrast, others 
argue that they deprive the market of the ability of ‘learning through trading’ thereby 
increasing uncertainty, exacerbating price volatility and reducing liquidity (Lee, Ready 
 
6 The Australian Bureau of Statistics typically publishes macroeconomic information at 11:30 am AET 
when all futures contracts listed on the Australian Securities Exchange are trading continuously.  Similarly, 
Statistics South Africa publishes the latest macroeconomic data at 11:30 am SAST when the South African 
Futures Exchange is open for trading. An additional futures market where macroeconomic information is 
released during continuous trading is the Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange in China where the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China releases most macroeconomic information at 10 am CST (China Standard 
Time) while the market is trading continuously. 
7 Prior to 21 May 2012, the U.S. Department of Agriculture published macroeconomic information at 7:30 
am CT when grain and oilseed futures contracts were closed for trading. Similarly, the Hong Kong Census 
and Statistics Department published the latest macroeconomic data at 4:30 pm HKT shortly after the 
afternoon session of the Hong Kong Futures Exchange is closed for trading. An additional futures market 
where macroeconomic information is released during the trading break is the Tokyo Commodity Exchange 
where the Japan Statistics Bureau releases most macroeconomic information between 8.30 am and 8.50 am 
JST, minutes before the exchange opens for trading at 9 am JST. 
8 Whether a piece of macroeconomic news is released during a securities trading break is the result of a 
joint decision by an information bureau who choses what time of day to release information and an 
exchange which chooses what time to close its markets. 
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and Seguin, 1994; Grossman, 1990).  These contradictory predictions do not provide an 
unambiguous basis and present a gap in the literature for determining whether information 
should be released before trading breaks or during continuous trading. This thesis closes 
this gap by investigating the role of trading breaks and determining an optimal period 
when information should be released in the futures market.  
Chapter 2 indicates that the extant literature finds contradictory results on whether trading 
breaks improve or impair market quality. Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) develop one of 
the first methods for studying the impact of trading breaks. In this method, market quality 
measures calculated from an experimental sample of trading halts are compared with 
measures taken from a pseudo-halts control sample. This research finds that trading 
breaks are detrimental for price volatility. The authors therefore conclude that trading 
halts around information releases deteriorates price volatility and market quality. 
However, their study might not be generalizable to macroeconomic information and 
futures markets for at least two reasons.  First, the release time of macroeconomic 
information is typically scheduled many months ahead of time and is well known and 
easy to discover by all market participants, unlike company-specific information which 
occurs more randomly through time.  This implies that participants in securities markets 
are more likely to be able to prepare themselves for the release of the macroeconomic 
information and to access, process and assess its impact on security prices rapidly after 
that macroeconomic information is released.  In turn, information dissemination is more 
rapid and therefore information is more likely to be equalised across market participants 
by the time the market re-opens following a trading break.  This implies that releasing 
macroeconomic information during a trading break is expected to have a dampening 
effect on price volatility and bid-ask spreads.  Second, macroeconomic information 
influences a large number of traded securities, including OTC, off-market and overseas 
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traded securities, unlike information released by companies which is more likely to be 
stock specific and influence only the security it relates to.  Hence, even though a specific 
futures contract may be closed for trading, thereby preventing ‘learning-through-trading’ 
from occurring in that futures contract, price discovery may occur in other related markets 
that are open for trading.  This information is then disseminated to market participants 
broadly, which implies that price uncertainty may dissipate by the time the futures market 
reopens. Therefore, unlike stock markets, releasing information during trading halts may 
reduce price volatility and improve liquidity.  For these reasons, it is unlikely that the 
results of research examining the release of stock specific information during trading halts 
in equities markets is generalizable to macroeconomic information and futures markets.  
This thesis tests the impact of releasing macroeconomic information during trading 
breaks in futures markets. 
Chapter 3 extends the analysis of Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) by examining the role of 
trading breaks in the futures market around macroeconomic information releases, 
especially, the impact that trading halts have on information asymmetry and market 
quality. Chapter 3 compares an experimental sample of days with information releases 
with a control sample of non-announcement days, and builds on work from Martens and 
Van Dijk (2007), McInish and Wood (1992), and Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) to 
measure the impact of imposing trading breaks on volatility, bid-ask spreads and depth. 
Specifically, this thesis examines price volatility, bid-ask spreads and market depth of 
trading following WASDE report releases for soybean and corn futures contracts traded 
on CME. The release of the report is assumed to affect information asymmetry in the 
market as different market participants incorporate macroeconomic news at different 
speeds. Trading breaks are expected to provide enough time for investors to analyse the 
information contained in the report, thus reducing information asymmetry. On the other 
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hand, the release of information during continuous trading creates high information 
asymmetry as sophisticated investors can process the information contained in the reports 
faster than other investors (retail investors and hedgers), which contributes to the extent 
of information asymmetry in futures markets. The findings in Chapter 3 contribute to the 
literature on the role of trading breaks, the ideal time for the release of macroeconomic 
information in futures markets, as well as, market quality in agricultural futures markets.    
1.3 Price Discovery in the Interest Rate Market 
In recent years, interest rate swaps are widely traded Over-the-Counter by private 
investors and banks in volumes similar to or higher than other financial instruments such 
as equities or government debt. As a result of higher liquidity in swap markets, institutions 
are increasingly using interest rate swaps to gain exposure to the yield curve and shifting 
to swaps for the pricing of other interest rate products (also known as Benchmark Tipping; 
McCauley, 2001). In order to understand the importance of interest rate swaps in the 
modern financial world and how the growth in popularity of swaps affects the flow of 
information in interest rate markets, Chapter 4 investigates the relationship that exists 
between interest rate swaps and futures while examining price discovery across the two 
markets.9  Chapter 4 underscores the fact that interest rate futures are closely linked to 
interest rate swaps as a source of pricing, and therefore, the release of macroeconomic 
 
9 Interest rate swaps are a security commonly used by banks, companies and financial institutions to gain 
exposure to the interest rate market. The plain vanilla interest rate swap is an agreement between two firms 
to exchange cash flows determined by the difference between a fixed and a floating interest rate during a 
period specified by the swap tenure (Litzenberger, 1992). The Australian 1-year interest rate swap has four 
fixed for floating exchange of cash flows that occur every three months, in which the fixed leg is the rate 
agreed at the beginning of the swap and the floating leg is represented by the Bank Bill Swap Rate (BBSW) 
reported daily by the Australian Financial Markets Association (AFMA). Litzenberger (1992) describes 
two motivations for investors to enter on a swap agreement – motivation for borrowing short and swapping 
into fixed, and motivation for borrowing long and swapping into floating.  
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information should be reflected simultaneously in both markets. However, the literature 
suggests that other factors such as liquidity and the structure of the markets might have 
an impact on how information is incorporated into prices.  Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley 
(1996) recognize that price discovery occurs in markets where trading costs are lowest, 
as information-based trades are executed where they produce the highest profit.  
Therefore, given the relatively higher trading activity of short-term interest rate futures 
over swaps, futures markets are likely to be cheaper to trade than swaps (see Aitken et. 
al, 2004 – bid and ask spreads are related to trading volume in futures markets); and this 
theory predicts that futures markets will be the location of price discovery in interest rate 
futures markets. Alternatively, Grunbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz (1994) hypothesize 
and provide evidence that informed traders prefer to trade in markets that are opaque, 
since anonymity allows informed traders to trade without revealing their private 
information.  This theory would imply that swap prices are likely to lead futures prices, 
as the over-the-counter (OTC) swap market has limited pre-and-post trade transparency 
and therefore will attract informed traders. Hence, the theories for the location of price 
discovery produce conflicting predictions about whether the swap market is expected to 
lead the futures market at the short end of the yield curve. Chapter 4 examines this issue 
by implementing a lead-lag model based on Sims (1972) on days when macroeconomic 
information is released.  
There is a considerable body of work examining the impact of the release of information 
on the relationship between stock index and stock index futures markets (see Chan, 1992; 
Frino, Walter and West, 2000).  Such periods are particularly important, because they are 
characterized by an increase in private information, informed trading, and information 
asymmetry.  These studies document a strengthening in the lead of futures markets around 
macroeconomic releases, which is consistent with the predictions of the theory that low 
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trading cost drives price discovery to futures markets during periods of high informed 
trading (Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley, 1996).  Macroeconomic information releases have 
an impact on prices of interest rate futures (see Ederington and Lee, 1993), and therefore 
are likely to create information asymmetries and informed trading around the time that 
they are released. This provides an ideal laboratory setting for further examining the 
location of price discovery in short-term interest rate markets during periods of high 
informed trading. To investigate the impact of macroeconomic releases, Chapter 4 
compares price discovery measures between days with information releases 
(announcement days) and normal trading days (non-announcement days).  
Chapter 4 also tests the price discovery relationship between the swap and futures markets 
in overnight markets. The overnight market is particularly interesting in Australia, as it is 
punctuated by the opening of both U.S. and U.K. markets, which creates price volatility 
(Frino and Hill, 2000; Zou, Rose and Pinfold, 2006).  This is likely to create information 
asymmetry and informed trading, and therefore provides another natural laboratory 
experiment for testing the location of price discovery in the presence of higher informed 
trading. Historically, futures markets traded only during day-time trading sessions, 
however, futures exchanges have moved to trading almost 24 hours per day.  For example, 
the bank accepted bill futures contracts examined in Chapter 4, currently trade around the 
clock, only breaking from trading between 4:30 and 5:08 pm and 7:00 am to 8:28 am.  
Chapter 4 uses a more recent sample period and extends previous research by examining 
price discovery in overnight short-term interest rate markets.  
The current literature on price discovery in short-term interest rate markets is also limited. 
There is extensive literature examining the relationship between stock and stock index 
futures markets (e.g. Grunbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz, 1994; Min and Najand, 1999; 
Shyy, Vijayraghavan and Scott-Quinn, 1996) as well as stock and stock option markets 
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(e.g. O’Connor, 1999; Stephan and Whaley, 1990; Chan, Chung and Johnson, 1993).  
There is also some research that examines the relationship between interest rate and 
interest rate futures markets (e.g. Scalia, 1998; Poskitt, 1999).  However, limited research 
exists on price discovery across different types of interest rate derivatives markets.  This 
is especially surprising since interest rate derivatives markets dwarf equity derivatives 
markets in terms of trading activity.10  Chapter 4 brings further evidence to bear on this 
issue and provides new insights on price discovery across two interest rate derivatives.    
1.4 The Impact of HFT on Market Quality and Price Discovery 
In recent years, derivatives markets around the world have implemented significant 
structural changes in their operations. New technologies have reduced trading times and 
transaction costs, and replace traditional human traders with computerised trading 
algorithms.11  One of the most relevant technologies is the introduction of co-location in 
different financial markets over the last decade. Co-location has a large impact on high 
frequency trading since it significantly reduces latency and increases the speed at which 
traders can react to new information releases. This improvement in reaction times for 
algorithmic traders might be beneficial for price discovery efficiency and liquidity in the 
markets (Chaboud et al., 2014, Chordia, Green and Kottimukkalur, 2016; Brogaard, 
Hendershott and Riordan, 2014; Frino et al., 2016; Brogaard, 2010; Brogaard, 
Hendershott and Riordan, 2014; Riordan and Storkenmaier, 2012; Frino, Mollica and 
Webb, 2014; Brogaard, Hagströmer, Nordén, and Riordan, 2015; Hendershott, Jones and 
 
10 Similarly to the U.K., trading in interest rate swaps in Australia dwarfs trading in equity futures.  For 
example, the ratio of average daily swap volume to futures volume in Australia for 2016 is approximately 
9.8 times ($58.5 billion / $6.0 billion) [data sourced from AFMA 2017]. 
11  When HFT was introduced in the market, trading speeds moved from the milliseconds to the 
microseconds. However, these days the discussion centers around trading speeds in the nanoseconds.  
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Menkveld, 2011; Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013), or detrimental for the markets if adverse 
selection costs increase for non-HFT participants (Cartea and Panalva, 2012; Chaboud et 
al., 2014; Boehmer, Fong, and Wu, 2014; Rosu, 2016; Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi and 
Tuzun, 2017). 12  Hence, Chapter 5 of this thesis contributes to the discussion on 
information asymmetry by investigating the role of algorithmic traders and their impact 
on market quality, liquidity and price discovery around macroeconomic information 
releases.   
Under this new market structure, there has been a change in the way markets incorporate 
macroeconomic information. Chapter 2 indicates that the announcement period represents 
a different informational environment compared to normal trading days, and the release 
of substantial information might have an impact on market quality, especially on intraday 
volatility and liquidity which seem to be largely driven by macroeconomic 
announcements. Up until now, a small but growing body of literature has examined the 
role of HFT in forming prices and providing liquidity when information arrives. Chaboud 
et al. (2014) and Scholtus et al. (2014) both investigate the impact of HFT on price 
dynamics on macroeconomic announcement days, and find mixed results on the effects 
of HFT: positively, HFT improves price discovery and increases depth and trading 
volume immediately after news releases; negatively, HFT might deteriorate volatility 
around information arrivals. This thesis extends previous studies and provides evidence 
from Australian derivatives markets. Chapter 2 identifies that, while Frino el al. (2014) 
has demonstrated that HFT improves liquidity in Australian futures market, Chapter 5 
focuses on testing the impact of HFT on the speed of adjustment and price discovery 
following scheduled macroeconomic releases.  
 
12 In support of opposing views on HFT, some authors attribute recent market crashes such as the Flash 
Crash of 2010 and the Knight Capital market glitch of 2013 to HFT activity.  
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As shown in Chapter 2, previous literature examines the market behaviour for earnings 
announcement days across various stock markets. Frino et al. (2017) examine the 
responses of HFT to firm specific news and find that high frequency traders react faster 
and more accurately to earnings announcements than non-HFT traders. Frino, Mollica, 
Monaco and Palumbo (2017) investigate one minute intervals surrounding earnings 
announcements in the Italian stock market and reveal an improvement in market depth 
following macroeconomic releases in the presence of HFT. Chapter 5 extends previous 
intraday studies in equity markets to interest rate derivatives markets. Interest rate futures 
have a number of unique features that may lead to differences in the speed of adjustment 
to new information, relative to equities. First, futures are more sensitive to new 
information and tend to lead the underlying spot market (Frino & West, 2003). Second, 
the intraday patterns in interest rate futures are more responsive to macroeconomic 
announcements (Ederington and Lee, 1995) compared to equities (Andersen, et al., 2000).  
In addition to Chapter 4, which studies price discovery between the swap and futures 
markets on macroeconomic announcement days, Chapter 5 extends this work by 
providing evidence on the role of HFT in price discovery for two related derivatives, and 
provides evidence that the speed of adjustment in the aftermath of announcements has 
been improved for futures market, as well as for the related swaps market, following the 
introduction of co-location facilities. Therefore, the reduction in latency in futures has led 
to an enhancement in price efficiency for OTC-traded swaps through cross-market 
arbitrage. In addition, Chapter 5 finds that HFT strengthens the lead effects of futures on 
days with new information releases.  
1.5 Research Problem  
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Overall, this thesis investigates how the information asymmetry created by the released 
of macroeconomic information affects market quality and price discovery in futures and 
swap markets. In order to investigate this problem, this thesis develops a number of 
hypotheses.13  To understand the impact of macroeconomic information releases around 
trading breaks on market quality in futures markets, this thesis presents the following 
hypotheses:   
• Trading breaks improve volatility around the release of macroeconomic 
information in futures markets. 
 
• Trading breaks improve liquidity around the release of macroeconomic 
information in futures markets. 
To understand the flow of information across futures and swap markets on normal trading 
days, around macroeconomic information releases and during overnight markets, this 
thesis presents the following hypotheses:   
• The price discovery relationship between interest rate swap and futures is bi-
directional for all trading days.  
  
• The futures market leads the swap market in price discovery around the release 
of macroeconomic information in the interest rate market.  
  
• The swap market leads the futures market in price discovery during overnight 
trading in the interest rate market.   
To understand how High Frequency Trading activity was affected by the introduction of 
co-location in the Australia Securities Exchange, as well as, the impact of this new HFT 
activity on market quality and price discovery across the futures and swap markets on 
days with macroeconomic information releases, this thesis presents the following 
hypotheses:   
 
13 The development of these hypotheses is explained in more detail in Chapter 2.  
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• The introduction of co-location at the ASX increases high frequency trading 
around information releases. 
 
• The increased level of high frequency trading leads to improved volatility in 
swap and futures markets around macroeconomic news releases. 
  
• The increased level of high frequency trading leads to improved liquidity in 
swap and futures markets around macroeconomic news releases. 
 
• The lead role of the futures market on days with macroeconomic information 
releases increases given the heightened level of high frequency trading in the 
interest rate market. 
1.6 Summary   
The three research topics in this thesis investigate issues related to the causes and effects 
of information asymmetry in derivatives markets. This chapter presents the questions 
surrounding these topics and explains the motivations for the studies provided in the 
subsequent chapters.  
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of the 
existing literature related to the issues investigated in this thesis. Specifically, literature 
around information asymmetry, trading halts, market quality, macroeconomic 
announcements, the development and impact of HFTs, and price discovery. In addition, 
Chapter 2 presents the hypotheses to be tested in this thesis. Chapter 3 investigates the 
role of trading halts in mitigating information asymmetry and improving market quality 
and liquidity. Chapter 4 examines price discovery between the interest rate swap and 
futures markets around macroeconomic information releases. Chapter 5 investigates the 
impact of co-location and HFT on market quality and price discovery on days with 
macroeconomic information releases. Finally, Chapter 6 
 provides the conclusion which incorporates a review of the results for the three studies.  
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Chapter 1 describes that the objective of this thesis is to provide empirical evidence to 
demonstrate the impact of information asymmetry, trading brakes, macroeconomic 
information releases and HFT activity on market quality and price discovery in 
derivatives markets. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the most important literature 
related to the three examinations presented in this thesis in order to present further 
motivations for the empirical analyses of information asymmetry, price discovery, 
volatility, liquidity and HFT.  
Section 2.2 outlines previous studies on stock-specific trading breaks imposed in the 
equity market. The section then discusses the importance of analysing trading breaks 
when macroeconomic information is released and explains how this type of information 
affects market liquidity and volatility. Section 2.3 discusses price discovery theories and 
models, and provides information of previous theoretical and empirical studies on price 
discovery. The section also explains the impact of liquidity and transaction costs on price 
discovery across markets, and describes price discovery around information releases and 
overnight markets. Section 2.4 summarises the theoretical and empirical literature around 
algorithmic and high frequency trading and discusses high frequency trading activity 
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around the release of information. Section 2.5 states the hypotheses tested in this thesis 
which are derived from the existing literature. Finally, section 2.6 presents an overview 
of this chapter.       
2.2 The Role of Trading Breaks in the Futures Market 
Trading breaks are usually implemented on a scheduled basis between the close of the 
night (day) session and the beginning of the day (night) session. In addition, trading 
breaks can also be enforced by exchanges to stop trading on a specific security for a 
certain time period when there is significant news that affects the security (e.g. publicly 
traded company releasing significant news about itself). The halt in trading for the 
affected security gives investors time to review the news and assess its impact on the 
market. Trading breaks usually last for one hour, but are not limited to that and can happen 
at any time of the day.  
Previous literature tends to focus on the impact of trading breaks on volatility, liquidity 
and price discovery in the equity market (Corwin and Lipson, 2000; Gerety and Mulherin, 
1992; Lee, Ready and Seguin, 1994; Christie, Corwin and Harris, 2002; King, Pownall 
and Waymire, 1992; Kryzanowski and Nemiroff, 2001; Fabozzi and Ma, 1988). 
However, the role of trading breaks in improving market quality has been understudied 
for futures markets. Although results in the equity market usually find that information-
motivated trading breaks are detrimental for market quality (Lee, Ready and Seguin, 
1994; Frino, Lecce and Segara, 2011; Christie, Corwin and Harris, 2002), it is important 
to investigate whether trading breaks might have a different impact on market quality in 
futures markets when macroeconomic information is released. This kind of information 
is typically pre-scheduled for many months in advance and influences a great number of 
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securities, unlike stock-specific information which is more likely to mainly affect a 
particular stock.  
In the agricultural futures market, prior studies examining the information content of 
reports that contain production and harvest forecasts (Sumner and Mueller 1989; Garcia 
et al. 1997; McKenzie 2008), crop progress and conditions (Lehecka et al. 2014), and 
World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) reports (e.g., Isengildina-
Massa et al. 2008a, 2008b; Adjemian 2012) document significant announcement effects 
in the market. Therefore, it is important to investigate what the role of trading breaks is 
at mitigating these announcement effects since the release of substantial information 
tends to create asymmetric information and deteriorate market quality. This can have a 
negative impact on producers who use futures markets to reduce their risk exposure to 
price movements between plantation date and harvest.   
2.2.1 Information Motivated Trading Breaks    
Since their inception, there has been considerable debate among regulators, market 
participants and academics as to the effectiveness of trading breaks. In the equity market, 
advocates of trading halts suggest that they provide time for investors to process new 
information which promotes an orderly market, maintains price stability and minimises 
transaction costs (IOSCO, 2002). This idea is based on the view of the Brady Commission 
which claims that trading breaks might have a calming effect as market participants can 
catch up with information flow in periods of high volatility in the market (Greenwald and 
Stein, 1988, 1991). Christie, Corwin and Harris (2002) examine the effect of trading halts 
on prices and transaction costs on NASDAQ and find that trading breaks that reopen the 
next day are associated with insignificant spread effects and reduced market volatility. 
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Their results confirm the hypothesis that the increased information transmission during 
the break has a positive impact on post-halt uncertainty in the equity market.      
A considerable volume of evidence supports the hypothesis that instituting trading halts 
around information releases impairs market quality. In this sense, proponents of trading 
breaks are aware that the illiquidity caused when the markets are closed during a trading 
halt might have a negative effect on market volatility since it prompts investors to 
overreact and exit the market more quickly than if trading breaks were not imposed 
(Gerety and Mulherin, 1992). Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) developed a method for 
examining the impact of trading halts which compares market behaviour around an 
experimental sample of information-motivated trading halts with market behaviour 
around a control sample of “price-matched pseudo-halts” – that is a period of time during 
continuous trading which is identical to the trading halt and which is matched on the basis 
of the absolute value of the price movement during the trading halt.  This approach 
controls for the effects of the price movement that typically accompanies information 
released during a trading halt and isolates the effect of the trading halt per se.  Using a 
sample of 852 trading halts in 1988 for stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), the study finds that trading halts exacerbate price volatility for more than two 
hours following the reopening of the market.  Christie, Corwin and Harris (2002) apply a 
similar price-matched pseudo-halt method to examine a sample of 156 delayed openings 
and 265 intraday halts instituted between September 1997 and December 1998 for stocks 
listed on NASDAQ. The study also confirms that trading halts exacerbate price volatility 
for more than one hour following the reopening of the market. In addition, the study 
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extends the analysis to bid-ask spreads but finds no evidence that trading halts cause a 
statistically significant change in bid-ask spreads following a trading halt.14   
Frino, Lecce and Segara (2011) use the price-matched pseudo halt method to examine 
market behaviour around 1,592 trading halts instituted between 1 January 2005 and 26 
September 2006 for stocks trading on the ASX.  The study also documents that trading 
halts increase price volatility and bid-ask spreads for more than one hour following the 
reopening of the market, while depth is abnormally low for more than two hours. 
Brailsford (1995) examines the impact of market closures on volatility in the Australian 
equity market using the ARCH class of models for a sample period from 1974 to 1991. 
The study argues that trading following market closures is marked by an increase in 
conditional volatility, which confirms that the production of information during the 
closure has an impact on volatility and risk after the break. Kryzanowski and Nemiroff 
(1998) investigate price discovery and market quality around trading breaks using 30-
minute intervals on the Montreal Exchange to find that volatility and trade activity 
significantly increase around trading breaks. This deterioration in market quality usually 
disappears within two days after the halt.  
In a later study, Kryzanowski and Nemiroff (2001) try to answer the question of whether 
trading breaks have a positive effect on the market by reducing information asymmetry 
or a negative effect by preventing traders from transacting in the market. In order to 
answer this question, their research examines the behaviour of quoted spread and depth 
around exchange-imposed trading halts on the Montreal and Toronto Exchanges. Their 
results show that the adverse selection component of the spread is usually much higher 
 
14 The focus of Christie, Corwin and Harris (2002) however is to determine whether the re-opening method 
has an impact on price volatility and liquidity.   
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around trading breaks. Although the literature concludes that instituting trading breaks 
around an information release impairs liquidity and therefore the quality of the equity 
market, it is important to study the impact of trading halts on futures markets where 
macroeconomic information rather than stock-specific information is released, as Fabozzi 
and Ma (1988) demonstrate that volatility around trading halts depends on the market 
where the security is traded.   
2.2.2 Macroeconomic Releases in Agricultural Futures Markets     
The WASDE report released by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provide 
demand and supply balance sheets and price forecasts for numerous crops, and is 
therefore an important source of public information in the agriculture market.15  The 
WASDE report includes domestic and international estimates for different commodities 
such as wheat, rice, corn, barley, soybean, rapeseed, palm, sorghum, oats, cotton, sugar, 
meat, poultry, eggs and milk. The USDA report is considered a public good because if 
the report were not released to the public, the private market might not be able to 
disseminate information in a similar way, which reduces the associated welfare benefits 
(Adjemian, 2012).     
 
15 The WASDE report has been published by the USDA since September 1973. In the beginning of the 
1980s, the WASDE report began to incorporate aggregate foreign supply and demand estimates. The 
WASDE report is prepared in a secured-environment by a team of U.S government officials, which is 
managed by the World Agricultural Outlook Board (WOAB), and contains data supplied by four different 
USDA agencies. The Agricultural Marketing Service provides data on existing prices for livestock and crop 
commodities; the Economic Research Service examines the impact of market conditions on supply and 
demand of commodities; the Farm Services Agency analyses the impact of policy environment on producer 
behavior; and the Foreign Agricultural Service offers information and data on foreign commodity markets 
(Vogel and Bange, 1999). Further, the report also includes a weather analysis which is prepared by the Joint 
Agricultural Weather Facility managed by the USDA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration.      
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In the agricultural futures market, the literature offers considerable evidence that WASDE 
reports provide the most substantive information content that has significant impacts on 
price volatility and market liquidity. Isengildina-Massa, Irwin, Good and Gomez (2008a) 
observe that from 1985 to 2006, WASDE reports containing National Agricultural 
Statistics Service (NASS) crop production estimates and other domestic and international 
statistics have the most significant impact when compared to other reports released in the 
agricultural market. Other important reports released in the agricultural futures market 
include the production and harvest forecasts and the crop progress and conditions reports.   
A small subset of the literature argues that the impact of the WASDE report on 
commodity prices is small or non-existence. In the case of orange juice, Baur and Orazem 
(1994) investigate the impact of the USDA forecast of orange prices on the market, and 
find that the price variation of oranges is not driven by the release of public information. 
Carter and Galopin (1993) analyse the information content in the USDA Hogs and Pigs 
report, and demonstrate that the information content in the report provides little value or 
information, to the point that futures traders are not willing to pay for having early access 
to the report because the information disseminated is already incorporated into the futures 
price. Using a similar methodology based on expected gain and transaction costs, Garcia, 
Irwin, Leuthold and Yang (1997) find that the USDA corn and soybean reports provide 
important information to participants in the commodity futures markets. However, the 
value of this information appears to decline after the mid-1980s. Fortenberry and Sumner 
(1993) find that the market impact of the WASDE report declined between the years 1985 
and 1989. In their results, it is concluded that the USDA reports do not provide significant 
information to the market anymore given than participants are now able to anticipate the 
information contained in the report.  
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Although, a limited amount of research argues that the impact of the WASDE report on 
commodity prices is small or non-existent, the vast majority of the literature agrees that 
there is a significant impact of the WASDE announcements on market quality. It is 
important to mention that most of the research that does not find an impact of the WASDE 
report on market quality and price movements fails to account for other determinants of 
volatility and liquidity such as the time when the report is released, seasonality and time-
to-delivery of the futures contracts. On the other side of the literature, Sumner and 
Mueller (1989) examine the reaction of futures markets to the WASDE report releases 
using various t-tests, F-tests and nonparametric chi-square tests. The study indicates that 
the reports contain significant information for the market, and therefore, it should 
continue to be supported and released to the market. Adjemian (2012) examines the 
WASDE announcement effect for cotton, soybeans and hard winter wheat across different 
expiring periods based on a methodology implemented by Williams (2001) and 
Isengildina-Massa et al. (2008a). Results demonstrates that the WASDE announcement 
effect persists across contract positions, is not restricted to months that include NASS 
crop survey data, is enlarged during low carryover periods for soybeans and wheat, and 
is rapidly incorporated into futures prices. Isengildina-Massa, Irwin, Good and Gomez 
(2008b) provide evidence that the WASDE reports lead to a significant reduction of 
implied volatility that averages 0.7 percentage points for corn and 0.8 percentage points 
for soybeans. The magnitude of the reduction is most significant when the reports contain 
both domestic and international information, and outlook information. The study notes 
that the effect is stronger in more recent years. Using intraday Chicago Board of Trade 
corn futures prices and trading volume from the electronic trading platform for July 2009 
to May 2012, Lehecka, Wang and Garcia (2014) extend the analysis of announcement 
effects of major USDA reports and confirm that the WASDE reports contain considerable 
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information for market participants. The study reports that the strongest price reactions to 
the releases are found immediately after the market opens, and market reactions persist 
for approximately ten minutes. The fact that the WASDE reports are found to 
significantly affect market quality provides a unique opportunity to examine whether the 
provision of sufficient time for market participants to analyse and process scheduled price 
sensitive information helps reduce uncertainty immediately upon re-opening of the 
markets after trading breaks are implemented.   
2.2.3 Market Liquidity and Volatility around information releases  
The literature defines liquidity as the willingness of traders to transact with someone else 
at a low cost (Harris, 1990). As Lee et al. (1993) indicate, market liquidity can be 
explained under two dimensions: the price dimension which measures transaction costs 
and is represented by the bid-ask spread, and the quantity dimension which measures how 
much depth there is in the market. Most of the current literature in market microstructure 
focuses on liquidity based on the theory of information asymmetry which implies that one 
market participant might have more or better information when trading. In this context, 
informed traders tend to profit at the expense of uninformed traders, and therefore, less-
informed traders try to avoid transacting in a market with informed traders (Harris, 2003). 
One of the reasons that information asymmetry might have an impact on transaction costs 
and liquidity is that if specialists believe that the market contains informed traders, they 
will protect themselves by increasing the bid-ask spread or reducing market depth at the 
quoted prices (Lee et al., 1993; Benveniste et al., 1992). In terms of market depth, 
Kavajecz (1999) demonstrates that specialists manage quoted depth to reduce the risk 
associated with information events. The study explains that liquidity providers decrease 
market depth around earnings announcements to reduce adverse selection costs. The 
literature also presents research that focuses on liquidity in the presence of limit order 
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books. Using a theoretical model, Foucault et al. (2007) demonstrate that tight bid-ask 
spreads result from an increase in anonymous quotes. Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) 
investigate the impact of insider trading activity on the behaviour of market-makers in 
the anonymous NASDAQ and transparent NYSE, and show that the effective spread of 
stocks traded on NASDAQ are smaller than on the NYSE, and therefore, NASDAQ 
dealers do not adjust effective spreads when insider trading is present in the market. In a 
study of the Paris, Tokyo and Korea exchanges, Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) explain 
that the move to anonymous trading reduces quoted spreads in these markets. For U.S. 
securities, Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) examine market bid-ask spreads and 
depths over a sample from 1988 to 1998, and find that liquidity significantly decreases in 
a downside market. In addition, the study also finds strong day-of-the-week effects and 
an increase in depth before the release of macroeconomic information.  
Although different measures of market liquidity have been explored in the literature, Lee, 
Mucklow and Ready (1993) provide three of the most popular liquidity metrics: quoted 
spread, quoted depth and effective spread:   
!"#$%&	()*%+& = 	-./	0*12% − 	41&	0*12% (2.1) 
 
!"#$%&	5%)$ℎ = 	5%)$ℎ	+$	+./	)*12% − 	5%)$ℎ	+$	71&	)*12% (2.2) 
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where n is the number of trades, 0> is the price of the 1	$ℎ trade, !> is the total number of 
shares transacted in the 1	$ℎ trade, -(@> is the ask price of the quote when the 1	$ℎ trade 
was transacted, and 4B5> is the bid price of the quote when the 1	$ℎ trade was transacted.  
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The previous literature finds a relation between information releases and market liquidity. 
In the equity market, Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) demonstrate that bid-ask spreads 
widen, and depth falls prior to earnings announcements for a sample of NYSE firms. 
These results suggest that liquidity providers are concerned about changes in asymmetric 
information and manage their risk by updating bid-ask spreads and depths. Similarly, Kim 
and Verrecchia (1994) also study the impact of earnings announcements on market 
liquidity. The study suggests that earnings announcements create information asymmetry 
in the market as some traders are able to make judgments about a company’s performance 
from the information provided in a better way than other traders. As a result, the increase 
in information asymmetry implies larger spreads given that market liquidity deteriorates 
at the time the information is released. Welker (1995) examines the relationship between 
disclosure policy and liquidity in the equity market, and also finds that bid-ask spreads 
increase for firms with disclosure policy news. The study concludes that uninformed 
investors use liquidity to protect themselves against adverse selection costs. 
In the futures market, Frino and Hill (2000) examine intraday futures market behaviour 
around macroeconomic information announcements on the Sydney Futures Exchange. 
The study finds that volatility, volume and bid-ask spreads adjust to the new information 
in the first 240 seconds after the announcement. In addition, bid-ask spreads increase 20 
seconds prior the release of information and remain high for 30 seconds after the 
announcement. Their study concludes that the increase in quoted spreads around 
macroeconomic releases is due to adverse selection costs. Fleming and Remolona (1999) 
investigate the impact of public information releases on volumes and bid-ask spreads in 
the U.S. treasury market. The study finds that spreads widen at the time of the 
announcement, possibly caused by inventory control concerns. In the subsequent stage, 
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price volatility and spreads remain elevated as participants transact to reconcile 
differences in private information views.            
The literature describes volatility as a measure of risk, which refers to the amount of 
uncertainty related to the magnitude of alterations in a security’s value. Volatility is not 
stable, and it tends to change over time. Black (1976) and Christie (1982) suggest that 
financial leverage is one of the reasons to have movements in stock market volatility over 
time. Similarly, Officer (1973) and Lauterbach (1989) suggest that macroeconomic 
variables have an impact on the behaviour of volatility for different time periods. Schwert 
(1989) studies why stock return volatility tends to be higher in some periods than at 
others. The study finds that many financial asset returns are more volatile during 
recessions since the operating leverage of firms usually increases during these periods. 
Schwert (1989) also reports some relationships between stock volatility and trading 
activity. In recent years, there is a perception that increased speculative activity has 
increased market volatility and risk.16  
The previous literature also investigates the relationship that exists between market 
volatility and macroeconomic announcements. Fama (1971) explains that prices should 
react immediately to new information in an efficient market, and consistent with this, 
there is no doubt amongst academics that macroeconomic information releases have a 
significant impact on prices. Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009) 
demonstrate that macroeconomic announcements can impact volatility of U.S. stocks, 
treasuries and corporate bonds. The study implements a multivariate GARCH-DCC IMA 
model as in Engle (2002) for the returns on seven portfolios to find that volatility 
 
16 Speculation refers to changes in asset prices that are not related to changes in economic fundamentals 
but to speculative trading (Edwards, 1988). 
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significantly increases when information is released to the market for U.S. stocks. In the 
case of bonds, volatility increases prior to the announcement and declines afterwards. 
These results are affected by the type of information, as bad news tends to have a larger 
impact on volatility. Engle and Ng (1993) define the news impact curve which determines 
how information is incorporated into estimates of volatility. Using ARCH and 
nonparametric models on Japanese stock return data from 1980 to 1988, the study finds 
that the model presented by Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1989) provides the best 
parametric model for this purpose. Some studies disagree with the common view that 
macroeconomic announcements affect market volatility, for example Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1994) implement a regression analysis after controlling for day-of-the week on 
a Dow Jones dataset, and find that the relationship between information releases and 
volatility is not strong. The study suggests a weak link between volatility and information 
releases.        
In the futures market, Ederington and Lee (1993) examine the impact of macroeconomic 
announcements on foreign exchange and interest rate futures markets, and demonstrate 
that these announcements affect time-of-day and day-of-the-week volatility for these 
markets. The study shows that the major impact of the news releases occurs during the 
first minute and stays high for several hours. Similarly, Harvey and Huang (1991) show 
that foreign exchange and interest rate futures prices are more volatile in the 70 minutes 
of trading after a release on Thursdays and Fridays than on any other day of the week. 
The study claims that this is due to the release of macroeconomic announcements during 
the first 60 minutes after the market is open for trading on these days. Edwards (1988) 
investigates changes in volatility in the cash market after the introduction of financial 
futures trading by focusing on stock prices and debt instruments including the S&P 500 
Index, 90-day Eurodollars and 90-day T-Bills. The study finds that increased trading 
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volumes in futures markets does not destabilize cash markets, but it is more likely that 
the increase in volatility is due to the existence of a macroeconomic disequilibrium. 
Buckle, Gwilym and Thomas and Woodhams (1998) investigate the behaviour of intraday 
volatility and volume on the Short Sterling interest rate futures and FTSE100 stock index 
futures contract traded on the London International Financial Futures and Options Ex-
change (LIFFE). The study focuses on how macroeconomic announcements released in 
the U.K. and the U.S. change the intraday behaviour of these two futures contracts. Their 
results show a U-shape for intraday trading volume and volatility, and demonstrate that 
these two variables are higher at the open than at the close. In addition, the study finds 
that the release of U.K. macroeconomic information is found to positively affect volume 
and volatility for the two contracts. However, U.S. macroeconomic information increases 
volatility and decreases volume for both contracts.  Han, Kling and Sell (1999) disagree 
with the hypothesis that macroeconomic announcements have an impact on volatility in 
the futures market. The study investigates the impact of macroeconomic announcements 
on intraday volatility in the foreign exchange futures market by using standard deviations 
and number of price changes estimated from tick data. The study finds a strong day-of-
the-week effect for the Japanese yen and Deutsche mark, and no effect for the Canadian 
dollar after controlling for macroeconomic announcements. These results contradict other 
theories suggested by Ederington and Lee (1993) and Harvey and Huang (1991) as day-
of-week effects are not found to be driven by the release of macroeconomic information. 
In summary, although there are extensive studies on the impact of information on market 
liquidity and volatility for both equity and futures markets, there is limited research on 
how trading breaks can manage and reduce the information asymmetry created when 
reports are released, and therefore, improving volatility and liquidity in the market.     
2.2.4 Information Asymmetry around Announcements      
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The consensus in the literature is that the release of macroeconomic news creates 
information asymmetry in the market. Proponents of trading breaks claim that a halt in 
the market is more likely to be imposed when there is an increase in asymmetric 
information (Bhattacharya and Spiegel, 1993), and suggest that trading breaks provide 
time for market participants to process the information released, decreasing information 
asymmetry and improving market quality. The previous literature explains how the 
release of information increases asymmetry information in the market, affecting market 
quality and prices. Kim and Verrecchia (1991b) suggest that asymmetric information is 
higher after the release of earnings announcements given that the reports bring noise to 
the market since some traders can process the earnings information more efficiently than 
other market participants. In their model, the decrease in liquidity in the period after the 
release of information is insignificant after controlling for the increase in volume, which 
suggest that the information advantage that some traders have from a superior ability to 
process announcements is a short-lived phenomenon. In terms of the type of 
announcement, Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) suggest that earnings announcements 
provide a good opportunity for investigating the impact of information asymmetry on the 
market, as the timing of earnings releases are largely predictable and announcements 
include price relevant information. In this context, if liquidity providers can anticipate the 
probability of informed trading before earnings releases, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
predict an increase in bid-ask spreads prior to announcements. Information asymmetry 
can also increase before news releases if information leakage is present in the market. 
Seppi (1992) and Seyhun (1992) provide evidence that the buy-sell direction of block 
trades and trades placed by insiders, anticipate the information contained in the 
announcements. Nevertheless, in the absence of any information leakage, there might be 
an increase in information asymmetry before earnings releases as specialists are 
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concerned that other traders may trade on private information before they can update their 
quotes, which leaves them exposed to potential losses. To avoid this situation, Lee, 
Mucklow and Ready (1993) hypothesize that specialists anticipate upcoming information 
releases by increasing the spread and lowering market depth. Using a theoretical model, 
Kim and Verrecchia (1991a) demonstrate that information asymmetry increases as the 
precision of the public information announcement increases up to a point and decreases 
afterwards, which explains that its behaviour is unimodal.  
In terms of government bonds, Green (2004) finds an increase in the informational role 
of trading after announcements, which suggests that the release of information increases 
asymmetric information in the government bond market. In addition, Green (2004) does 
not find any leakage of information prior to economic announcements as the sensitivity 
of prices to order flow is lower than usual before the release of information. Although 
Fleming and Remolona (1999) find that volume is elevated many hours after the 
announcements, Green (2004) disagree with this finding and documents that volumes 
return to normal levels within 15 minutes. In the currency market, Cao, Evans, and Lyons 
(2006) suggest that asymmetric information in the forex market is due to dealers’ private 
access to order flow from customers, which might help predict movements in the short-
term rate. Peiers (1997) implements a price leadership model based on Error Correction 
Models (ECMs) to demonstrate that Deutsche Bank is a price leader prior to the release 
of Central Bank interventions. Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) study joint announcements 
(a type of announcement that includes earnings and dividend announcements released on 
the same day), initial announcements, and following announcements, and find a strong 
increase in asymmetric information only before the “following announcement” and no 
effect on the other two kinds of announcement. Their results suggest that there is normal 
asymmetric information before dividend and earnings announcements. Nevertheless, the 
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dealer suspects a non-scheduled announcement when the “following announcement” is 
apart from the “initial announcement” by more than ten days.  
In the equity market, it is known that analyst research increases the amount of information 
available to market participants (Asquith, Mikhail and Au, 2005; Lepone, Leung and Li, 
2012). Analyst research is defined as a combination of earnings announcements and 
analyst conference calls, and is derived from the analysis of public information that 
cannot be easily interpreted by the public. The previous literature focuses on how analyst 
research is disseminated from the sell-side institutions (brokerage houses) to the buy-side 
institutions (mutual funds, insurance firms and pension funds), and concludes that the 
sell-side usually reduces information asymmetry in the market since it distributes 
information to less-sophisticated market participants (Ming, 2016).                  
2.3 Price Discovery in the Interest Rate Market 
As a consequence of the dramatic increase in swap volumes relative to volumes in short-
term interest rate futures, Poskitt (2007) sets out to examine the possibility that 
benchmark tipping and price discovery have occurred away from interest rate futures 
markets towards swap markets at the short end of the yield curve. If this is the case, the 
futures market has lost its importance as an important source of price discovery in 
derivatives markets which can have important implications for market participants. Using 
U.K. data on sterling futures and swap contracts, Poskitt (2007) documents a largely 
contemporaneous relationship in price movements, and concludes that information flows 
between futures and swaps, and vice-versa, for up to 20 minutes. In addition, the study 
finds that over the very short term (one minute), information flows from futures contracts 
to swap contracts are still dominant. In order to understand how information is 
incorporated into prices, and the impact of information asymmetry on price discovery, 
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Chapter 4 examines price discovery on days of macroeconomic information 
announcements and in overnight markets – when private information, informed trading, 
and information asymmetries are likely to be high.     
2.3.1 Price Discovery  
Price discovery is defined as the transmission of information into security prices 
(Hasbrouck, 1995), as well as, the process implemented by financial markets to find 
equilibrium in prices from new information (Schreiber and Schwartz, 1986). Similar to 
liquidity, price discovery provides another important function of financial markets 
(O’Hara, 2003). While liquidity refers to the capability of a security to be sold at a low 
cost, price discovery refers to the ability of financial markets to provide efficient prices 
(O’Hara, 2003). In the case of a security traded in different markets, previous literature 
agrees that prices for the same security should converge in the long-term, even though 
prices might deviate from one another in the short-term. These deviations across markets 
occur because prices can be seen as an information-based common price shared by these 
markets, and as a transitory noise or liquidity trading shock such as order imbalances or 
bid-ask bounce (Gonzalo and Granger, 1995). This idea can also be expressed using a 
random walk model as in Hasbrouck (1995 and 1996):        
HI = 	HIJG +	KI (2.4) 
 
0I = 	HI +	(I, 0I = 	 M
0G,I
0N,I





where 0G,I  and 0N,I  are two securities traded at two different markets at potentially 
different prices, and HI  is the implicit common efficient price at which the security 
should transact in the two markets. This efficient price (HI) follows a random walk. KI 
represents the new information, while (I	reflects the non-informational features.        
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Different models are used to study price discovery between two financial markets. The 
Sims (1972) lead/lag model is based on a methodology that implements a direct test for 
the existence of unidirectional causality and provides an opportunity to measure the 
contemporaneous relationship across two markets. In a recent study, Poskitt (2007) 
implements the Sims (1972) model to show that the flow of information between the 
interest rate sterling swap and futures markets is bidirectional on normal trading days, 
however, in the very short term the futures market remains the primary source of price 
discovery in the U.K. interest rate market. Other models of price discovery include the 
Information Share model (Hasbrouck, 1995) based on an implicit unobservable efficient 
price that is common to all markets, in which the information share component is defined 
as the proportional contribution of a market’ innovations to the innovation in the common 
efficient price. Hasbrouck (1995) applies this methodology to a sample of equities traded 
on the NYSE and some other regional exchanges. Using bids and offers at one-second 
time intervals, the study finds that price discovery concentrates at the NYSE with a 
median information share measure of 92.7 percent. Based on a cointegration technique as 
discussed in Granger (1986), Gonzalo and Granger (1995) propose the Component Share 
model which provides a new method for estimating the permanent component of a time 
series by implementing multivariate information. This new method is then use to study 
cointegration in large systems by covering the common long-memory factors of each 
subsystem. Yan and Zivot (2010) and Putnins (2013) develop the Information Leadership 
Share model which is derived from a combination of the Information Share and 
Component Share models. The Information Leadership model identifies the time series 
that first incorporates information into prices by controlling for the difference in noise 
levels across markets. Putnins (2013) demonstrates that noise can have a profound impact 
on the results of previous price discovery studies.                   
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Previous research presents several empirical price discovery studies implemented on 
different markets and securities. The majority of this research does not measure the 
impact of information announcements on price discovery across markets. Lucey, Larkin 
and Connor (2013) implement the Hasbrouck (1995) Information Share (IS) and Gonzalo 
and Granger (1995) Component Share (CS) to measure the speed at which information is 
incorporated into gold prices at the New York Mercantile Exchange Futures Market 
(NYMEX which is one of the markets operated by the CME Group) and the London over-
the-counter spot market (LOTC). The study finds that neither London nor New York is 
dominant in terms of price discovery. However, in a later study implemented by using 
intraday observations, Hauptfleisch, Putnins and Lucey (2016) perform a similar analysis 
on price discovery between the spot and futures gold markets. In addition to IS and CS, 
this analysis also includes the Information Leadership Share (ILS) model to control for 
different level of noise across the two gold markets. The study finds that although both 
markets contribute to price discovery, the New York futures market plays a larger role. 
Other models of price discovery are based on ECMs. Poskitt (1999) implements the 
Garbade-Silber model (GS) and ECM Granger Causality model to a sample from the New 
Zealand interest rate market to study information flows between the futures and the spot 
market. The study finds that the bill futures is the source of price discovery and 
demonstrates that the two markets present relatively slow convergence to equilibrium. 
Frino et al. (2012) also implement a Granger causality test to investigate whether order 
flows coming from overseas influence price discovery in the Australian futures market. 
Their results confirm that transactions that originate in Sydney and Chicago contribute 
the most to price discovery of the SPI futures contracts.   
A significant part of the price discovery literature focuses on the relationship between a 
stock index and stock index futures contract. The majority of this research shows that 
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price discovery in the equity market is dominated by the index futures trading. Hasbrouck 
(2003) implements the Information Share approach to investigate price discovery for the 
U.S. equity index market, which is comprised of index futures contracts, ETFs, E-minis 
futures contracts and sector ETFs. The study empirically demonstrates that price 
discovery occurs in the E-mini market for the S&P 500 and NASDAQ-100 indexes, 
however, price discovery is shared between futures contacts and the ETF for the S&P 400 
MidCap index. Chu, Gideon and Tse (1999) examine the price discovery relationship in 
three S&P 500 index markets (spot index, index futures and S&P Depositary Receipts). 
Using intraday trading data, the study implements a Johansen’s maximum likelihood 
estimator to analyse the cointegration relationship amongst the three markets. Given that 
the three times series are cointegrated, a Vector Error Correction model that discomposes 
the common stochastic trend is implemented. The study demonstrates that the futures 
market is the source of price discovery in this market. Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley 
(1996) provides an explanation for the price discovery relationship in the stock, futures 
and options markets based on transaction costs. In terms of the option market, the study 
finds that stock prices lead stock option prices. This is consistent with the cost of trading 
theory as a synthetic stock position in the stock option costs twice as much as the position 
in a single stock. For index securities, the study finds that index futures contracts lead the 
stock index, which is consistent with the liquidity theory as the derivatives market is more 
liquid and less expensive to trade than the stock index market. Using minute-by-minute 
data, Tse (1999) investigates information flows between the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (DJIA) index and the index futures. The study implements the IS model as in 
Hasbrouck (1995) and the VECM to provide evidence that the DJIA futures leads price 
discovery in this market. The study concludes that the futures contract is more 
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informationally efficient than the equity market. These results are consistent with the 
transaction costs theory as the futures market provides a low-cost trading platform.     
The literature also provides price discovery research examining other global markets. 
Karabiyik, Narayan and Phan (2017) examine the source of price discovery for different 
numbers of Islamic stocks and stock index futures, and conclude that price discovery for 
Islamic stocks is dominated by the spot market. Miao, Ramchander, Wang, and Yang 
(2017) study intraday price discovery between the CSI 300 equity index and index futures 
in China, and demonstrate that the index futures is the main source of price discovery for 
the Chinese equity market. Booth, So and Tse (1999) examine intraday price discovery 
in Germany using the DAX security index and index futures, and similar to other studies, 
the futures market is found to be the main source of price discovery. Zhong, Darrat and 
Otero (2004) study price discovery between the recently established Mexican stock index 
future and spot market. The study shows that the futures market is the main source of 
price discovery in Mexico. Finally, Jong and Donders (1998) estimate that the lead-lag 
relationship between the Amsterdam Exchange (AEX) index and index futures is 
dominated by the futures market. 
The lead-lag model is a popular method for studying price discovery across markets, thus, 
a number of previous studies implement the lead-lag model as the main methodology of 
price discovery. Grunbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz (1994) use a lead-lag model to 
examine the relationship between spot and futures prices on an intraday basis. The study 
finds that the futures market leads the spot market by 20 minutes, which is longer than in 
other markets where both securities are floor-traded. Their results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that screen trading increases the speed at which information is incorporated 
into prices. Min and Najand (1999) use a lead-lag model to investigate the relationship 
between the cash and futures in the Korean market. Using intraday data, the study finds 
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that the futures market leads the spot market by 30 minutes. In terms of volatility, the 
study finds a contemporaneous relationship between the two markets. Shyy, 
Vijayraghavan and Scott-Quinn (1996) investigate the lead-lag relationship across 
different stock index futures traded on the Marché à Terme International de France 
(MATIF) and the cash index traded in Paris. Using an Error Correction Model on minute-
by-minute price data, the study finds that CAC futures contracts lead the CAC cash index. 
O’Connor (1999) implements a lead-lag model between the stock and option markets 
using an intraday sample of 19 firms over a two months period. The study finds that the 
stock market is the source of price discovery, which is due to high trading costs in the 
option market. Stephan and Whaley (1990) investigate the intraday relationship between 
options and stocks for a sample of firms traded on the CMOE in 1986. Using a lead-lag 
model, the results show that the stock market leads the option market by 15 minutes. Chan, 
Chung and Johnson (1993) explain that the lead in price discovery of the stock market 
over the stock market is due to the infrequent trading of options. In addition, the study 
shows that the lead of the stock market disappears after the midpoint of the bid-ask spread 
is used instead of prices. In summary, although the previous literature concentrates on the 
price discovery relationship between two markets, the literature fails to explain how the 
release of substantial information might affect this price discovery relationship, especially, 
in derivatives markets. 
2.3.2 Liquidity, Transaction Costs and Price Discovery 
The previous literature recognizes the importance of transaction costs on information 
flows across markets. In the absence of transaction costs and market frictions, no-
arbitrage theory between the spot and futures markets requires prices in both markets to 
move simultaneously (Grunbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz, 1993). If there is friction in 
the market, Stoll and Whaley (1990a) suggest that there might be a lead-lag relationship 
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between the spot and futures as infrequent trading in some of the index members might 
create a spurious price discovery relation in the data. In addition, bid-ask spreads might 
induce negative serial correlation into the spot price, which might also create a spurious 
lead-lag relationship. In order to solve these two problems, an ARMA model can be used 
to reduce the effects of infrequent trading and bid-ask spreads on the index returns. In 
terms of transaction costs, price discovery usually occurs in the market with lower 
transaction costs as informed traders prefer to select a market that produces the highest 
profit (Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley, 1996). Transaction costs have three main 
components for derivatives markets where the largest component is the bid-ask spread 
used as a compensation for traders who provide liquidity to the market by standing ready 
to transact with other market participants. The second component of transaction costs is 
the commission paid to brokers as a compensation for executing trades on behalf of their 
customers. Finally, the third component is the price impact cost that usually applies to 
large trades as this type of order tends to move the bid (ask) quote downward (upward). 
The market impact costs reflect not only the liquidity, but also the depth of the market. 
When information is considered, the trading cost hypothesis demonstrates that the market 
with the lowest trading costs incorporates information much faster than the other market. 
Another reason why there might be a lead-lag relationship between the futures and spot 
markets is the difference in liquidity between the two markets. Grunbichler, Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1993) explain that if the average time between trades in the futures market 
is shorter than in the spot market, then information will be incorporated first into prices 
in the futures market. This result is explained since the price discovery relationship across 
markets is a function of the relative liquidity of the markets. Other market frictions such 
as short-selling restrictions could also incentivize traders to transact in the derivatives 
market instead of the spot market (Black, 1976). Short-selling restrictions in the spot 
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market prevent traders from selling the security, and thus limit their capacity to profit on 
a downward market. Given that futures markets do not have this restriction, the derivative 
market becomes more attractive to informed traders and this enhances the lead role of this 
market in terms of price discovery.      
Apart from transaction costs, liquidity and market frictions, other factors can also 
influence the price discovery relationship across the spot and derivatives markets. In 
terms of speed and availability, the futures market provides more immediacy to 
participants than does the spot market. This immediacy gives informed traders an 
opportunity to quickly act on their private information at a low cost, and therefore, 
increases the lead effect of the futures market over the spot market as information would 
be first reflected in futures prices, and then transmitted to the spot market. Adverse 
selection costs can also affect price discovery across markets. Subrahmanyam (1991) 
demonstrates that adverse selection costs encountered by liquidity traders might be 
reduced by transacting in the futures market instead of the spot market, implying that 
information might flow from the futures to the spot market. In some situations, it is 
possible for market participants to prefer trading in the spot market rather than futures 
market. Chan (1992) shows that there are situations in which a trader who has particular 
information about a firm, might find it optimal to trade the actual stock of the company 
rather than trading the index futures. In these occasions, the type of information can 
influence the price discovery relation between the spot and futures markets as the spot 
market can become an important source of information, and thus, the flow of information 
between the two markets can be bi-directional (Chan et al., 1991).  
In summary, previous literature demonstrates that transaction costs, liquidity and market 
frictions across the spot and derivatives markets have an influence on how information 
flows between these two markets. Previous research shows that informed traders prefer 
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low-cost and highly liquid markets with few trading restrictions as the main market to 
exploit their private information. This has a direct impact on price discovery as 
information might be incorporated first in markets that have these characteristics. In the 
case of the spot and futures markets, previous research suggests that the futures market is 
cheaper and more liquid than the spot market, and therefore, information usually flows 
from the futures to the spot market. However, the previous literature fails to investigate 
and compare transaction costs and liquidity across two derivatives contracts (swaps and 
futures) during day and night sessions, as well as, its implications on price discovery in 
derivatives markets.   
2.3.3 Price Discovery and Information Asymmetry 
The release of macroeconomic information usually increases asymmetric information in 
the market and affects how information is incorporated into prices. Gau and Wu (2017) 
explain that the price discovery function of a market displays how efficient markets are 
at reacting to the arrival of new information. A good example of how information is 
incorporated across markets occurs in the foreign exchange (forex) market, which is the 
largest financial market in the world and trades continuously in multiples markets in 
Europe, Asia and United States. These markets contribute differently to price discovery 
depending on trader composition and market mechanisms. The release of macroeconomic 
information can affect currency prices and the price discovery process in the forex market. 
Using a sample of the most liquid currency-pairs EUR/USD and USD/JPY spanning from 
2008 until 2012, and the Information Share model of Hasbrouck (1995), Gau and Wu 
(2017) demonstrate that the London and New York trading hours dominate price 
discovery in the foreign exchange market only on days with U.S. macroeconomic 
announcements, whereas, the European trading period contributes the most to price 
discovery on days without any U.S. macroeconomic releases. The study agrees with the 
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local information hypothesis in which information might be asymmetrically distributed 
across different regions and suggests that local traders possess better information at the 
release of local macroeconomic announcements. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega 
(2003) also provide an empirical study on price discovery in the foreign exchange market 
around macroeconomic information releases. Using a data set of U.S. dollar spot 
exchange rates for British Pound, Japanese Yen, German Mark, Swiss Franc, and the Euro, 
the study shows that announcement surprises, which is the difference between the 
expected and actual news, create conditional mean jumps in the market. Price discovery 
in the foreign exchange spot and futures markets is also studied by Chen and Gau (2010). 
The study measures competition in price discovery around macroeconomic information 
announcements for the EUR-USD and JPY-USD spot and futures rates. The study 
implements the Information Share and the common factor component weight models on 
a sample from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and finds that overall spot rates 
lead futures rates in terms of price discovery. However, the flow of information from the 
futures market to the spot market increases around the release of macroeconomic 
information.  
The release of macroeconomic information can also affect price discovery in the equity 
market. In a study implemented using Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX) and the NYSE for a sample period from 2004 to 2011, Frijns, Indriawan 
and Tourani-Rad (2015) find that price discovery significantly changes during days with 
macroeconomic announcements, as the NYSE becomes the source of price discovery 
regardless of the origin of the information. Previous literature demonstrates that not only 
that macroeconomic announcements can have an effect on information asymmetry and 
price discovery, but also that analyst reports can impact the price discovery process. 
Gleason and Lee (2003) examine information content and price discovery around the 
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release of analysts’ earnings forecast revisions. These announcements are a key source of 
information related to corporate earnings, and unlike earnings announcements, forecast 
revisions can take place at any time during the quarter. The study suggests that the price 
adjustment process depends on the reputation of the analysts, and therefore, it is important 
to control for this factor. The main result of the study shows that the price adjustment 
process is faster for firms covered by a greater number of analysts. Although a small 
section of the previous research investigates price discovery around the release of 
information, the previous literature does not examine how information flows across two 
derivatives contracts, and it becomes especially important to investigate whether trading 
in an OTC environment can influence the price discovery process since swaps are not 
exchange traded instruments whereas futures contracts trade on recognized exchanges.                                
2.3.4 Day and Night Trading: Liquidity and Price Discovery       
Liquidity and price discovery can vary depending on trading sessions and the time when 
information is released. Previous research investigates how daytime and overnight trading 
activity affects intraday liquidity and information flows for different markets. Aitken, 
Frino, Hill and Jarnecic (2004) investigate how the introduction of electronic trading on 
the London International Financial Futures and Option Exchange, the Sydney Futures 
Exchange and the Hong Kong Futures Exchange during 1999 and 2000, affects liquidity 
and bid-ask spreads in these markets. Before the introduction of electronic trading, these 
markets transacted only during daytime trading hours. The study demonstrates that there 
is a reduction in bid-ask spreads after the introduction of electronic trading which allow 
traders to transact overnight. Their result is explained given that electronic and overnight 
trading increase liquidity levels and reduce transaction costs when compared to markets 
with only daytime floor trading. Lockwood and Linn (1990) examine the volatility of the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) from 1964 to 1989 during daytime and overnight 
 
 63 
trading hours. Their results show that volatility is much greater during daytime session 
relative to the overnight session. In addition, the study explains that volatility is not stable 
over time, but it changes according to different market conditions such as the elimination 
of fixed commissions fees and the introduction of stock options.  
One of the reasons why liquidity is different during overnight markets is the fact that 
liquidity providers might be different during these markets. Bjonnes, Rime and Solheim 
(2005) explain liquidity provision during the overnight foreign exchange market. Using 
a data sample for the SEK/EUR market from 1993 to 2002, the study presents evidence 
that non-financial customers are the most important liquidity providers during the 
overnight foreign exchange market. The cost of liquidity is also affected by overnight 
trading. Bhattacharya, Haslag and Martin (2009) argue that the difference in liquidity 
costs across the daytime and overnight trading sessions, in which intraday trading costs 
are near zero while the cost of overnight trading is in the 1-6% range, is due to the design 
of an optimal payments system. The study argues that the cost of daytime trading liquidity 
is near zero since it provides low social opportunity cost, whereas, overnight liquidity is 
expensive as its overuse reduces output considerably.  
The release of information can also affect liquidity for intraday and overnight markets. 
Pronk (2006) investigates the impact of earnings announcements on the bid-ask spread 
and depth for the NYSE and AMEX exchanges. The results show that the percentage 
deviation in quoted spread is higher for daytime announcements compared to overnight 
announcements. Similarly, the deterioration of the percentage deviation in market depth 
is greater for daytime announcement relative to overnight announcements. The results are 
robust to firm-specific factors, cross-listing, the size of the information content of the 
announcement, and intraday timing consistency. Abad, Sanabria and Yague (2009) 
examine the intraday response to earnings announcements during daytime and overnight 
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trading hours for the Spanish market. The study finds that the speed of reaction and the 
improvement in liquidity is immediate for overnight announcements, but it takes longer 
for daytime releases. Their results explain why Spanish companies usually release bad 
earnings announcements during daytime trading hours. These findings are different from 
previous studies in American markets, suggesting that the microstructure of the market 
has an impact on how information is incorporated into prices.                             
Price discovery can also be affected during daytime and overnight trading sessions. 
Trading after hours is different from normal day sessions as overnight trading is usually 
dominated by professional traders and trading volumes tend to be low during these 
markets. These issues might have an impact on the efficiency of price discovery during 
the after-hours market. He, Lin, Wang and Wu (2009) evaluate the flow of information 
in the U.S. treasury market during daytime and overnight trading. Using an intraday data 
set and a model of price discovery developed by Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans 
(1997), the study finds that asymmetric information is usually high in the pre-open period 
and low in the post-close period. In terms of price discovery, the study suggests that 
overnight trading markets are an important source of price discovery in the treasury 
market. Barclay and Hendershott (2003) examine the effects of trading hours on price 
discovery for NASDAQ listed stocks from March to December 2000. The study finds that 
there is a greater amount of informed trading activity and private information revelation 
during the pre-open session. In addition, the study demonstrates that information 
asymmetry is reduced over the trading day, and that, despite a high volume of trading 
activity during the post-close period, the total information revealed in this period is low.  
The release of information can also affect the price discovery relationship across markets. 
Greene and Watts (1996) examine the market response to earnings announcements during 
daytime and overnight sessions on the NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges. The study 
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explains the different reasons for information to be incorporated differently during normal 
and overnight periods. Firstly, news released during overnight markets when there is little 
trading activity, provides more time for information to be disseminated to investors, as 
well as, more time for investors to submit new orders to the market. Thus, the first post-
announcement prices might bring more information than non-trading hours 
announcements. Secondly, if the market opening mechanisms used at the NSYE and 
NASDAQ differ in their ability to incorporate information into prices, then there are 
different price adjustments after information is released during non-trading and trading 
hours. Greene and Watts (1996) find that the opening trade on the NYSE incorporates the 
great majority of the price response during non-trading hours, whereas the response is 
equally spread over numerous post-announcement trades for trading-hour announcements. 
For NASDAQ, the first post-announcement trade incorporates the majority of the price 
response without accounting for announcement time. These results suggest that trading 
environments have an impact on the ability of the market to incorporate information. 
Moshirian, Nguyen and Pham (2012) examine how the release of corporate information 
during overnight markets affects price discovery on the Australian Securities Exchange. 
Their results suggest that the release of these announcements increases the efficiency of 
opening prices. In addition, the amount of information in the announcement significantly 
influences the aggressiveness of pre-opening orders. The study also finds that prices react 
immediately to overnight announcements once the market is open for trading, whereas 
adjustments based on the information released during trading hours are not instantaneous.  
2.3.5 Trading Costs in Opaque Markets        
Opaque markets, also called over-the-counter (OTC) markets, provide a platform to 
transact on different securities such as government bonds, swaps and other OTC 
derivatives. The previous literature suggests that there are three main determinants of 
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execution costs in opaque markets. First, market microstructure determinants which refer 
to the availability of price information before and after a trade. Second, security-specific 
determinants which reflect different characteristics of the security such as the time to 
maturity and credit risk. Third, trade specific determinants which incorporate 
characteristics for each particular trade such as the size of the trade and the institutions 
executing the trade.  
In terms of the microstructure determinants, previous research investigates the impact of 
post-trade transparency on execution costs in the opaque market. Post-trade transparency 
in the OTC market is common these days as different governments introduce new policies 
to prevent market manipulation and improve liquidity in these markets. Bessembinder et 
al. (2006) investigate the impact of post-trade transparency on transaction costs in the U.S. 
corporate bond market after the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) asked 
market participants to report all transactions for several corporate bond issues. 
Bessembinder et al. (2006) demonstrate that post-trade transparency reduces execution 
costs in the OTC market. This reduction is even more significant for bonds that were not 
required to be reported to NASD.  In terms of the security characteristics as a determinant 
of execution costs, Hong and Warga (2000), Chakravarty and Sarkar (2003) and Edwards 
et al. (2007) explain that bonds with longer maturity and high credit risk display higher 
execution costs. Similarly, complex bonds and bonds that have been issued for a longer 
period also present higher trading costs (Harris and Piwowar, 2006). In terms of trade-
specific determinants of trading costs, previous research in the opaque market shows a 
negative relation between trade size and trading costs, implying that larger orders are 
transacted at a lower price (Schultz, 2001; Edwards et al., 2007).17  
 
17 In the lit market, previous research finds that larger orders have greater price impact and higher execution 
costs (Chan and Lakonishok, 1995; Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, 1990). 
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The difference in trading costs between the equity and opaque markets is due to the fact 
that institutions actively trading in opaque markets have good information about market 
prices. This superior information is obtained by trading frequently with market dealers, 
which allows institutions to minimize their trading costs (Harris and Piwowar, 2006; 
Schultz, 2001). In addition, the difference in trading costs across the lit and opaque 
markets can also be explained by the strong broker-dealer relationship that exist in opaque 
markets. Bernhardt et al. (2005) measures the strength of this relationship by estimating 
the volume transacted between dealers and brokers over a 20-day window. The study 
finds that the stronger the broker-dealer relationship, the greater the price improvement 
received by brokers.  
2.4 The Impact of HFT on Market Quality and Price Discovery  
In recent years, there is a growing interest in the literature to investigate the impact of 
algorithmic and high frequency trading on financial markets in terms of market quality 
and price discovery. Algorithmic trading (AT) is the use of computer-based algorithms to 
help make decisions, as well as, submit and manage orders automatically (Hendershott, 
Jones and Menkveld, 2011). HFT is a subclass of algorithmic trading, however, not all 
AT can be considered HFT. HFT is defined by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) as a group of professional traders that implement different strategies 
and generate a great number of trades each day. HFT usually involves transacting within 
a very short investment horizon, implementing a great number of orders submissions and 
cancellations, and reducing to a minimum the inventory position at the end of the trading 
session. In addition, HFT involves the use of co-location facilities and personalized data 
feeds to increase the speed of transaction and reduce latency.  Some of the trading 
strategies implemented by HFTs include pseudo market marking and statistical arbitrage 
which can be done by computers and does not require human intervention. Apart from 
 
 68 
high frequency trading, other forms of algorithmic trading involve the minimization of 
implementation shortfall costs and information leakage for large trade orders. 
Nevertheless, this type of algorithmic trading is usually performed by agency traders 
rather than HFTs.  
There have been considerably increased HFT activity in recent years. In the U.S. equity 
market, HFT represented less than 10% of the total transacted volume at the beginning of 
the 2000s. However, HFT activity increased to approximately 50% of the total trading 
volume by the end of 2012. This increase is not particular to the U.S. market, HFT also 
increased in other markets such as Asia and Europe where it represented around 40% of 
the trading volume by the end of 2012. The increase in AT and HFT activity can be 
attributed to the introduction of new technologies which increases the speed at which 
market participants can place orders with exchanges. Goldstein, Kumar and Graves (2014) 
demonstrate that the average latency has been reduced from several seconds to 
milliseconds, and in some cases, microseconds. Although part of the literature agrees on 
the benefits of HFT in the market, there is a general concern about algorithmic trading 
after the flash crash of May 2010. Easley, Lopez del Prado and O’Hara (2011) investigate 
this event and suggest that high frequency traders who withdraw from the market during 
the 2010 crash were responsible for the increase in volatility during the event.              
2.4.1 High Frequency Trading: Theoretical and Empirical Literature  
The popularity of AT and HFT in recent years has increased the number of studies 
examining the impact of this technology on trading speed and market liquidity. The 
previous literature shows that trading speed can affect liquidity through inventory 
management and adverse selection. This section presents the results of the previous 
literature examining how an improvement in trading speed can affect financial markets.   
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The previous literature on high frequency trading can be divided in theoretical and 
empirical research. One of the earliest theoretical studies on algorithmic and high 
frequency trading is conducted by Cvitanic and Kirilenko (2010). In their study, an 
electronic limit order book which includes trades placed by different market participants 
such as high and low frequency traders is used to investigate the impact of HFT on market 
volatility. The study finds that the introduction of HFT decreases the average trade value 
and volatility in the market. Their result is driven by market-making algorithms which 
are able to update their information and trading strategy in response to information 
announcements. Jovanovic and Menkveld (2016) develop a theoretical model that 
incorporates computerized traders as informed market makers in a limit order market to 
examine the effects of this technology on investor welfare. The study explains that the 
main role of these market makers is to facilitate transactions and reduce information 
friction between fast and slow market order traders. In their results, the participation of 
these market makers reduces the effective bid-ask spread, thus improving liquidity in the 
market. The reduction in the spread is due to the low risk faced by high frequency traders 
as they can update their information and quotes faster than normal market makers, thus, 
reducing their exposure to adverse selection costs. In the case that markets are free of 
adverse selection issues, Javanovic and Menkveld (2016) suggest that high frequency 
traders might increase adverse selection problems in the market as their advantage in 
speed reduces the willingness of slow traders to transact with better informed traders. 
This causes an increase in the bid-ask spread and a reduction in market efficiency. In a 
study that contradicts Javanovic and Menkveld (2016), Rosu (2018) assumes that HFTs 
are uninformed market makers. The study implements multiple forms of informed traders 
and changes the fundamental price of a security. Rosu (2018) finds that information 
depreciates quickly, and this decay increases with greater competition amongst informed 
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traders. These high rates of decay imply that prices can reveal information quickly which 
increases efficiency and liquidity in the market.  
A number of studies also investigate the impact of HFT on welfare, where the majority 
of theoretical studies find negative consequences for other market participants. Biais, 
Foucault and Moinas (2015) show that it is convenient for institutions to invest in fast 
technologies to manage market fragmentation. This advanced technology can provide 
faster access to important information which improves social welfare. Using a framework 
as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), the study finds that HFTs excessively invest in 
technology which increases negative externalities on other traders. Hoffman (2014) 
determines that high frequency traders avoid adverse selection as their high speed allows 
them to be the first in the market who react to new information. This reduces the risk that 
their limit orders can be picked off following adverse price movements. Similar results 
are explained by Javanovic and Menkveld (2016) who suggest that fast traders have the 
ability to avoid adverse selection costs and pass this cost to other market participants.  
Foucault, Kozhan and Tham (2016) explain that adverse selection costs are higher as 
news-traders and arbitrageurs become faster, and thus, market makers are required to 
decrease their liquidity provision. The study also claims that a crowding effect, which is 
generated by HFTs competing against each other to exploit an arbitrage opportunity, 
might move prices away from fundamental values. In addition, Foucault, Kozhan and 
Tham (2016) investigate high frequency triangular arbitrage opportunities using data 
from the forex market, and suggest that a 1% increase in the likelihood that an arbitrage 
situation terminates with an arbitrageur’ trade, increases bid-ask spreads by 
approximately 4%. Budish, Cramton and Shim (2015) implement a study using 
millisecond-level data from exchanges to report that there are mechanical arbitrage 
opportunities at high frequency time horizons that are caused by having a continuous limit 
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order book market design. In addition, the study develops a theoretical model to 
demonstrate that the arbitrage opportunities dampen liquidity supply and produce a 
continuous speed competition amongst high frequency traders. The same study shows 
that having a market with frequent batch auctions throughout the day corrects the 
weakness of the continuous limit order book as it eliminates arbitrage opportunities, 
improves liquidity and prevents an HFT “arms race”.  
Cartea and Penalva (2012) implement a theoretical model with market makers, HFTs and 
liquidity traders. The study finds that liquidity traders have a large price impact when 
high frequency traders are present in the market. Market makers also lose income to HFTs, 
but they are compensated by a higher liquidity discount. In addition, the study finds that 
although HFTs increase price volatility, high frequency traders also improve trading 
volumes in the market. Foucault, Hombert and Rosu (2016) provide a theoretical model 
that includes both private information and news. Their results show that the speed 
advantage of HFTs significantly increases adverse selections costs without affecting price 
informativeness. Another research focusing on HFT and adverse selection costs is that of 
Biais, Foucault and Moinas (2015) who show that fast trading technology provides 
superior access to information which creates adverse selection. However, the technology 
improves financial institutions’ ability to receive mutual profits from trades. In an 
expanded model based on Kyle (1985), Rosu (2016) develops a theoretical model that 
considers fast and slow traders defined by the speed at which they can process information. 
The study shows that, after trading on information, fast traders can transfer part of their 
inventory to slower traders in order to realize their profits. In summary, the current 
theoretical literature shows that HFT affects market liquidity through inventory costs and 
adverse selection costs. In general, most theoretical models find that HFT have negative 
consequences on other market participants and increase market volatility. In terms of 
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market liquidity, most theoretical literature finds that fast market makers improve 
liquidity in the market. 
The popularity of algorithmic and high frequency trading has also increased the number 
of empirical studies examining the impact of HFT on the market. Overall, the previous 
research agrees on the positive impact that HFT has on financial markets. Some of the 
benefits from HFT include faster price discovery, improvement in liquidity and a 
reduction in volatility. Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011) demonstrate that 
computerized trading improves liquidity and price discovery in the market. The study 
calculates the volume of message traffic as a measure of algorithmic trading, using the 
introduction of autoquote on the NYSE in 2003 as an exogenous event to measure 
causality from algorithmic trading to variations in market quality. In their results, 
algorithmic trading significantly reduces both quoted and effective spreads. In addition, 
the study also presents improvements in the permanent price discovery as information is 
more efficiently disseminated in the quotes rather than in the trades. Hasbrouck and Saar 
(2013) introduce a new proxy for HFT where trade and quote data are used to identify the 
strategic run of trades. The study shows that traders interact at a latency as low as three 
milliseconds. Using a data set from NASDAQ for one month in 2007 and 2008, 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) divide each trading day into 10-minute intervals to examine 
the impact of HFT on volatility, depth and spreads. After controlling for potential 
endogeneity between HFT and market quality metrics, the study implements a two-stage 
simultaneous equation and finds improvements in depth, spreads and volatility during 
periods of high market stress.  
Brogaard (2010) examines HFT trading patterns during a time of increased volatility on 
the NASDAQ exchange. The study uses a data set of 26 HFT firms from 2008 to 2010, 
and finds that HFTs supply more liquidity to the market than the liquidity that it demands 
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from the market. Using a similar data set, Brogaards, Hendershott and Riordan (2014) 
show that high frequency traders play an important role in price discovery as HFTs 
improve pricing efficiency by trading in the same directions as permanent price changes 
and reversing transitory pricing errors. Viljoen, Westerholm and Zheng (2014) extend 
previous studies to the Australia index futures market and examine the price impact of 
high frequency traders on the SPI 200 futures market. In their study, HFT is measured by 
the dollar trading volume associated with each order update. The study finds that HFTs 
are informed and contribute to price discovery and liquidity in the Australian futures 
market, however, the study fails to isolate the effect of latency on liquidity by using an 
exogenous event that changes the level of speed trading.  
A small section of the literature does not consider HFT to be beneficial for the market. 
Opponents of AT and HFT suggest that these kinds of market participants cause an 
increase in volatility in financial markets. Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi and Tuzun (2017) 
explain that HFT exacerbated but did not cause the market crash of May 2010. Using 
audit trail data for the E-mini S&P 500 futures contract on the day of the event, the study 
finds that HFT initially provided liquidity to fundamental traders but subsequently 
contributed to the selling pressure that initiated the event. The previous literature also 
raises questions about the quality of the quotes submitted by HFTs as these quotes tend 
to be short-lived with validity periods measured in the milliseconds. Egginton, VanNess 
and VanNess (2016) support this critique and show a strong relation between periods with 
increased quoting behavior and poor market quality. Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson 
and Vega (2014) find a much stronger correlation amongst orders placed by algorithmic 
traders than the correlation amongst orders coming from normal slow traders. Their 
results question the contribution of algorithmic trading to the dissemination of systemic 
risk in financial markets.  
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Although there is a considerable literature on high frequency trading, it is not easy to 
accurately measure algorithmic and high frequency trading activity in the market as the 
available transaction and order level data fails to identify with precision orders and trades 
coming from a particular algorithmic or high frequency trader. In order to address this 
issue, previous literature estimates the portion of computerized trading from the intraday 
data using different proxies as measures of HFT activity. Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) and 
Egginton, VanNess and VanNess (2016) identify episodes of market updates that attract 
responses in the milliseconds. Although this methodology is not perfect as it loses the 
breadth relative to the message-count sample, it allows the analysis with better precision 
around periods with high HFT activity. Hendershott and Riordan (2013) and Brogaard, 
Hendershott and Riordan (2013) have access to a proprietary data set that classifies the 
types of traders, in particular, HFTs and non-HFTs. Overall, there are two kind of data 
sets employed by previous literature, one set of data provides longer time periods but 
makes vague distinction about algorithmic and high frequency trading. The other set of 
data clearly identifies HFT activity but has limitations in terms of the length of the sample. 
This lack of superior data has prompted some researcher to use trading systems upgrades 
as proxies for an increase in HFT activity. Brogaard, Hendershott, Hunt and Ysusi (2014) 
use the introduction of technological upgrades in the London Stock Exchange from 2007 
to 2011 as a measure of an increase in HFT activity. During this period, the study 
identifies five events which reduced latency from 11 milliseconds to 0.113 milliseconds. 
Boehmer, Fong and Wu (2014) use the implementation of co-location facilities as a 
measure of AT. The study confirms previous research and finds a positive impact of 
algorithmic trading on liquidity. Brogaard, Hagstromer, Norden and Riordan (2015) 
examine the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm and identify the initial date for the introduction 
of co-location services which improve latency for market participants. The study is able 
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to classify fast and slow traders by identifying market participants who use the co-location 
service. Their results show that co-located traders reduce their adverse selection costs 
relative to non-co-located traders. Riordan and Storkenmaier (2012) isolate the effect of 
HFT on liquidity in a limit order market by using the technological upgrade at the 
Deutsche Bȍrse in 2007. The study shows that transaction costs decrease by one to four 
basis points and liquidity increases after the upgrade. Their study demonstrates the 
importance of latency in the stock market, however, it is still necessary to investigate the 
role of latency around information announcements in futures markets.  
Frino, Mollica and Webb (2014) examine how the introduction of co-location at the 
Australia Securities Exchange in February 2012 affects market liquidity. The study finds 
that co-location attracts more HFT in the futures market and improves market liquidity as 
there is a decrease in bid-ask spreads and an increase in market depth. Although this study 
investigates the impact of co-location on the Australian market, it does not examine how 
the market behaves around the release of macroeconomic information. In addition, Frino, 
Mollica and Webb (2014) also omit the impact that HFT might have on price discovery.  
Apart from studying the impact of HFT on liquidity and volatility, the previous literature 
investigates the effects of HFTs on large institutional trades in order to assess the impact 
on the costs of these trades. Brogaard, Hendershott, Hunt and Ysusi (2014) establish that 
the introduction of technological upgrades at the LSE from 2007 to 2011 results in higher 
HFT activity. In addition, the study also extrapolates these results on the effects of the 
LSE upgrade to institutional execution costs. In their results, there is no relationship 
between higher HFT activity and institutional execution costs.  
In summary, the previous literature shows mixed results on the impact of HFT on market 
quality. Proponents of HFT find that high frequency traders contribute to more efficient 
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price discovery and improve market liquidity. Another group of research claims that HFT 
exacerbate volatility and increases adverse selection costs for other market 
participants.             
2.4.2 High Frequency Trading around Information Announcements         
The previous literature shows that the speed of trading has significantly increased in 
recent years as new market participants such as high frequency traders enhance speed and 
reduce latency by investing in new technology and using co-location facilities. As a result, 
high frequency traders might be able to extract profit from the market by rapidly 
responding to scheduled information releases. In addition, market reaction times to new 
information might be reduced for high frequency traders given their advantage in speed 
and consistency. Jiang, Lo, and Valente (2015) investigate high frequency trading in the 
U.S. fixed income market around macroeconomic releases. The study finds that HFT 
activity significantly increases after the release of information and usually improves price 
efficiency. In their results, high frequency traders reduce market liquidity as bid-ask 
spreads increase before announcements and depth deteriorates following news releases. 
Chaboud et al. (2014) examine how HFT affects the foreign exchange market around 
information announcements. The study shows that HFTs improve price discovery by 
increasing the speed at which information is incorporated into prices and reducing 
arbitrage opportunities in the market. In addition, the study finds that they do not increase 
volatility in the foreign exchange market.  
Scholtus, Dijk and Frijns (2014) examine the capacity of the market to respond to U.S. 
macroeconomic releases in the S&P 500 ETF market. The focus of the study is to 
investigate whether speed is important for news-based trading strategies. In their results, 
the profit to these kinds of strategies is reduced after a 300 milliseconds delay, and speed 
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is more relevant on days with high volatility or influential news. In addition, Scholtus, 
Dijk and Frijns (2014) find that HFTs improve quoted depth at the best level and increase 
trading volume after the release of the announcement. However, HFTs tends to decrease 
volatility and the overall depth in the market. Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan (2014) 
use a dataset that identifies HFTs and non-HFTs in the sample to investigate the impact 
of high frequency traders on price efficiency. The study shows that HFTs are able to 
supply more liquidity than the liquidity demanded for time intervals following 
macroeconomic releases. Therefore, HFTs do not impose net adverse selection costs on 
other traders during announcement periods.  
Zhang (2018) investigates the impact of HFT on market quality around earnings 
announcements in the U.S. equity market. The study examines the role of HFTs in 
reacting to price changes and the release of firm-specific news. The results show that high 
frequency traders dominate price discovery in the short-term, however, non-HFTs are the 
main contributors to price discovery in the long-term. Frino et al. (2016) demonstrate that 
algorithmic traders react faster to earnings announcements than non-algorithmic traders 
in the Australian stock market. Specifically, volume imbalance of non-algorithmic traders 
leads volume imbalance of algorithmic traders before the announcement, however, the 
opposite occurs in the post-announcement period.  
In terms of price discovery, new evidence suggests that HFT significantly contribute to 
price discovery in a more general form. Brogaard et al. (2014) deconstruct the price 
movements into permanent and temporary components to investigate how HFT explains 
each type of price change. In their results, HFTs trading volume improves price discovery 
by trading in the same direction to permanent price changes and in the opposite direction 
to transitory price changes. Benos and Sagade (2016) examine the impact of high 
frequency trading on price discovery for the U.K. equity market. The study investigates 
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how HFTs affect four U.K stocks in a one-week sample period, and finds that elevated 
volatility increases high frequency trading activity. In addition, the study demonstrates 
that HFTs usually have a higher information-to-noise ratio than non-HFTs, however, 
there are times in which the HFTs’ contribution is accompanied by large amount of noise.                     
2.5 Hypotheses Development   
The literature review presented in Chapter 2 identifies a number of gaps in the current 
literature. In this section, a set of testable hypotheses is developed, and tests of these 
hypotheses are presented in the following chapters. The hypotheses developed in this 
section are related to the impact of trading breaks, information announcements and HFT 
activity on liquidity, market quality and price discovery in derivatives markets, which 
forms the theme of this thesis.   
2.5.1 The Role of Trading Breaks in the Futures Market 
A large body of research has investigated the role of trading breaks in the equity markets. 
Section 2.2.1 shows that advocates of trading breaks suggest that they provide time for 
investors to process information which improves liquidity and volatility in the equity 
market (IOSCO, 2002; Greenwald and Stein, 1988, 1991; Christie, Corwin and Harris, 
2002). Part of the previous literature does not agree with the claim that trading breaks are 
beneficial for the equity market, but instead provide evidence that trading breaks impair 
market quality by increasing volatility or reducing market liquidity (Gerety and Mulherin, 
1992; Lee, Ready and Seguin, 1994; Christie, Corwin and Harris, 2002; Frino, Lecce and 
Segara, 2011; Brailsford, 1995; Kryzanowski and Nemiroff, 1998; Kryzanowski and 
Nemiroff, 2001). Contrary to the equity market where stock-specific information is 
released, macroeconomic announcements are the main source of information in futures 
markets. These kinds of announcements are usually pre-scheduled for many months in 
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advance and influence a great number of securities, unlike stock-specific information 
which is more likely to mainly affect a particular stock. Section 2.2.2 identifies that in the 
agricultural futures market, the WASDE report is the main source of information as it 
significantly affects prices (Adjemian, 2012; Isengildina-Massa, Irwin, Good and Gomez, 
2008a; Baur and Orazem, 1994; Carter and Galopin, 1993; Garcia, Irwin, Leuthold and 
Yang, 1997; Fortenberry and Sumner, 1993; Sumner and Mueller, 1989; Lehecka, Wang 
and Garcia, 2014). Although a large body of the previous literature concludes that 
instituting trading halts around information releases impairs liquidity in equity markets, 
there is a gap in the literature on the impact of trading breaks on futures markets where 
macroeconomic information rather than stock-specific information is released. Chapter 3 
fills this gap by providing theoretical and empirical evidence on the impact of trading 
breaks on market quality around the release of macroeconomic information in the 
agricultural futures market. 
The chapter’s first and second hypotheses (HQ,G, HQ,N) are that market quality (volatility 
and liquidity) is affected in the futures market when macroeconomic information is 
released, as information asymmetry significantly increases in the market. Therefore, 
trading breaks play an important role in incorporating this new information into prices 
and reducing the deterioration of volatility and liquidity.  
RQ,G:	  Trading breaks improve volatility around the release of macroeconomic 
information in futures markets. 
 
RQ,N:	  Trading breaks improve liquidity around the release of macroeconomic 
information in futures markets. 
2.5.2 Price Discovery in the Interest Rate Market 
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Section 2.3.1 defines price discovery as the transmission of information into security 
prices (Hasbrouck, 1995), as well as, the process implemented by financial markets to 
find equilibrium in prices from new information (Schreiber and Schwartz, 1986). The 
previous literature proposes different methodologies to measure price discovery, 
including lead-lag models, ECMs, the information share model, the component share 
model, and the information leadership model (Hasbrouck, 1995; Gonzalo and Granger, 
1995; Yan and Zivot, 2010; Putnins, 2013). Section 2.3.2 identifies that empirical studies 
on price discovery usually measure how information flows between stock and stock index 
futures markets (Grunbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz, 1994; Min and Najand, 1999; 
Shyy, Vijayraghavan and Scott-Quinn, 1996), stock and stock option markets (O’Connor, 
1999; Stephan and Whaley, 1990; Chan, Chung and Johnson, 1993), and interest rate and 
interest rate futures markets (Scalia, 1998; Poskitt, 1999).  However, limited research 
exists on price discovery across different types of interest rate derivatives markets. 
Chapter 4 extends previous studies by examining the flow of information across interest 
rate swaps and futures contracts.  
The first hypothesis (HT,G) tests whether there is a contemporaneous flow of information 
in the interest rate market on normal trading days.  
RT,G:	 The price discovery relationship between interest rate swap and futures is bi-
directional for all trading days.   
Section 2.3.3 explains how information asymmetry is usually affected by the release of 
macroeconomic information, and presents the previous literature that investigates how 
the release of substantial information affects price discovery. However, these studies only 
concentrate in the foreign exchange market (Gau and Wu, 2017; Andersen, Bollerslex, 
Diebold and Vega, 2003; Chen and Gau, 2010) and the equity market (Frijns, Indriawan 
and Tourani-Rad, 2014; Gleason and Lee, 2003). Previous research does not examine 
 
 81 
price discovery around information releases in interest rate markets, especially it does not 
investigate how information flows across two securities when one of the securities is 
traded in an over-the-counter market and the other in a regulated exchange. Chapter 4 
intends to fill this gap by examining the flow of information on days when 
macroeconomic information is released in the interest rate market. 
The second hypothesis (HT,N) tests whether macroeconomic information is incorporated 
first into futures prices, and then, into swap prices.  
RT,N:	 The futures market leads the swap market in price discovery around the release 
of macroeconomic information in the interest rate market.   
Section 2.3.4 shows that price discovery can also vary depending on the trading session 
and the time when information is released. Although a small part of the previous literature 
investigates the price discovery relationship between two markets during daytime and 
overnight trading sessions (Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans, 1997; Lin, Wang and 
Wu, 2009; Hendershott, 2003; Greene and Watts, 1996; Greene and Watts, 1996; 
Moshirian, Nguyen and Pham, 2012), there is a gap in the literature on how information 
flows in interest rate markets during overnight trading, especially, as overseas markets 
open during the Australian overnight trading session. 
The third hypothesis (HT,Q) tests whether information flows from the swap market to the 
futures market during overnight trading.   
RT,Q:	 The swap market leads the futures market in price discovery during overnight 
trading in the interest rate market.   
2.5.3 The Impact of HFT on Market Quality and Price Discovery 
Section 2.4.1 identifies that there is a debate in the current literature over the advantages 
or disadvantages of the development of high frequency trading. Some researchers 
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highlight the benefits for more efficient price discovery and better liquidity in the market 
(Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan, 2014; Brogaard, 2010; Frino, Mollica and Webb, 
2014; Riordan and Storkenmaier, 2012; Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld, 2011; 
Brogaard et al., 2015), whereas others express concerns that HFT might increase volatility 
and deteriorate liquidity (Cartea and Panelva, 2012; Boehmer, Fong and Wu, 2014; Rosu, 
2016; Chaboud et al., 2014; Kirilenko et al., 2017). Thus, it is important to understand 
the impact of HFT on market quality around macroeconomic news releases in interest 
rates markets. Co-location is an important technological upgrade which reduces latency 
and allows traders to react faster to information releases (Chordia, Green and 
Kottimukkalur, 2016; Jiang, Lo and Valente, 2015; Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan, 
2014; Chaboud et al., 2014; Frino et al., 2016). Section 2.4.2 shows that there is a gap in 
the current literature on the impact of co-location on HFT around the release of 
macroeconomic information in futures and swap markets. Chapter 5 intends to fill this 
gap by investigating how high frequency trading affects market quality and price 
discovery around macroeconomic information releases.  
The first hypothesis (HU,G) tests whether the introduction of co-location services at the 
ASX increases HFT activity around information releases.  
RU,G:	 The introduction of co-location at the ASX increases high frequency trading 
around information releases. 
Chapter 5 uses the introduction of co-location at the ASX as an exogenous event to 
identify the causal effect of HFT on liquidity and price discovery which is an issue that 
has not been resolved in the current literature. The chapter’s second and third hypotheses 
(HU,N , HU,Q ) test whether HFT affects liquidity and volatility around the release of 
information in the interest rate market.  
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RU,N:	 The increased level of high frequency trading leads to improved volatility in swap 
and futures markets around macroeconomic news releases.  
 
RU,Q:	 The increased level of high frequency trading leads to improved liquidity in swap 
and futures markets around macroeconomic news releases.  
In addition to liquidity and volatility, the fourth hypothesis (HU,T) tests whether HFT 
affects the price discovery relationship between swaps and futures in the interest rate 
market.  
RU,T:	 The lead role of the futures market on days with macroeconomic information 
releases increases given the heightened level of high frequency trading in the interest 
rate market.  
 2.6 Summary   
This chapter reviews previous literature and develops a number of hypotheses. Tests of 
these hypotheses are presented in the following chapters. Chapter 3 examines the impact 
of trading breaks on market quality when macroeconomic information is released in the 
agricultural futures market. Chapter 4 investigates the price discovery relationship around 
the release of information for the Australian interest rate market. Chapter 5 tests the 
impact of high frequency trading on liquidity and volatility around macroeconomic 
announcements in the Australian interest rate market.              
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3.1 Introduction  
The first empirical examination in this thesis investigates the role of trading breaks and 
the release time of macroeconomic announcements on market quality in the agricultural 
futures market. In recent years, two major changes have affected the microstructure of 
the market. On 1 January 2013, the USDA changed the time that it published the WASDE 
report from 7:30 am CT (Central Time) to 11 am CT. 18   Previous research has 
demonstrated that the information content of the WASDE report is relevant to pricing 
soybean and corn futures contracts (Isengildina-Massa et al., 2008; Adjemian, 2011; 
Lehecka et al., 2014) – the two most heavily traded agricultural contracts on the CME 
(see Table 3-1).  In turn, the CME changed its trading hours for its futures contracts in 
May 2012 and April 2013.  The effects of these changes were to move the announcement 
of WASDE from during a trading break to during continuous trading.  This change 
provides a unique natural experiment for testing the impact of releasing macroeconomic 
information on related futures contracts during trading breaks.  Specifically, this chapter 
 
18 Although WASDE reports are always published on the second week of the month. The calendar day and 
day-of-week when the report is released varies for each month.  The WASDE report provides 
comprehensive forecast and information related to the supply and demand for major crops, including 
soybeans and corn.  
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examines the impact of the release of the WASDE reports by the USDA on the market 
quality (namely price volatility, bid-ask spreads and market depth) of soybean and corn 
futures contracts.  
Chapter 2 identifies two main gaps in the current literature. Firstly, there are contradictory 
findings on whether information should be released before trading breaks or during 
continuous trading. Secondly, the current literature concentrates on equity markets where 
firm-specific information is released, however, this may not be generalisable to 
macroeconomic information releases in the futures markets since the release time of 
macroeconomic information is typically scheduled many months in advance and is well 
known by all market participants and easy for them to discover, unlike company-specific 
information which occurs more randomly through time. Chapter 3 investigates all these 
issues and provides a comprehensive conclusion at the end of the chapter.    
The reminder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 explains the data 
implemented in this study and provides more information on market liquidity and changes 
to the structure of the market. Section 3.3 details the different market quality measures 
used to explain the impact of trading breaks on the market. Section 3.4 demonstrates the 
empirical evidence of the impact of trading breaks on market quality when 
macroeconomic information is released in the agricultural futures market. Section 3.5 
presents robustness tests, and Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.  
3.2 Data  
The data used in this study was obtained from the Thomson Reuters Tick History Data 
Base (TRTH) maintained by the Securities Industries Research Centre of Asia-Pacific 
(SIRCA) which contains trade and quote data for futures contracts traded on U.S. 
exchanges.  The present study uses data for both corn and soybean contracts from 1st July 
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2009 to 31st December 2015.19  The trade data describes the contract (code), date and time 
of each trade, along with the price and volume transacted. The data quote records 
document the prices and volumes of prevailing bid and ask quotes for the best level of the 
order book. For each 10-minute interval, the last trade price, interval high and low prices, 
the average volume traded and the average best bid and ask prices, along with the average 
depth at the best prevailing bid and ask prices are sampled.  
Consistent with prior studies for futures contracts, this study examines the nearest to 
expiry contracts which tend to be the most liquid.  Studies analyzing agricultural futures 
have also observed that announcement effects are most pronounced in the most liquid 
contracts (Adjemian, 2012). To obtain the nearest and most liquid contracts, this study 
adopts the method of Webb and Smith (1994), sampling the closest to expiry contract 
until the contract volume for the first deferred contact is higher than the nearest to delivery.  
This research seeks to examine the impact of trading halts on price volatility and market 
liquidity. Using the changes to trading hours of soybean and corn futures contracts traded 
on CME and changes in the release time of the WASDE reports published by the USDA, 
this study divides the period 1 July 2009 to 31 December 2015 into two sub-periods. The 
period from 1 July 2009 to 18 May 2012 is classified as the “Trading Break” sample 
where the WASDE reports were released at 7:30 am CT during a trading break from 7:15 
am CT to 9:30 am CT.20  The second period from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2015 
 
19 There is total of 35 WASDE releases in the period from January 2013 to December 2015 where the 
WASDE announcements were published at 11:00 am CT during continuous trading.   For symmetry, this 
study goes back through time before May 2012 to sample 35 WASDE announcements that were released 
when the market was closed for trading.  This produces a sample period of 1 July 2009 to 31 December 
2015.  
20 The WASDE report in May 2012 occurs during continuous trading hour therefore it is not included in 
the “Trading Break” sample. 
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is categorized as the “Continuous Trading” sample where the WASDE announcements 
were published at 11:00 am CT during continuous trading (See Figure 3-1).21  
During the study’s sample period from 1st July 2009 to 31st December 2015, a total of 70 
WASDE reports were released. For the sub-periods, “Trading Break” contains 35 reports 
and “Continuous Trading” 35 reports.22  This study adopts the WASDE report days as the 












21 The period from 21 May 2012 to 31 December 2012, which contains 7 WASDE releases, is omitted from 
the study as the number of observations is too small to draw any reliable conclusions. During this period, 
WASDE reports are released at 7:30 am CT while the market is continuously trading. The figure below 
presents CME morning trading breaks and WASDE report time for the sample period. 
 
Date 
CME Morning Trading Break 





Aug '06 to May '12 7:15 am to 3:30 am 7:30 am ✓ 
May '12 to Dec '12 -- 7:30 am ✘ 
Jan '13 to April '13 -- 11:00 am ✘ 
April '13 onwards 7:45 am to 8:30 am 11:00 am ✘ 
   
22 Lehecka, Wang and Garcia (2014) examine market reaction to the release of major USDA reports (i.e., 
WASDE, Crop Production, Grain Stocks, Prospective Planting, and Acreage reports). This study utilizes 
only the WASDE report as it is released monthly and is well-documented to contain the most significant 
information for corn and soybean. To prevent bias, all other reporting days for the reports listed above have 
been removed from the study’s sample.   
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Figure 3- 1  
Sub-Sample Periods and Release time of WASDE Reports 
Note. Figure 3-1 shows the two sub-samples period used in this study. The period from 1 July 2009 to 18 
May 2012 is classified as the “Trading Break” sample where WASDE reports were released at 7:30 am CT 
during a trading break from 7:15 am CT to 9:30 am CT.   The second period from 1 January 2013 to 31 
December 2015 is categorized as the “Continuous Trading” sample where WASDE announcements were 
published at 11:00 am CT during continuous trading. 
 
 
This study concentrates on the two most liquid futures contracts traded at CME. Table 3-
1 shows that soybeans contracts are the most traded agricultural futures at CME with an 
average daily turnover of approximately 3.8 billion U.S. dollars, and corn contracts are 
the second most traded futures contract with an average turnover of approximately 2.8 
billion U.S. dollars. Therefore, Chapter 3 examines the impact of releasing information 
during trading halts for these two futures contracts, soybeans and corn.     
Table 3- 1  
Daily Turnover of Most Actively Traded Contracts in CME (USD) 
Note. Figure 3-1 shows the daily average turnover of the most actively traded contracts at the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).  
Futures Contract Turnover 
Soybeans Futures  $3,757,710,509.79  
Corn Futures  $2,761,888,344.47  
Chicago SRW Wheat Futures  $1,295,480,101.41  
Soybean Meal Futures  $   771,731,808.57  
Live Cattle Futures  $   626,182,307.55  
Lean Hog Futures  $   366,939,441.94  
Cotton Futures  $   345,218,476.52  
Feeder Cattle Futures  $   147,614,272.01  
 

















Trading Halt Period (July 2009 - May 2012)



















Continuous Trading Period (January 2013 - Dec 2015)




The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) offers futures contracts on approximately 
1,263 different contracts.  Of these contracts, 49 relates to agricultural produces. 23  Based 
on the CME Group leading product reports, corn and soybean are consistently ranked as 
the most actively traded contracts.24   For example, in 2015 (Quarter 4), the average 
notional daily volumes for corn and soybeans were 5.5 and 10 billion USD respectively.  
This is not surprising, as corn and soybeans represent 81% of the total U.S. grain 
production (Isengilda-Massa et al., 2015).25   It is also noteworthy that the WASDE 
reports are observed to have the most significant impact on corn and soybean futures 
contracts (Adjemian, 2012). 
Over the past decade, there have been substantial structural changes in corn and soybeans 
trading that are driven by technology, changes in market participation, and demand. Prior 
to 2003, only about 1% of monthly trading was conducted electronically and non-
producers shared around 25% of the total volume traded at the exchange. By 2009, 
electronical trading accounts for 95% of total daily volume and non-producer 
participation increased to around 40% of total volume traded at the exchange (Kaufman, 
2013). Crop prices and trading volumes have also increased significantly in the last 10 
years, not merely at CME but in prominent overseas markets too. Commodities prices 
and volumes have been driven by higher demand from emerging countries such as China 
 
23 CME Group product offerings list as of 31 December 2015. 
24  The seven most actively traded contracts by notional dollar turnover are: Soybeans, Corn, Wheat, 
Soybean Oil, Soybean Meal, Live Cattle and Lean Hog. As a product line, agricultural products contribute 
to a 15% of the total clearing and transaction fees revenue. This contribution is the fourth largest after 
Interest Rate (31%), Energy (23%), and Equity (19%) products (CME group 10-K annual report, 2015).  
25 Soybean and corn futures contracts trade on different expiry dates of the year. Soybeans contracts trade 
on the 15th of January, March, May, July, August, September and November, and corn futures contracts 
trade on the 15th of March, May, July, September and December. These contracts coincide with harvest 
period and the minimum tick is ¼ of one cent per bushel (or $12.50 per contract). Settlement is based on 
the delivery of the underlying commodities. 
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and India, and new policies promoting the use of biofuels (Wright 2011, 2012).  As an 
example, crop prices at the CME doubled between 2005 and 2007, and volumes at the 
Dalian Commodity Exchange increased three-fold from 2005 to 2006 (Kaufman, 2013). 
Trading at the exchange has also changed in the past years. Between 2009 and May 2012, 
corn and soybeans traded in two sessions which span 17 hours daily. The day session 
during this period opens at 9:30 am CT and closes at 1:15 pm CT, and the night session 
starts from 6 pm CT and ceases at 7:15 am CT the next day. The WASDE report by 
USDA was released at 7:30 am CT during the trading break where the market is closed. 
This creates a pseudo trading halt that allows all market participants time to access and 
analyze the information content of the reports.   
In May 2012, CME extended trading hours to 21 consecutive hours from 5 pm CT to 2 
pm CT the next day. This creates an overlap between the unchanged WASDE report 
release times at 7:30 am CT and continuous trading, thereby effectively removing the 
pseudo trading halt that was previously in place. This now requires market participants to 
process the information in real time and impound new content into prices promptly.   
 In January 2013, after considerable debate, the USDA changed the WASDE release time 
from 7:30 am CT to 11:00 am CT (a period of higher liquidity). The justification for the 
shift was to release the report at a time where liquidity was highest (Kaufman, 2013).26  
On the 8th April 2013, based on market surveys and the need to reduce operating costs, 
CME again revised its trading hours back to day and night sessions (Kaufman, 2013). As 
a consequence, a pause in electronic trading is observed from 7:45 am CT to 8:30 am CT. 
 
26 Prior to this, in June 2012, the CME had already announced that open outcry hours would begin at 7:20 
a.m. CT on days of WASDE releases in an attempt to increase liquidity. Pit trading opened at its usual time 
(9:30 a.m. CT) on all other days. During the period from 1 January 2013 to 8 April 2013, trading spans 21 
continuous hours in which the WASDE report is released at 11 am CT.  
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Both pit and electronic platforms now close at 1:15 pm CT with electronic markets 
reopening at 7 pm CT. While the agricultural futures market no longer trades on an 
extended basis, the WASDE reports are still released at 11:00 am CT during trading 
hours.27 
3.3 Method  
In order to estimate the impact of announcement releases on market quality during 
announcement and non-announcement days for the trading break and continuous trading 
periods, this study implements established measures of volatility, bid-ask spreads and 
depth. In addition, it controls for the size of the information released by implementing a 
matching procedure across sample periods.  
3.3.1 Volatility  
The measure of price volatility calculated and reported in this research is the price range 










> \ is the maximum price i in interval t of the day d, and min
>
[0W,I
> \ is the 
minimum price i in interval t of the day d. This study implements the price range as the 
main volatility indicator since it provides more accurate estimates and lower mean-
squared error than other typical measures (Martens and Dijk, 2007).  
3.3.2 Bid-Ask Spreads 
In addition to the impact of trading halts on price volatility associated with the WASDE 
report releases, market liquidity may also be affected. One measure of market liquidity is 
 
27 As of 31 December 2015. 
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the bid-ask spread which is a proxy for information asymmetry and also a component of 
trading costs (see Frino, Jones, Lepone and Wong, 2014). Higher spreads around the 
WASDE releases suggest that there are higher levels of information asymmetry 
surrounding the announcements and higher transaction costs. To measure bid-ask spreads, 








where -./W,I>  is the best ask price i in interval t of the day d, 41&W,I>  is the best bid price i 
in interval t of the day d, and 	_W,I is the total number of best quotes in interval t of the 
day d.  
3.3.3 Market Depth  
Market depth is another commonly used measure of liquidity (see Lee, Mucklow and 
Ready, 1993). High levels of quoted depth at the best prevailing bid and ask prices 
indicate high levels of liquidity and lower market impact costs for large trades. Decreases 
in market depth around the WASDE releases would suggest that market makers and 
participants are less willing to make markets because of the adverse selection problem 
created by the information released. This study calculates average depth per 10-minute 










where 41&	0*12%W,I>  and -./	0*12%W,I>  are best prevailing best bid and ask quotations at 
price i in interval t of the day d and 41&	(1c%W,I>  and -./	(1c%W,I>  are the best prevailing 
bid and ask sizes at price i in interval t of the day d. 
3.3.4 Magnitude of Price Movements Across Sub-Periods  
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It may be possible that the level of unexpected information or value of information in the 
WASDE reports is systematically different over the two sub-periods - which could bias 
the results. To test for this, this study compares the average of absolute returns for each 
sub-period around the time the report is released. Specifically, for the “Trading Break” 
period, this study calculates the return using the last traded price 20 minutes prior to the 
WASDE announcements (this is the last price five minutes before the close of the night 
session during the Trading Break period) and the last traded price 240 minutes after the 
report is released (this is the price 120 minutes after the market opens for trading, which 
provides enough time for the information content of the WASDE report to be incorporated 
into the price). Similarly, for the “Continuous Trading” period, this study calculates the 
return using the last traded price 20 minutes prior to WASDE announcements and the last 
traded price 120 minutes after the report is released (this is the last price 15 minutes before 
the closing time of the day session for the Continuous period). To illustrate, during the 
“Trading Break” period on WASDE days, returns are calculated using prices sampled at 
7:10 am and at 11:30 am. Similarly, for the “Continuous Trading” period, the price is 
sampled at 10:40 am and at 1 pm.  
Table 3-2 (Part A) compares the magnitude of price movements on the WASDE days 
across the two sub-periods.  While there are some differences in the average of absolute 
returns across sub-periods, the t-statistic testing average returns between the Trading 
Break and Continuous Trading period is not statistically significant.28   This implies that 
the average price movement on WASDE days is not systematically different across the 
two sub-periods and therefore the magnitude of the information released across sub-
periods cannot explain any observed results.    
 
28 Table 3-1 (Part A) shows that the difference in the average of absolute returns on WASDE days between 
the Trading Break and Continuous Trading period is 0.31% and insignificant.  
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3.3.5 Time of the Day and Day of the Week Price Matched Sample  
In this study, a sampling procedure is adopted similar to the Lee et al (1994) price-
matched pseudo-halts procedure.  Specifically, this study matches each WASDE day in a 
sub-period with the non-WASDE day with the closest return on the same day of the week 
and time of the day within the sub-period.  The purpose of this procedure is to control for 
time-of-day and day-of-week patterns in the volatility and liquidity variables, as well as 
the magnitude of the price movement associated with the WASDE release.   To ensure a 
close match, any matched returns that differ by more than 1% are eliminated from the 
final sample.29  The final sample consists of 66 WASDE reports: 34 reports for the 
“Trading Break” period and 32 reports for the “Continuous Trading” period. Table 3-2 
(Part B) demonstrates that there is no significant difference in the average of absolute 
returns for the WASDE and non-WASDE day samples within each sub-period.30   
Table 3- 2  
Comparison of Magnitude of Information Content Across and Within Sample 
Periods 
Note. Table 3-2 reports the sample absolute mean returns in percentage on WASDE days (Experimental 
sample) and non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample) for the two sample periods. Table 3-2 is divided 
into two parts – (Part A) presents the difference in mean returns between the Trading Break and Continuous 
Trading periods, (Part B) reports the difference in mean returns between the experimental and matched 
control samples within each of the two periods. * represents statistical significance at the 10% level. 
  Experimental Sample   Matched Control Sample   Part B: 
  Mean (%) 
S.D 









Trading Break 1.171 0.935 34   1.110 0.856 34   0.06 0.28 
Conti. Trading  0.857 0.616 32   0.784 0.533 32   0.07 0.51 
Part A:                     
Mean Diff (%) 0.31       0.33           
T-Value 1.60       1.83*           
 
 
29 After implementing the matching mechanism, one and three reports from the “Trading Break” and 
“Continuous Trading” periods are eliminated, respectively. 
30 For each sub-period, the WASDE days and non-WASDE sample are categorized as the “Experimental” 
and “Matched Control” sample, respectively.  
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3.4. Results  
3.4.1 Price Volatility  
This section reports the results for the test of hypothesis RQ,G. In particular, this section 
explains whether trading breaks improve market volatility around the release of 
macroeconomic information.   
Table 3-3 presents the average price range (price volatility) for each 10-minute interval 
around the release time of WASDE reports on both WASDE and non-WASDE days for 
the two sub-periods. 31  During the “Trading Break” period, WASDE reports are released 
at 7:30 am and the day session opens at 9:30 am, hence there is a two-hour trading break 
prior to the commencement of trading. The difference in price volatility across WASDE 
and non-WASDE intervals is statistically significant for up to 20 minutes following the 
release of the WASDE reports. During the “Continuous Trading” period, WASDE reports 
are released at 11:00 am and the announcements occur during continuous trading. The 
results reported in Table 3-3 imply that price volatility for WASDE days are significantly 
greater than non-WASDE days for up to 60 minutes at the 0.05 level or better when results 
are released during continuous trading. The adjustment time during this period is greater 
than that reported for the “Trading Break” sub-period and suggests that releasing WASDE 
reports during continuous trading increases the trading time it takes for price volatility to 
 
31 Tables 3-3 to 3-6 present volatility and liquidity measures for 18 10-minute intervals of trading around 
the release of the reports. For Panel-A (Trading Break Period), the 7:10 am interval corresponds to a five-
minute interval (instead of 10 minutes) prior the closing of the market at 7:15 am. Similarly, for Panel-B 
(Continuous Trading Period), the 1:10 pm interval corresponds to a five-minute interval (instead of 10 
minutes) prior the closing of the market at 1:15 pm.  
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return to equilibrium.32  These results show that trading breaks improve price volatility 
around the release of macroeconomic announcements, in support of hypothesis RQ,G.    
3.4.2 Bid-Ask Spreads  
In terms of bid-ask spread as a measure of liquidity, this section presents the results for 
the test of hypothesis RQ,N. Specifically, this section investigates whether trading breaks 
improve market liquidity around the release of macroeconomic information.    
Table 3-4 presents the results for bid-ask spreads on WASDE and non-WASDE days for 
the two sub-periods. For the “Trading Break” period when WASDE reports are released 
during a trading break, bid-ask spreads for the WASDE sample are significantly greater 
than the non-WASDE sample only for the first 10 minutes following the resumption of 
trading after the release.33  In contrast, during the “Continuous Trading” period when 
WASDE reports are released during continuous trading, bid-ask spreads are significantly 
higher for the WASDE sample for up to seven 10-minute intervals immediately following 
the release of the report.  When compared to the results for the “Trading Break” sub-
period, these results confirm that releasing WASDE reports during continuous trading 
increases the trading time it takes for bid-ask spreads to return to equilibrium following 
the information release. These results show that trading breaks improve liquidity around 
the release of macroeconomic announcements, in support of hypothesis RQ,N.    
 
32 As a robustness test, Appendix A.1 implements two additional measures of volatility for soybeans 
contracts - price volatility and frequency of price changes. In addition, additional controls of information 
connect are implemented in Appendix A.2 for soybeans contracts. All results in this chapter are replicated 
for soybeans contracts using 1-minutes intervals as presented in Appendix A.3. Finally, all results are 
replicated and presented for corn futures contracts using 10-minutes intervals in Appendix A.4. Similarly, 
Appendix A.5 presents results for corn futures contracts implemented using 1-minutes intervals.    
33 The difference in bid-ask spreads between the two samples is significant at the 10% level.  
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3.4.3 Market Depth 
Market depth is considered another measure of market liquidity. This section also 
presents the results for the test of hypothesis RQ,N. In particular, this section investigates 
whether trading breaks improve market liquidity around the release of macroeconomic 
information.    
Table 3-5 presents intraday market depth on WASDE and non-WASDE days for the two 
sub-periods. During the “Trading Break” period, the difference in depth between 
WASDE release days and non-WASDE days is not significant for any of the time 
intervals immediately after the market resumes trading.   In sharp contrast, during the 
“Continuous Trading” period, there is evidence that market depth is lower on WASDE 
days for at least 40 minutes of trading immediately following the release of the report. 
Again, this confirms the notion that releasing WASDE reports during continuous trading 
exacerbates market depth and increases the trading time it takes for market depth to return 
to equilibrium following the information release. These results show that trading breaks 
improve liquidity around the release of macroeconomic announcements, in support of 
hypothesis RQ,N.   
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Table 3- 3  
Intraday Price Range for Soybeans Contracts 
Note. Table 3-3 reports intraday average Price Range for the Trading Break period where WASDE reports are released at 7:30 am, and the Continuous Trading period where WASDE reports 
are released at 11:00 am. Price Range is measured using the difference between the highest and lowest price for soybeans during each ten-minute interval. Differences between WASDE days 
(Experimental sample) and non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample), along with the t-statistics are provided. Due to the small size of the two sample periods, the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney 
statistics are also reported for additional robustness. The number of observations in the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. ***, **, and * represents 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 













Difference T-statistics WMW 
6:30 1.176 1.053 0.12 0.652 712.0*  10:20 2.477 2.453 0.02 0.076 532 
6:40 1.331 1.346 -0.01 -0.083 581.5  10:30 2.453 2.789 -0.34 -1.095 460 
6:50 1.625 1.544 0.08 0.423 655  10:40 2.531 2.664 -0.13 -0.391 519.5 
7:00 2.191 1.566 0.63 2.898*** 797.0***  10:50 3.539 3.063 0.48 0.926 682.0** 
7:10 1.743 1.368 0.38 2.012** 730.5*  11:00 18.141 3.078 15.06 12.809*** 1016.0*** 
9:30 13.088 8.118 4.97 4.361*** 905.0***  11:10 7.68 3.125 4.55 6.907*** 934.0*** 
9:40 7.728 5.625 2.1 2.537** 822.5***  11:20 5.766 3.039 2.73 4.447*** 824.0*** 
9:50 5.375 5.074 0.3 0.53 627  11:30 4.828 2.531 2.3 5.916*** 871.0*** 
10:00 4.728 4.309 0.42 0.79 678  11:40 4.188 2.438 1.75 3.684*** 794.5*** 
10:10 4.331 4.176 0.15 0.3 642.5  11:50 4.094 2.18 1.91 5.693*** 862.0*** 
10:20 3.926 3.574 0.35 0.841 708.5  12:00 3.383 2.672 0.71 1.852* 665.0** 
10:30 3.816 3.441 0.38 0.871 728.0*  12:10 3.188 2.781 0.41 1.082 617.5 
10:40 3.346 3.478 -0.13 -0.404 559.5  12:20 3.328 2.586 0.74 1.994* 649.5* 
10:50 3.566 2.897 0.67 1.838* 694  12:30 3.016 2.453 0.56 1.683* 611 
11:00 2.875 3.39 -0.51 -1.415 479  12:40 2.797 2.68 0.12 0.326 546.5 
11:10 3.051 3.169 -0.12 -0.269 617  12:50 3.039 2.586 0.45 1.378 607.5 
11:20 2.971 2.978 -0.01 -0.02 574.5  13:00 3.422 2.992 0.43 1.237 627 
11:30 3.118 3.11 0.01 0.018 604  13:10 3.492 3.836 -0.34 -0.881 475.5 
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Table 3- 4  
Intraday Bid-Ask Spreads for Soybeans Contracts 
Note. Table 3-4 reports intraday average quoted bid-ask spreads (cents) for the Trading Break period where WASDE reports are released at 7:30 am, and the Continuous Trading period where 
WASDE reports are released at 11:00 am. Bid-ask Spread is calculated for each ten-minute interval using the difference between the best prevailing quotes in the market for soybeans. Differences 
between WASDE (Experimental sample) and non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample), along with the t-statistics are provided. Due to the small size of the two sample periods, the 
Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney statistics are also reported for additional robustness. The number of observations in the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. 
***, **, and * represents statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 











Difference T-statistics WMW 
6:30 48.248 44.505 3.74 1.231 662.0   10:20 29.310 29.439 -0.13 -0.348 493.0 
6:40 45.304 45.876 -0.57 -0.199 597.0   10:30 29.407 29.831 -0.42 -1.161 431.0 
6:50 47.941 46.665 1.28 0.417 623.0   10:40 29.396 29.640 -0.24 -0.553 507.0 
7:00 48.790 46.712 2.08 0.733 634.0   10:50 32.556 29.848 2.71 3.752*** 770.0*** 
7:10 47.981 46.809 1.17 0.416 629.0   11:00 41.805 29.859 11.95 8.438*** 989.0*** 
9:30 37.691 35.849 1.84 1.696* 732.0*   11:10 32.942 30.235 2.71 4.022*** 825.0*** 
9:40 34.184 34.098 0.09 0.093 612.0   11:20 32.414 29.658 2.76 4.526*** 826.0*** 
9:50 34.068 33.673 0.39 0.517 615.0   11:30 31.220 29.758 1.46 2.879*** 714.0*** 
10:00 33.272 33.360 -0.09 -0.118 570.0   11:40 30.712 29.607 1.11 2.265** 660.0** 
10:10 32.999 33.187 -0.19 -0.244 551.0   11:50 30.780 29.558 1.22 2.691*** 679.0** 
10:20 32.843 33.490 -0.65 -0.780 533.0   12:00 30.495 29.468 1.03 2.334** 669.0** 
10:30 32.995 33.498 -0.50 -0.646 595.0   12:10 30.281 29.613 0.67 1.430 610.0 
10:40 32.729 33.269 -0.54 -0.738 551.0   12:20 30.352 29.596 0.76 1.625 636.0* 
10:50 32.849 33.697 -0.85 -1.079 508.0   12:30 30.246 29.593 0.65 1.705* 642.0* 
11:00 32.695 33.565 -0.87 -1.125 508.0   12:40 29.752 29.765 -0.01 -0.027 544.0 
11:10 32.483 33.484 -1.00 -1.193 531.0   12:50 30.479 30.067 0.41 0.835 575.0 
11:20 33.200 33.536 -0.34 -0.385 546.0   13:00 30.386 30.351 0.04 0.070 530.0 
11:30 33.314 34.491 -1.18 -1.345 520.0   13:10 30.093 30.192 -0.10 -0.184 523.0 
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Table 3- 5 
Intraday Depth for Soybeans Contracts 
Note. Table 3-5 reports intraday average depth for the Trading Break period where WASDE reports are released at 7:30 am, and the Continuous Trading period where WASDE reports are 
released at 11:00 am. Depth is measured using all available quotes at the best level for soybeans during each ten-minute interval. Differences between WASDE (Experimental sample) and non-
WASDE days (Matched Control sample), along with the t-statistics are provided. Due to the small size of the two sample periods, the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney statistics are also reported for 
additional robustness. The number of observations in the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. ***, **, and * represents statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 











Difference T-statistics WMW 
6:30 16017.932 17522.192 -1504.3 -0.836 528.0   10:20 47488.002 53418.682 -5930.7 -1.123 497.0 
6:40 18690.141 19684.357 -994.2 -0.475 621.0   10:30 48135.920 53566.421 -5430.5 -0.960 506.0 
6:50 17624.617 26826.561 -9201.9 -1.839* 527.0   10:40 46985.896 56349.893 -9364.0 -1.331 411.0 
7:00 20375.255 21102.250 -727.0 -0.252 513.0   10:50 36496.752 53628.564 -17131.8 -3.121*** 269.0*** 
7:10 19889.743 21540.101 -1650.4 -0.571 502.0   11:00 28694.588 51278.494 -22583.9 -5.546*** 129.0*** 
9:30 38843.626 40388.908 -1545.3 -0.524 515.0   11:10 35247.131 50607.346 -15360.2 -3.696*** 275.0*** 
9:40 46605.383 46655.821 -50.4 -0.013 541.0   11:20 36426.784 47365.904 -10939.1 -3.429*** 295.0*** 
9:50 41284.301 44832.246 -3547.9 -0.987 522.0   11:30 40218.281 48718.035 -8499.8 -2.025** 364.0** 
10:00 46574.599 45493.402 1081.2 0.256 611.0   11:40 42290.150 51582.873 -9292.7 -1.686* 371.0* 
10:10 45913.511 46286.852 -373.3 -0.088 592.0   11:50 45591.193 52030.434 -6439.2 -1.176 355.0** 
10:20 48303.423 45152.217 3151.2 0.733 651.0   12:00 42635.923 50027.660 -7391.7 -1.915* 377.0* 
10:30 47912.286 47665.587 246.7 0.047 618.0   12:10 44729.636 51152.385 -6422.7 -1.491 419.0 
10:40 44200.282 49971.216 -5770.9 -1.142 524.0   12:20 43495.933 53011.097 -9515.2 -2.069** 354.0** 
10:50 46310.918 47483.273 -1172.4 -0.245 581.0   12:30 44727.569 49302.210 -4574.6 -1.296 438.0 
11:00 49452.476 50853.465 -1401.0 -0.267 584.0   12:40 46706.891 49522.606 -2815.7 -0.738 476.0 
11:10 48600.717 46017.796 2582.9 0.511 647.0   12:50 47169.314 52803.204 -5633.9 -1.268 428.0 
11:20 46331.918 43978.372 2353.5 0.564 634.0   13:00 47758.908 52762.301 -5003.4 -1.155 426.0 
11:30 47336.749 44293.568 3043.2 0.686 653.0   13:10 70570.527 71120.570 -550.0 -0.077 478.0 
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3.5 Summary  
The move by CME to extend trading hours creates a natural experiment where scheduled 
price sensitive reports by the USDA shifts from being announced during non-trading 
hours to a release during continuous trading. Previous research finds ambiguous results 
on whether trading breaks are beneficial or detrimental for market quality, therefore, this 
chapter investigates in detail the impact of trading halts on market quality.   
This chapter has developed an empirical model to test the role of trading breaks on market 
quality around announcement days. Results based on the first hypothesis !",$ provide 
evidence that the removal of the trading halt exacerbates volatility. Further analysis on 
market liquidity using bid-ask spreads and depth supports the second hypothesis !",% that 
liquidity declines significantly around WASDE announcements without a trading halt. 
Findings from this study suggest that trading halts are beneficial in reducing information 
asymmetry and price volatility, as well as, improving market liquidity.  
Using a sample of quotes and trades on the soybeans and corn futures contracts, the 
empirical results are consistent with the theoretical proposition that trading breaks 
decrease information asymmetry across market participants, and therefore, improve 




















4.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the effect of information asymmetry on the speed at which 
information is incorporated into prices across the swap and futures markets. Swap 
contracts are traded over-the-counter in a market with little pre-and-post trade 
transparency, which provides an advantage for informed traders to benefit from their 
private information. On the other hand, futures contracts are transacted in a public 
exchange where all investors have access to the same information, thus reducing 
information asymmetry in the market. Chapter 2 presents a gap in the literature since 
limited research exists on price discovery across different types of interest rate derivatives 
markets, and theories for the location of price discovery in equity markets produce 
conflicting predictions about whether the swap market is expected to lead the futures 
market at the short end of the yield curve. Therefore, this chapter extends previous 
research by examining price discovery on days of macroeconomic information 
announcements and in overnight markets when private information, informed trading, 
and information asymmetries are likely to be high. 
The reminder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 explains the data 
implemented in this study and provides more information on the structure of the swap 
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and futures markets in Australia. Section 4.3 explains the lead-lag model used to measure 
the flow of information between the swap and futures markets, and compares transaction 
costs and liquidity across the two markets. Section 4.4 demonstrates the empirical 
evidence of how information flows in the interest rate derivatives market around 
macroeconomic information releases and overnight trading. Section 4.5 presents an 
alternative model implemented to estimate price discovery in the interest rate market 
using Information Leadership Share (ILS). This model takes into consideration the 
differences in noise levels across markets.  Section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
4.1.1 Swap Market Background 
Swaps were first traded in the 1980s among companies looking to avoid capital controls 
from the British government.  Since then, the swap market has grown rapidly and 
expanded into various types and countries.  As of 2016, swaps have become one of the 
most important financial instruments in Australia, with an approximate average daily 
turnover of A$58.5 billion and an average transaction size that ranges between A$47 and 
A$100 million (see AFMA, 2017).  This level of liquidity represents a 30% increase from 
2010 according to AFMA (2017).  The popularity of interest rate swaps reflects how 
simple swaps can be executed by companies and financial institutions to hedge against 
interest rate risk (Bicksler and Chen, 1986).  Nevertheless, the rise of interest rate swaps 
has increased the risk of manipulation by some market participants.  For example, British 
and U.S. regulators fined Barclays and Deutsche Bank in 2012 and 2015, respectively, 
over charges of manipulating the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) which is used 
as a benchmark to settle interest rate swaps in the U.K. (Perkins and Mortby, 2015).  As 
a response to prevent manipulation in the swap market, regulators around the world 
introduced new regulations such as the creation of an alternative risk-free benchmark and 
disclosure of live and executable prices by prime banks (Duffie and Stein, 2015). 
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4.2 Data  
The data for this study are obtained from the Thomson Reuters Tick History Data Base 
(TRTH) maintained by the Securities Industries Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA).  
From this dataset, this research extracts one-minute intraday bid and ask quote data for 
Australian 90-day bank accepted bill futures contracts traded on the Australian Security 
Exchange (ASX) from 1 January 2013 to 1 April 2016.  The data include the contract 
code, date and time of each quote, along with quoted price and volume for all futures 
contracts that are part of the quarterly expiration cycle (March, June, September and 
December).34   OTC quote data for the Australian one-year interest rate swap contract is 
also collected from TRTH on a 1-minute intraday basis for the same sample period (1 
January 2013 – 1 April 2016).  This data set includes indicative bid and ask quotes 
supplied by approved dealers and contributors.35   Data for interest rate swap and futures 
contracts are collected for the period when both markets are open for trading, from 8:28 
am to 4:30 pm (Daytime session) and 5:08 pm to 7:00 am (Overnight session).  This 
research calculates the mid-quote for both swap and futures as the average of the best bid 
and ask quotes at each 1-minute interval after removing weekends and holidays.  Mid-
quotes reduce the effect of bid-ask bounce, as explained in Hauptfleisch, Putnins and 
Lucey (2016). 
 
34 The 90-day Bank Accepted Bill futures contract is quoted as the yield deducted from an index of 100 
(ASX, 2014). 
35 Indicative quotes in the OTC swap market are expressed in yields. This study converts the quotes to 
prices by deducting the yield from 100. Although actual quotes are not available for the swap market, 
indicative mid-quotes are used as a proxy for actual mid-quote prices. Goodhart and Figliuoli (1991) explain 
that dealers avoid giving misleading quotes in the OTC market to prevent damaging their reputation.  Poskitt 
(2007) also uses indicative quotes in his research. 
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Australian macroeconomic announcements are obtained from Bloomberg for the period 
1 January 2013 – 1 April 2016.  This data set includes the date, announcement content 
and time stamp for major macroeconomic announcements such as Average Weekly 
Wages, Current Account Balance, Building Approvals, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
Cash Target (Reserve Bank of Australia [RBA] interest rate), and Unemployment.  These 
announcement types significantly impact the interest rate market, as identified by Frino 
and Hill (2001) and Frino, Walter and West (2000). 
4.2.1 Institutional Detail  
In Australia, the 90-day bank accepted bill futures contract was launched in 1979.  Since 
then, the 90-day BABs futures contract has become one of the 10 most liquid contracts in 
the world, with an average daily turnover of 83,000 contracts in 2012, seven times higher 
than the turnover of the spot market (data in a private communication from the ASX).  
The 90-day BABs trade at the ASX Trade24 for four expiry months (March, June, 
September and December) from 8:28 am AEST to 4:30 pm AEST and 5:08 pm AEST to 
7:00 am AEST during the winter period, as well as from 8:28 am AEST to 4:30 pm AEST 
and 5:08 pm AEST to 7:30 am AEST during the summer period.  The winter period is 
from the second Sunday in March until the first Sunday in November; in addition, the 
summer period is from the first Sunday in November until the second Sunday in March.  
Australian interest rate swaps are mainly traded in the OTC market.  OTC swap trading 
includes traditional voice dealers and exchange-like trading platforms with central limit 
order books.  In Australia, around 60% of swaps trading is dominated by voice dealers, 
and only a small fraction of trades is executed on electronic trading platforms such as the 
Australian Market Licence (AML) regime, swap execution facilities (SEF) and 
multilateral trading facilities (MTF).  A voice trading venue refers to an interdealer 
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market where clients negotiate prices with dealers directly over the phone.  Voice trading 
is usually supported by electronic displays, email or text messages.  As an alternative to 
voice venues, electronic trading provides higher levels of pre-and-post trade transparency 
in the OTC market.  Electronic trading covers four main trading mechanisms.  1. Request-
for-quote (RFQ) trading allows market participants to select the best quoted price from 
an auction with multiple dealers. In the RFQ process, a client submits an intention to buy 
or sell a security, and approved dealers respond with their best bid and ask quotes.  The 
dealer with the best quoted price wins the auction and trades with the client.  2. Central 
limit order books trading is an exchange-like venue where market participants 
continuously trade on quotes following some priority rules.  3. Fixing and matching 
sessions are where approved dealers submit indicative bid-ask quotes used to calculate an 
average fixed price during the fixing session.  Then, market participants submit firm 
quotes to trade at the fixed price during the matching session.  4. Click-to-trade trading 
provides market participants with an electronic trading venue where prices are displayed 
in real time and participants can choose the price and dealer to execute the trade.  As of 
2012, central clearing was not widely introduced in the Australian interest rate derivative 
market.  Instead, many of the banks dealing in the OTC market offer clients their own 
clearing services. 
4.3 Method  
This section compares transaction costs and liquidity between interest rate swap and 
futures contracts. In addition, it describes a lead-lag model used to calculate how 
information flows across the swap and futures markets on normal daytime trading 
sessions, macroeconomic announcement days and overnight trading sessions.   
4.3.1 Transaction Costs in the Swap and Futures Markets 
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Similarly to Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley (1996), this analysis begins by examining the 
liquidity and transaction costs of different securities, through comparing bid-ask quotes 
and daily turnover in the interest rate swap and futures markets.  For both swaps and 
futures bid-ask spreads (BAS) are measured in basis points for each one-minute interval 
using prevailing best bid and ask quotes, as in Zhou, Rose and Pinfold (2006).  Daily 
volumes for swaps and futures are collected from AFMA (2017) as the daily average 
turnover in A$ billion.36   Table 4-1 provides descriptive statistics for bid-ask spreads and 
average daily turnover for the daytime session (8:28 am to 4:30 pm), night-time session 
before midnight (5:08 pm to 11:59 pm), and night-time session after midnight (12:00 am 
to 07:00 am).  Table 4-1 documents that the bid-ask spread of swaps is many times greater 
than BAB futures across all periods examined – however these are not directly 
comparable.  More importantly, the difference between bid-ask spreads of swaps and 
futures exhibits an intraday/intranight pattern.   Table 4-1 and Figure 4-1 demonstrates 
that during the day, the difference in bid-ask spreads is greatest.  However, in the first 
part of the evening trading session (before midnight) the bid-ask spreads begin to 
converge, while after midnight is when the difference in bid-ask spreads between swaps 
and BAB futures is smallest.  In addition, Table 4-1 documents that the ratio of daily 
average futures turnover to daily average swap turnover is approximately 2.0 times 






36 Since transaction prices and volumes are not available for the OTC swap market, this study estimates 
swap and BAB futures daily average turnover figures in Australian dollars for a sample period 
approximating the sample period examined in this section based on the AFMA survey data for 2017 and 
after adjusting for exchange rates sourced from the RBA. 
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Table 4- 1  
Bid-Ask Spreads and Trading Volumes in the Short-Term Interest Rate Market 
Note. Table 4-1 reports descriptive statistics for bid-ask spreads (BAS) and daily average turnover for 
interest rate swaps and futures between 1 January 2013 and 1 April 2016. Bid-ask spreads for the futures 
market are calculated in basis points for each one-minute interval by subtracting the prevailing bid quote 
from the prevailing ask quote. Bid-ask spreads for the swap market are similarly calculated using indicative 
bid and ask quotes provided by approved contributors. Bid-ask spreads in Table 4-1 are calculated for three 
trading sessions – daytime session from 8:28 am to 4:30 pm, night-time session before midnight from 5:08 
pm to 11:59 pm, and night-time session after midnight from 12:00 am to 7:00 am. This study estimates 
swap and BAB futures daily average turnover figures in Australian dollars for a sample period 
approximating the sample period examined in this section using AFMA survey data for 2017 and after 
adjusting for exchange rates sourced from the RBA.    
  Bid-Ask Spreads (in basis points)      
  Daytime Session   











  Swap Futures Deferred   Swap Futures   Swap Futures   Swap Futures 
Mean 3.877 1.006 1.005   3.970 1.025   3.853 1.038  53.4 104.7 
SD. 1.783 0.013 0.010   1.799 0.066   1.769 0.119  7.2 6.1 
Maximum 7.983 1.120 1.079   7.985 1.886   7.988 2.0  58.5 109.5 
Minimum 1.406 1.0 1.0   1.0 1.0   1.0 1.0  48.4 95.8 
 
The results in Table 4-1 suggest that price discovery between swaps and BAB futures can 
take on an intraday pattern. If price discovery is driven by transaction costs, then if swap 
prices are to lead futures market prices, this is most likely to happen during the overnight 
session – particularly after midnight when the cost of trading swaps approaches that of 
futures.  In the remainder of this chapter, the lead-lag relationship between price 
movements in swap and BAB futures prices during different times of the day and around 













Figure 4- 1  
Intraday Bid-Ask Spreads in the Short-Term Interest Rate Market 
Note. Figure 4-1 reports intraday bid-ask spreads (BAS) in basis points for interest rate swaps 
and futures between 1 January 2013 and 1 April 2016. Bid-ask spreads for the futures market are 
calculated in basis points for each one-minute interval by subtracting the prevailing bid quote 
from the prevailing ask quote. Bid-ask spreads for the swap market are similarly calculated using 
indicative bid and ask quotes provided by approved contributors. Bid-ask spreads in Table 4-1 
are calculated for three trading sessions – daytime session from 8:28 am to 4:30 pm, night-time 
session before midnight from 5:08 pm to 11:59 pm, and night-time session after midnight from 
12:00 am to 7:00 am. The bid-ask spread spikes in Figure 4-1 for the futures market correspond 
to the time when macroeconomic information is released at 11:30 am and 2:30 pm, as well as, 
the opening of the futures market night session at 5:08 pm.  
 
 
4.3.2 Modelling Price Discovery 
Price discovery analysis for the 90-days BABs futures contracts and one-year interest rate 
swaps is conducted on an intraday basis using two well-known methodologies – a lead/lag 
model and the Information Leadership Share (ILS). Based on prior research, this research 
implements a lead/lad model similar to Sims (1972), Frino, Walter and West (2000) and 
Poskitt (2007), to investigate the price discovery relationship between the swap and 
futures markets during daytime and overnight trading. In addition, the impact of 
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examined.  Coefficients of the lead/lag model are estimated by regressing various 
measures of one-minute swap prices against lagged, contemporaneous and leading one-
minute futures prices as follows: 






where ∆'( is the change in the swap price over interval t, ∆3( is the change in the futures 
price over interval t and 5( is the residual.37   Under Equation (4.1), the futures market 
leads the swap market when coefficients on lagged futures prices (k < 0) are significant 
and coefficients on lead futures prices (k > 0) are insignificant.  Alternatively, the swap 
market leads the futures market when coefficients on lagged futures prices (k < 0) are 
insignificant and coefficients on lead futures prices (k > 0) are significant.  In addition, 
using a Wald test, this study examines whether the sum of the first ten lead coefficients 
(i.e., k=+1 to k=+10) are equal to zero (∑ -(./$0/1$ = 0).  The rejection of this test (T1) 
indicates that information is transmitted from swap to futures markets.  Similarly, a 
second test examines whether the sum of the first ten lag coefficients (i.e., k=-1 to k=-10) 
are equal to zero (∑ -(./2$0/12$ = 0).  The rejection of this second test (T2) implies that 
information is transmitted from the futures to the swaps.  The simultaneous rejection of 
T1 and T2 indicates that price discovery occurs simultaneously in the interest rate swap 
and futures markets.  
4.4 Results  
4.4.1 Price Discovery Between Swaps and Futures During Daytime Trading   
 
37 This analysis ignores the 20 minutes before and after trading breaks and avoid comparing prices across 
market breaks as in Frino, Walter and West (2000). 
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This section reports the results for the test of hypothesis !8,$. In particular, this section 
explains whether the flow of information between the swap and futures markets is 
contemporaneous for all days during daytime trading.    
Table 4-2 presents the results for the lead/lag model (Equation [4.1]) for daytime 
trading.38  Model 1 in Panel A demonstrates that, when the coefficients are estimated 
using the nearby futures contract for the independent variable, seven lagged futures prices 
(k=-1 to k=-7) are significantly positive, which implies that the futures market leads the 
swap market by up to seven minutes.  In addition, coefficients on six lead futures prices 
(k=+1 to k=+6) are significantly positive at the 0.01 level, suggesting that information 
flows from the swap market to the futures market by up to six minutes.  These results 
demonstrate that the transmission of information between the swap and futures markets 
is largely contemporaneous.  When the deferred contract is used as independent variable 
in Model 2, two lead coefficients (k=+5 and k=+6) become insignificant and one lag 
coefficient (k=-8) becomes significant, implying that lower transaction costs (see Table 
4-1) in the deferred contract increases the transmission of information from the futures 
market to the swap market to eight minutes in duration, and reduces the feedback from 
the swap market to the futures market to four minutes.  Results using the deferred contract 
demonstrate that the price discovery relationship between the swap and futures markets 
is contemporaneous by up to four minutes; however, the futures market leads price 
discovery over the medium term.  F-statistics reported in Panel B provide further evidence 
of the price discovery relationship between interest rate swap and futures.  The rejection 
of T1 and T2 demonstrates a strong bi-directional flow of information between the swap 
 
38 For simplicity, it is reported the first ten leads and lags coefficients, however, the lead/lag model is 
estimated using twenty leads and lags as explained in Equation (4.1). 
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and futures markets.39  These results confirm that price discovery between the short-term 
interest rate swap and futures markets is largely contemporaneous, in support of 
hypothesis !8,$.    
4.4.2 The Impact of Macroeconomic Information Releases 
This section reports the results for the test of hypothesis !8,%. In particular, this section 
explains whether the futures market leads the swap market in price discovery around the 
release of macroeconomic announcements.    
Panel A of Table 4-3 documents that, when the lead-lag model is estimated on non-
announcement days, seven lagged futures prices (k=-1 to k=-7) are significantly positive, 
which implies that the futures market leads the swap market by up to seven minutes.40   In 
addition, coefficients on seven lead futures prices (k=+1 to k=+7) are significantly 
positive at the 0.01 level, suggesting a seven minutes feedback from the swap market to 
the futures market.  These results demonstrate that the price discovery relationship 
between the swap and futures markets is highly contemporaneous on non-announcement 
days.  When the lead-lag model is estimated on macroeconomic announcement days, four 
lead futures prices (k=+4 to k=+7) become insignificant, implying that the futures market 
becomes the source of price discovery in the short-term interest rate market on 
announcement days.  The lead of the futures market is also evidence in the magnitude of 
the significant lead and lag coefficients on announcement days.  The sum of the 
significant lag coefficients (k=-1 to k=-7) is 0.276, three times the size of the significant 
 
39 T1 tests whether the sum of the first ten lead coefficients are equal to zero (∑ -(./$0/1$ = 0). T2 examines 
whether the sum of the first ten lag coefficients are equal to zero (∑ -(./2$0/12$ = 0). 
40 Table 4-3 presents the coefficients estimated using the nearby futures contract as the independent variable. 
In addition, it is estimated the lead/lag model on announcement and non-announcement days using the 
deferred futures contract and find similar results under the two models.   
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lead coefficients (k=+1 to k=+3) of 0.090.  These findings indicate that the futures market 
leads price discovery on days with macroeconomic information which are accompanied 
by increases in informed trading and information asymmetry in the market, in support of 
hypothesis !8,%.  This result is consistent with the Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley (1996) 
theory that price discovery occurs in the market with lowest transaction costs.  As 
demonstrated in Table 4-1, the cost of trading in the futures market is relatively lower 
than the cost of trading in the interest rate swap market during the daytime session.41 
4.4.3 Price Discovery in Overnight Trading Markets  
This section reports the results for the test of hypothesis !8,". In particular, this section 
explains whether the swap market leads the futures market in price discovery during 
overnight trading.       
Table 4-4 presents the results for the lead/lag model in overnight markets.  Panel A 
documents that, when the coefficients are estimated for the overnight session before 
midnight, two lagged futures prices (k=-1 and k=-2) around the contemporaneous 
coefficient (k=0) are significantly positive at the 0.01 level, which implies that the futures 
market leads the swap market by up to two minutes.  In addition, coefficients on two lead 
futures prices (k=+1 and k=+2) around the contemporaneous coefficient (k=0) are 
significantly positive at the 0.01 level, suggesting that information flows from the swap 
market to the futures market by up to two minutes.  These results demonstrate that the 
transmission of information between the swap and futures markets is largely 
contemporaneous during overnight trading before midnight.  When coefficients are 
 
41 In an additional study, Appendix B investigates how information flows within the swap market when 
macroeconomic information is released. This study focuses on price leadership across local and foreign 
banks in the swap market.  
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estimated for the overnight session after midnight, the lag coefficient k=-2 becomes 
insignificant, implying that higher transaction costs (see Table 4-1) in the futures market 
after midnight reduce information transmission from the futures market to the swap 
market from two minutes to one minute in duration.  These results demonstrate a largely 
contemporaneous relationship between the swap and futures market in the overnight 
market before midnight; however, the swap market becomes the source of price discovery 
in the second half of the overnight session.  F-statistics reported in Panel B provide an 
additional insight into the price discovery relationship between interest rate swap and 
futures in overnight markets.  The rejection of T1 and T2 in the session before midnight 
demonstrates a strong bi-directional flow of information between the swap and futures 
markets.  However, the rejection of T1 and the failure to reject T2 in the session after 
midnight confirms that the swap market leads the futures market during this time period.  
These findings indicate that the swap market leads price discovery around the time that 
the U.S. and U.K. markets opens for trading – a period which previous research 
demonstrates increases information asymmetry and price volatility in the Australian 
overnight market. These results support hypothesis !8,".    
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Table 4- 2  
The Lead/Lag Relationship Between Swap and Futures Prices in Daytime 
Trading  
Note. Table 4-2 reports regression coefficients for the lead/lag model for daytime trading (8:28 
am to 4:30 pm) for the period 1 January 2013 to 1 April 2016. Model 1 presents the coefficients 
estimated using an OLS regression with one-minute intraday observations where the dependent 
variable is the change in the swap price and the independent variable is the change in the nearest-
to-delivery quarterly futures contract price. Model 2 presents the coefficients estimated when the 
independent variable is the change in the quarterly deferred futures contract price. Panel B 
reports the F-statistics of Wald tests on coefficient restrictions for T1 and T2.  ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01.  
Coefficients from lead/lag OLS regression   
  Nearby Contract  Deferred Contract 
  Coefficient  T-statistic  Coefficient  T-statistic 
Intercept  0.0000  0.36  0.0000  0.18 
9 t+10  0.0014  0.42  0.0042  1.03 
9 t+9  0.0018  0.50  0.0051  1.70 
9 t+8  0.0055  1.50  0.0013  0.23 
9 t+7  0.0069  1.87  0.0020  0.67 
9 t+6  0.0164  4.43***  0.0032  1.05 
9 t+5  0.0138  3.74***  0.0057  1.88 
9 t+4  0.0136  3.69***  0.0129  4.25*** 
9 t+3  0.0205  5.55***  0.0164  5.43*** 
9 t+2  0.0249  6.74***  0.0261  8.64*** 
9 t+1  0.0389  10.57***  0.0397  13.13*** 
9 t  0.3077  83.64***  0.3304  109.49*** 
9 t-1  0.0495  13.46***  0.0380  12.60*** 
9 t-2  0.0228  6.19***  0.0289  9.56*** 
9 t-3  0.0160  4.34***  0.0173  5.73*** 
9 t-4  0.0275  7.49***  0.0159  5.26*** 
9 t-5  0.0074  2.02**  0.0011  0.37 
9 t-6  0.0132  3.60***  0.0103  3.42*** 
9 t-7  0.0266  7.26***  0.0159  5.28*** 
9 t-8  0.0052  1.42  0.0123  4.09*** 
9 t-9  0.0022  0.60  0.0060  1.99 
9 t-10  0.0064  1.76  0.0019  0.62 
         
Panel B: Hypothesis tests (F-test)      
T1: ∑ -(./$0/1$   100.23***    107.64*** 




Table 4- 3  
The Lead/Lag Relationship Between Swap and Futures Prices on 
Announcement and Non-Announcement Days 
Note. Table 4-3 reports the regression coefficients for the lead/lag model on macroeconomic 
announcement and non-announcement days for the period 1 January 2013 to 1 April 2016. Panel 
A presents the coefficients estimated using an OLS regression with one-minute intraday 
observations where the dependent and independent variables are the change in the swap price 
and nearby futures contract price, respectively. Panel B reports the F-statistic for Wald tests on 
coefficient restrictions for T1 and T2.  ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Coefficients from lead/lag OLS regression   
  Announcement Days  Non-Announcement Days 
  Coefficient  T-statistic  Coefficient  T-statistic 
Intercept  0.0000  0.06  0.0000  0.43 
9 t+10  0.0089  1.19  0.0017  0.30 
9 t+9  0.0026  0.35  0.0008  0.19 
9 t+8  0.0065  0.87  0.0050  1.16 
9 t+7  -0.0032  -0.44  0.0100  2.30** 
9 t+6  0.0019  0.25  0.0147  3.40*** 
9 t+5  0.0112  1.51  0.0137  3.18*** 
9 t+4  0.0079  1.07  0.0152  3.52*** 
9 t+3  0.0282  3.79***  0.0160  3.71*** 
9 t+2  0.0333  4.48***  0.0194  4.50*** 
9 t+1  0.0292  3.93***  0.0432  10.03*** 
9 t  0.3992  53.81***  0.2689  62.44*** 
9 t-1  0.0747  10.06***  0.0401  9.31*** 
9 t-2  0.0333  4.48***  0.0169  3.93*** 
9 t-3  0.0276  3.31***  0.0115  2.68*** 
9 t-4  0.0525  7.09***  0.0157  3.64*** 
9 t-5  0.0306  4.13***  0.0015  0.34 
9 t-6  0.0189  2.55**  0.0097  2.26** 
9 t-7  0.0391  5.28***  0.0205  4.79*** 
9 t-8  0.0030  0.41  0.0056  1.31 
9 t-9  -0.0033  -0.45  0.0031  0.72 
9 t-10  -0.0025  -0.34  0.0027  0.28 
         
Panel B: Hypothesis tests (F-test)      
T1: ∑ -(./$0/1$   22.67***    68.25*** 
T2: ∑ -(./2$0/12$    48.71***    51.84*** 
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Table 4- 4  
The Lead/Lag Relationship Between Swap and Futures Prices in  
Overnight Markets 
Note. Table 4-4 reports the regression coefficients of the lead/lag model on overnight trading 
before midnight (5:08 pm to 11:59 pm) and after midnight (12:00 am to 7:00 am) for the period 
1 January 2013 to 1 April 2016. Panel A presents the coefficients estimated using an OLS 
regression with one-minute intraday observations where the dependent and independent 
variables are the change in the swap price and nearby futures contract price, respectively. Panel 
B reports the F-statistics of Wald tests on coefficient restrictions for T1 and T2.  ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 
   
  Before Midnight  After Midnight 
  Coefficient  T-statistic  Coefficient  T-statistic 
Intercept  0.0000  0.02  0.0000  0.04 
9 t+10  0.0044  1.15  -0.0042  -0.29 
9 t+9  0.0132  3.46***  0.0155  3.87*** 
9 t+8  -0.0005  -0.12  -0.0007  -0.17 
9 t+7  0.0025  0.65  0.0097  2.43** 
9 t+6  0.0111  2.92***  0.0166  4.15*** 
9 t+5  0.0023  0.61  0.0036  0.91 
9 t+4  0.0084  2.21**  0.0025  0.61 
9 t+3  0.0042  1.11  -0.0010  -0.57 
9 t+2  0.0255  6.75***  0.0335  8.41*** 
9 t+1  0.0300  7.96***  0.0168  4.21*** 
9 t  0.0247  6.55***  0.1898  47.73*** 
9 t-1  0.2355  62.52***  0.0181  4.56*** 
9 t-2  0.0158  4.21***  0.0014  0.34 
9 t-3  0.0050  1.32  0.0068  1.73 
9 t-4  0.0055  1.46  0.0067  1.68 
9 t-5  0.0067  1.80  -0.0052  -1.31 
9 t-6  0.0097  2.59***  0.0073  1.85 
9 t-7  0.0039  1.05  -0.0047  -0.47 
9 t-8  -0.0048  -1.29  0.0027  0.69 
9 t-9  0.0065  1.74  -0.0079  -2.00 
9 t-10  0.0037  0.99  0.0018  0.67 
         
Panel B: Hypothesis tests (F-test)      
T1: ∑ -(./$0/1$   43.22***    14.22*** 




4.5 Robustness Test  
In addition to a lead-lag model, this study implements the Information Leadership Share 
(ILS) model that controls for any differences that might exists in noise levels across the 
two markets. This model is estimated using intraday 1-minute observations from 8:30 am 
to 4:30 pm AEST.42  The aim of using intraday observations to estimate the Yan and Zivot 
(2010) and Putnins (2013) Information Leadership Share (ILS), is to analysis how 
information is incorporated into the interest rate market and how this has changed over 
time. Specifically, this robustness test estimates ILS by combining the Hasbrouck (1995) 
Information Share (IS) and the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) Component Share (CS).43   
The IS and CS are estimated using a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) where if 
two time series are cointegrated of order (1,1), IS and CS decompose price innovations 
into temporary and permanent components as specified by the following equations 
(Hauptfleisch and Putnins, 2016)44:  
 
 
42 The 90-days BABs futures contracts trade from 8:28 am AEST to 4:30 pm AEST at the Australian 
Security Exchange (ASX) whereas interest rate securities such as deposits and swaps trade 24-hours in the 
OTC market. However, trading volume and liquidity is concentrated around Australian daytime working 
hours.   
43 This study calculates the Information Leadership Share using one-minute intraday data for each day in 
the sample period, the daily estimates are then averaged for each year in the sample. This provides a clear 
view of changes in price discovery over time.   
44  Before undertaking the cointegration test, this study must evaluate whether the time series for the 
theoretical and actual swap price are integrated of the same order. Using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test 
(ADF), this study can infer the number of unit roots in each time series to determine whether both variables 
are integrated of order I (1). If both time series are integrated of order I(1), it is possible to measure whether 
the series are cointegrated by estimating the long run equilibrium between the two variables using OLS at 
price levels and testing the regression residuals for the presence of a unit root with an ADF test. If the 
residuals are stationary, it is concluded that the two series are cointegrated of order (1,1).  
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where  ∆'( is the change in the log of the swap price (SF) and ∆FF	is the change in the log 
of the futures price (FF). Equation (4.2) infers that current changes in swap prices are 
determined by the lagged values of ∆'( and ∆3( whereas Equation (4.3) postulates that 
current changes in futures prices are determined by the lagged values of ∆'( and ∆3(. 
Following Baillie et al. (2002) and Hauptfleisch and Putnins (2016), IS and CS are 
estimated using the error correction coefficients and variance covariance of the error 








where H'I is the Component Share of the swap market and H'K	is the Component Share 
of the futures market. As in Zhang and Wei (2010), if the error terms are free of 





























where Y'I  is the Information Share of the interest rate swap market and Y'K  is the 
Information Share of the interest rate futures market.  A problem with IS and CS is that 
these two methods are affected by the relative level of noise between the two markets 
causing price discovery for the market with the lowest noise level to be overstated.  Given 
that IS focus on the speed at which prices are incorporated into prices and CS explains 
the relative levels of noise, a combination of these two models provides a more accurate 
measure of the speed at which prices impound new information while controlling for the 
relative levels of noise across markets. This additional measure of price discovery, 
namely Information Leadership Share (ILS), is developed in Yan and Zivot (2010) and 







































where YZ'I is the Information Leadership Share of the interest rate swap market and YZ'K 
is the Information Leadership Share of the interest rate futures market. Since the sum of 
these two components equals to one, the market with the highest Information Leadership 
Share (ILS) is considered to be the source of price discovery under this model. In this 
research, ILS is implemented as a robustness test since it indicates where information first 
enters the market after controlling for the level of noise across the swap and futures 
markets. 
4.5.1 Price Discovery Using Information Leadership Share  
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This section reports the robustness test of hypothesis !8,$ . In particular, this section 
explains whether the flow of information between the swap and futures markets is 
contemporaneous for all days.        
Figure 4-2 presents the estimation results of ILS based on the Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM).45  The results are estimated on a daily basis and average for each year, 
this provides an understanding of the differences in mean levels of price discovery for the 
futures market over time. Similarly to the Sim (1972) model, ILS results show a strong 
contemporaneous relation between the swap and futures market on normal daytime 
trading sessions. However, futures market slightly leads price discovery during some 
periods. During 2008 and 2009, the futures market has an ILS close to 50%, after which 
it moves between 50% and 56% from 2010 to 2014. In 2015, there is an increase in the 
futures market ILS to 64%, however, ILS moves back to 50% in 2016, maintaining the 
bidirectional relation between the swap and futures markets. These results confirm that 
price discovery between the short-term interest rate swap and futures markets is largely 












45 Before implementing the Vector Error Correction model, it is important to test whether the two time-
series are cointegrated. First, this study confirms that both series are integrated of order I (1) using ADF 
test. Given that both series are found to be I (1), the present study confirms that the two series are 
cointegrated using a second ADF test on the residuals from the long-run relationship between the swaps 
and futures. This result is expected since it is known that an interest rate swap is a combination of different 
interest rate futures contracts, therefore, there is a strong relation between the two time-series.  
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Figure 4- 2  
Futures Market Price Discovery Shares from 2008 to 2016 
Note. Figure 4-2 shows the interest rate futures market share of price discovery from 
1 January 2008 to 1 April 2016. The Information leadership Share (ILS) measure of 
price discovery is presented as a yearly average of daily estimates. These daily 
estimates of price discovery are calculated using intraday data with a frequency of one 
minute.     
 
 
4.6 Summary  
This chapter explains the relationship that exists between the interest rate swap and 
futures markets. Results based on the first hypothesis !8,$ find evidence of a strong bi-
directional flow of information between the swap and futures markets during daytime 
trading sessions.  However, the lead/lag relationship between interest rate swap and 
futures contracts is influenced by macroeconomic information releases and overnight 
trading sessions – periods characterized by elevations in private information and informed 
trading.  Results based on the second hypothesis !8,% find that futures market prices lead 
the transmission of information during macroeconomic information releases when 
transaction costs are relatively lower in the futures market relative to the swap market. 
Furthermore, results based on the third hypothesis !8," report that the swap market prices 
lead price discovery during overnight trading after midnight, which are likely to be driven 
















the theory that price discovery is driven by transaction costs and liquidity. These findings 
confirm that, even though interest rate swaps have grown in importance in recent years, 
the 90-days futures contract is still a relevant instrument that provides similar exposure 
to the yield curve as interest rate swaps, as well as, an important source of price discovery 
for the interest rate market. Additionally, this research finds that information asymmetry 
between the swaps and futures market is very similar and information is incorporated at 
a similar rate in the two markets. This is understandable given that, although new market 
participants have entered the futures market, informed traders remain the same across the 












5.1 Introduction  
This chapter investigates the impact of HFT on the intraday speed of adjustment and price 
discovery following scheduled macroeconomic announcements for interest rate 
derivatives. The introduction of co-location at the ASX provides an exogenous event used 
to examine how HFT affects volatility and liquidity in the interest rate derivatives market.  
In addition to Chapter 4, which studies price discovery in the interest rate derivatives 
market around information releases, this chapter also compares the lead-lag effects 
between swaps and futures in the pre- and post-colocation periods. This provides a 
comparison of the impact of HFT activity on price discovery between the two markets.  
Chapter 2 demonstrates that macroeconomic announcement periods provide a different 
informational environment compared to normal trading days (Andersen and Bollerslev, 
1998; Ederington and Lee, 1993; Cai et al., 2001; Frino and Hill, 2001). Nevertheless, the 
impact of co-location on HFT activity on days with macroeconomic information releases 
in futures and swap markets remains unresolved in the literature. In addition, the impact 
of HFT on the flow of information between the swap and futures markets also remains a 
gap in the current literature.  
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 explains the data 
implemented in this study and provides institutional detail for swap and futures markets. 
Section 5.3 details different market quality measures used to explain the impact of HFT 
and co-location on market quality. In addition, this section explains the Sims (1972) 
model implemented to measure price discovery in the interest rate market. Section 5.4 
demonstrates the empirical evidence of the impact of High Frequency Trading on market 
quality around macroeconomic information releases in the swap and futures markets, as 
well as, the impact of HFT on the flow of information across the two markets. Section 
5.5 concludes the chapter.  
5.2 Data 
The data for this study are sourced from the Thomson Reuters Tick History Data Base 
(TRTH) maintained by the Securities Industries Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA).  
From this dataset, intraday bid and ask price, bid and ask size, and traded price and 
volume for the Australian 90-day bank accepted bill (90-day BABs) futures contracts 
traded on the Australian Security Exchange (ASX) from 2 March 2010 to 19 February 
2014 is collected.46   Over-the-counter (OTC) quote data for the Australian one-year 
interest rate swap contract is also collected from TRTH on an intraday basis for the period 
2 March 2010 to 19 February 2014. This database includes indicative quotes provided by 
approved dealers and contributors.47   For both swaps and futures contracts, the mid-quote 
is calculated as the average of the best bid and ask quotes which reduces the effect of bid-
 
46 Although the 90-days BABs futures is traded on a quarterly expiration cycle (March, June, September 
and December), this study uses the nearby futures contract and roll to the deferred contract at expiry date. 
In order to remove outliers in the futures dataset, this study includes days on which there are less than 10 
contracts transacted, and observations with bid-ask spreads smaller than the minimum tick. 
47 Indicative quotes are expressed in yields in the OTC swap market, therefore, this analysis converts the 
quotes to prices by deducting the yield from 100 (ASX, 2017).  
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ask bounce (Hauptfleisch, Putnins and Lucey, 2016). Data for interest rate swap and 
futures contracts are collected for the daytime trading session from 8:28 am AEST to 4:30 
pm AEST.  
This study investigates the impact of the increase in high frequency traders (HFT) after 
co-location was introduced in Australia on price volatility, market liquidity and price 
discovery. Using the introduction of co-location in Australia on the 20 February 2012, 
this analysis divides the period 2 March 2010 to 19 February 2014 into two sub-periods. 
The period from 2 March 2010 to 19 February 2012 is classified as the “Pre Co-location” 
sample, and the period from 21 February 2012 to 19 February 2014 is classified as the 
“Post Co-location” sample.    
Macroeconomic announcements are collected from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS) and include the date, announcement type and release time for major 
macroeconomic announcements in Australia. Following Frino and Hill (2001), this study 
selects the types of announcements with a significant impact on market volatility. On this 
basis, the selected six types of announcements are: Consumer Price Index, Gross 
Domestic Product, Producer Price Index, Retail Sales, Building Approvals, and 
Unemployment Rate. In total, there are 159 macroeconomic information releases between 
2 March 2010 and 19 February 2014, in which 79 announcements occur in the pre co-
location period and 80 in the post co-location period.48  
5.2.1 Institutional Detail  
The Australian 90-day bank accepted bill futures contract, introduced in 1979, has 
become one of the most liquid contracts in the world, trading a daily average of 114,805 
 
48 In this study, only major announcements released at 11:30 am AEST are considered, therefore, the 
announcements are not affected by the pre-market opening and closing phases.  
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contracts in 2017, six times higher than the daily average turnover of the SPI futures 
contract (AFMA, 2017).  The 90-day futures contract trades at the ASX Trade24 on a 
quarterly expiration cycle (March, June, September and December) from 8:28 am AEST 
to 4:30 pm AEST, and 5:08 pm AEST to 7:00 am AEST during the winter period from 
the second Sunday in March until the first Sunday in November, as well as from 8:28 am 
AEST to 4:30 pm AEST, and 5:08 pm AEST to 7:30 am AEST during the summer period 
from the first Sunday in November until the second Sunday in March.   
Australian interest rate swaps are mostly traded in the over-the-counter market. Swap 
trading comprises regular voice dealer trading and exchange-like trading platforms with 
central limit order books.  In Australia, swap trading is dominated by voice dealers, and 
only a small proportion of trades is executed on exchange-like trading platforms, 
including the Australian Market Licence (AML) regime, swap execution facilities (SEF) 
and multilateral trading facilities (MTF). 
5.3 Method 
This section describes different measures for HFT activity, volatility, and liquidity 
implemented to estimate the impact of co-location on HFT and the speed of adjustment 
of the market following information releases. In addition, it presents a model that 
standardizes the metrics for the information content in the announcement, and a model of 
price discovery to investigate the impact of HFT on the flow of information across the 
swap and futures markets.   
5.3.1 Message Traffic 
During the sample period from 2 March 2010 to 19 February 2014, the Australian futures 
market experienced significant improvements in the speed of trading and dramatic growth 
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in HFT, stimulated by the introduction of co-location facilities on 20 February 2012. As 
HFTs cannot be explicitly identified in the Australian futures data which remains an 
anonymous market, this analysis employs message traffic to measure HFT.49  The HFT 
proxy is then used to quantify the change in the extent of HFT in the Australian interest 
rate futures market. In this study, message traffic is defined as the sum of changes in the 
order book for each one-minute interval. The larger the message traffic is, the more active 
high frequency traders are.  
5.3.2 Volatility 
The measure of volatility is calculated following McInish and Wood (1992) as the 
standard deviation of mid-point quotes during each five-minutes interval: 
\]^_`a^a`b( = c







   
(5.1) 
where d> is the mid-point quote price i, de is the average quote price during interval t, `> 
is the amount of time d> is alive during interval t, and n is the total number of quotes in 
interval t.  
5.3.3 Bid-Ask Spreads 
The impact of high-frequency trading associated with macroeconomic information 
releases might not only affect volatility, but also market liquidity. An important measure 
of market liquidity is the bid-ask spread which is a component of trading costs as 
mentioned in Frino, Jones, Lepone and Wong, 2014. To measure bid-ask spread, it is 
implemented a measure similar to McInish and Wood (1992) defined as:  
 









  (5.2) 
where hkli,(>  is the ask price i in interval t of the day d; gami,(>  is the bid price i in interval 
t of the day d; and 	oi,( is the total number of quotes in interval t of the day d. 
5.3.4 Market Depth 
Another important measure of market liquidity is market depth (Lee, Mucklow and Ready, 
1993). This study calculates market depth using available quote sizes at the first level as 







  (5.3) 
where gam	'atAi,(>  and hkl	'atAi,(>  are the bid and ask sizes at price i in interval t of the day 
d, and  oi,( is the total number of quotes in interval t of the day d. 
5.3.5 Intraday Analysis and Estimated Parameters 
In order to measure the effect of HFT activity on market quality around macroeconomic 
information announcements, this research evaluates intraday volatility and liquidity 
around the release time of the reports before and after the introduction of co-location.50   
Following Gajewski (1999) and Frino et al. (2017), volatility and liquidity is measured as 
the difference between the actual value and a benchmark value. The benchmark value is 
estimated using observations from 50 to 20 minutes prior to each information release. 
 
50 Liquidity is measured using bid-ask spread and market depth for the descriptive statistics analysis. 
However, the intraday liquidity analysis is estimated only using bid-ask spreads since bid and ask sizes are 
not available for the OTC swap market.   
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This benchmark is implemented to standardize the volatility and liquidity measures for 
each macroeconomic announcement. Specifically, excess volatility and liquidity are 
estimated as: 
xyzAkki,( 	= 	hz`5_^i,( −	gAozℎU_{li    (5.4) 
where hz`5_^i,( is the actual value for volatility or bid-ask spread in minute interval t for 
announcement d, and gAozℎU_{li  is the mean volatility or bid-ask spread calculated 
from interval -50 to -20 on announcement day d.     
5.3.6 Modelling Price Discovery 
Based on prior research, the method implements a lead/lad model as in Frino, Walter and 
West (2000) that investigates the impact of co-location on the price discovery relationship 
between the swap and futures markets during macroeconomic information releases. 
Coefficients of the lead/lag model are calculated by regressing measures of one-minute 
swap prices against lagged, contemporaneous and leading futures prices as follows:  




  (5.5) 
where ∆'( is the change in the swap price over interval t, ∆3( is the change in the futures 
price over interval t, and 5( is the error term.51  Under the lead/lag equation, the futures 
market leads the swap market when the k < 0 coefficients (lagged futures prices) are 
significant while the k > 0 coefficients (lead futures prices) are insignificant. Alternatively, 
 
51 This analysis ignores the 20 minutes around trading breaks to prevent comparing prices across market 
breaks (Frino, Walter and West, 2000).    
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the swap market leads the futures market, when the k < 0 coefficients (lagged futures 
prices) are insignificant while the k > 0 coefficients (lead futures prices) are significant.  
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This section reports the results for the test of hypothesis !|,$. In particular, this section 
explains whether the introduction of co-location at the ASX increases high frequency 
trading around information releases in interest rate markets.         
Descriptive statistics are presented for futures and swap contracts and are based upon data 
in the four-year period from 2 March 2010 to 19 February 2014, coinciding with a 48-
month event window centred on the introduction of co-location facilities in the Australian 
futures market. Table 5-1 reports the average number of quotes, volatility, level 1 quoted 
depth, quoted bid-ask spread and messages for swap and futures contracts during the pre 
and post co-location periods. Statistics are presented in Table 5-1 for all trading days 
(Panel A), only announcement days (Panel B), a 1-hour window surrounding 
announcement releases (Panel C), and non-announcement days (Panel D). 
Table 5-1 shows that message traffic increases for BABs futures contracts from an 
average of 2,338 intraday 1-minute messages to 3,785 following the introduction of co-
location. This is consistent with previous literature that demonstrates an increase in HFT 
activity after the introduction of co-location in Australia (Frino, Mollica and Webb, 2014). 
Overall, it is observed a significant reduction in the average daily volatility following co-
location for both swap and futures contracts. Similarly, there is an improvement in the 
liquidity measures with a significant reduction in bid-ask spread for both swaps and 
futures, and an increase in market depth for the futures market. These results demonstrate 
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that the introduction of co-location not only improves market quality in the futures market, 
but also has a positive impact on liquidity and volatility in the swap market, in support of 
hypothesis !|,$.52  
 
52  Given the implied relationship that exists between the interest rate swap and futures markets, the 
introduction of co-location in the futures market is expected to also have an impact on the OTC swap market.   
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Table 5- 1  
Descriptive Statistics of One-Year SWAPs and BABs Futures 
Note. Table 5-1 documents summary statistics of liquidity variables for interest rate swaps and futures during the two-
year “Pre” co-location period from 2 March 2010 to 19 February 2012, the two-year “Post” co-location period from 
21 February 2012 to 19 February 2014, and the four-year period (“All”) around colocation from 2 March 2010 to 19 
February 2014.  Table 5-1 reports volatility as the standard deviation of mid-quoted prices, quoted spread as the 
difference between the best prevailing quotes, level 1 depth as the average of the ask and bid sizes, and message as 
the number of records. Summary statistics of liquidity variables are presented for all days in each sample in Panel A, 
only announcement days in Panel B, 30 minutes before and after announcements in Panel C, and non-announcement 
days in Panel D.  
  
1-year Interest Rate Swaps    90-day Bank Accepted Bills Futures 
  










Panel A. All Days           
                  
Pre  289 0.016 4.48   2338 0.012 1.02 1379 
Post  287 0.009 2.91   3785 0.009 1.01 2200 
All 288 0.012 3.64   3067 0.010 1.02 1793 
                  
Panel B. Announcement Days           
                  
Pre  339 0.023 4.31   2617 0.022 1.02 1373 
Post  477 0.017 3.08   4192 0.015 1.02 2037 
All 410 0.020 3.71   3402 0.019 1.02 1715 
                  
Panel C. Announcements (News Release Window)           
                  
Pre  77 0.017 4.41   666 0.013 1.06 1089 
Post  120 0.012 3.00   999 0.011 1.04 1734 
All 90 0.013 3.66   837 0.012 1.05 1421 
                  
Panel D. Non - Announcement Days           
                  
Pre  282 0.013 4.27   2056 0.008 1.02 1398 
Post  328 0.009 3.05   3522 0.006 1.01 2403 
All 305 0.011 3.74   2752 0.007 1.02 1875 
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5.4.2 Magnitude of Information Content Across Sub-Periods 
It might be possible that the value of information released in macroeconomic 
announcements is systematically different before and after co-location which could bias 
the results. To test for this, this study compares the absolute mean returns for each sub-
period around the time that macroeconomic information is released. Specifically, it is 
calculated the return using the mid-quoted price 30 minutes before the macroeconomic 
announcement and 30 minutes after the announcement is released.53  In Table 5-2, the 
analysis compares the magnitude of price changes on announcement days (Experimental 
sample) and non-announcement days (Control sample) for interest rate futures (Panel A) 
and swaps (Panel B) during the pre and post colocation periods. Although there are some 
differences between the absolute average returns across the two periods, t-statistics testing 
the mean difference of returns are not statistically significant for both swaps and futures. 
This implies that the magnitude of the macroeconomic information releases across the 




53 As the reports are released at 11:30 am AEST, returns are calculated using the mid-quoted price at 11:00 
am AEST and 12:00 pm AEST for both swaps and futures.  
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Table 5- 2  
Comparison of Magnitude of Information Content Before and After 
Co-location 
Note. Table 5-2 reports the sample absolute mean returns in basis points on announcement 
days (Experimental Sample) and non-announcement days (Control Sample) for the “Pre 
Co-location” period from 2 March 2010 to 19 February 2012 and the “Post Co-location” 
period from 21 February 2012 to 19 February 2014. Returns are calculated using quoted 
prices 30 minutes prior to the announcement and 30 minutes after the announcement is 
released. Part A presents the difference in absolute mean returns for the 90-day Bank 
Accepted Bills Futures, while Part B reports the difference in absolute mean returns for 
the one-year interest rate swaps. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
  Experimental Sample   Control Sample 
  Mean (bps) S.D (bps)   Mean (bps) S.D (bps) 
Panel A. Futures         
            
Pre Co-location 3.74 7.47   0.68 1.14 
Post Co-location 2.29 4.26   0.49 0.79 
Mean Difference -1.45     -0.19   
T-Value -1.51     -1.40   
            
Panel B. Swaps         
            
Pre Co-location 3.53 3.96   1.11 1.28 
Post Co-location 2.23 2.27   0.88 0.84 
Mean Difference -1.30     -0.23   












5.4.3 The Impact of High Frequency Trading on Price Volatility 
This section reports the results for test of hypothesis !|,% . In particular, this section 
explains whether the increased level of high frequency trading leads to improved 
volatility in swap and futures markets around macroeconomic news releases.          
Table 5-3 reports the average mid-quoted price volatility for each five-minute interval 
around the release of macroeconomic information on both announcement days 
(Experimental sample) and non-announcement days (Control sample) for the periods 
before and after co-location. Results show that, before co-location, the difference in 
volatility across announcement and non-announcement days for the futures market is 
statistically significant for up to 10 minutes leading to the release of information and 35 
minutes following information releases. After co-location, the difference in volatility 
across sub-periods is reduced to five minutes leading to the release of information and 25 
minutes following information releases. Results demonstrate that the introduction of co-
location reduces the time required for volatility to return to equilibrium in the futures 
market. Similarly, results for the swap market show that, before co-location, the 
difference in volatility across announcement and non-announcement days is statistically 
significant for up to 10 minutes leading to the release of information and 45 minutes 
following information releases. After co-location, the difference in price volatility across 
sub-periods is reduced to 40 minutes following information releases. These results 
demonstrate that the introduction of co-location not only reduces the time required for 
volatility to return to equilibrium in the futures market, but also reduces the time required 





Table 5- 3  
Intraday Excess Volatility for BABs Futures and One-Year SWAPs 
Note. Table 5-3 reports the intraday average excess volatility for the “Pre Co-location” period from 2 March 2010 to 19 February 2012 and 
the “Post Co-location” period from 21 February 2012 to 19 February 2014. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the mid-
quoted prices for each five-minute interval. Differences between announcement days (Experimental sample) and non- announcement days 
(Control sample), along with the t-statistics, are provided. The Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney (WMW) statistics are also reported for additional 
robustness. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Pre Co-location  Post Co-location 
  Exp. Sample 
Control 
Sample Diff. T-stat WMW   
  Exp.  Sample 
Control 
Sample Diff. T-stat WMW 
Panel A. Futures                 
                          
-3 0.0004 0.0004 0.0000 0.045 4272.0   -3 0.00037 -0.00004 0.0004 1.703 4189.5 
-2 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0009 3.105*** 4991.0***   -2 0.00025 -0.00016 0.0004 1.679 3982.0 
-1 0.0018 0.0002 0.0016 5.117*** 5978.5***   -1 0.00153 0.00019 0.0013 3.762*** 5063.5*** 
0 0.0066 0.0008 0.0058 6.348*** 6870.0***   0 0.00549 0.00060 0.0049 6.398*** 6487.0*** 
1 0.0018 0.0002 0.0016 5.086*** 5562.0***   1 0.00154 0.00021 0.0013 4.315*** 5165.0*** 
2 0.0016 0.0001 0.0016 4.618*** 5296.5***   2 0.00101 0.00013 0.0009 2.982*** 4754.5*** 
3 0.0007 0.0002 0.0005 1.766* 4469.5   3 0.00076 0.00051 0.0002 0.817 3959.5 
4 0.0007 0.0001 0.0006 1.941* 4486.0   4 0.00070 -0.00017 0.0009 2.979*** 4322.0** 
5 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0012 2.115** 4613.0**   5 0.00004 -0.00019 0.0002 0.958 3905.0 
6 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0006 2.196** 4676.0*   6 0.00012 0.00001 0.0001 0.367 3658.0 
7 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 0.963 4435.0   7 0.00005 0.00001 0.0000 0.146 3683.5 
8 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0004 1.449 4250.0   8 -0.00006 -0.00026 0.0002 0.805 3368.5 
9 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0005 1.707 4179.0   9 -0.00017 -0.00009 -0.0001 -0.322 3176.0 
                          
Panel B. Swaps                 
                          
-3 -0.0002 0.0010 -0.0011 -1.647 3974.0   -3 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0007 1.680 4775.0 
-2 0.0011 -0.0007 0.0018 3.072*** 5741.5***   -2 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0007 1.664 4743.0 
-1 0.0011 0.0000 0.0010 1.792* 5593.5***   -1 0.0006 0.0001 0.0005 1.278 4726.0 
0 0.0067 0.0004 0.0063 5.965*** 7098.0***   0 0.0050 0.0005 0.0046 6.745*** 6523.0*** 
1 0.0020 -0.0001 0.0021 3.921*** 6084.0***   1 0.0015 0.0000 0.0015 3.788*** 5847.0*** 
2 0.0015 -0.0007 0.0022 3.438*** 6239.5***   2 0.0013 -0.0005 0.0019 5.391*** 6061.0*** 
3 0.0016 -0.0004 0.0020 2.71*** 5860.0***   3 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0011 3.31*** 5475.0*** 
4 0.0011 -0.0002 0.0014 2.092** 5677.0***   4 0.0009 -0.0002 0.0012 2.7*** 5266.0*** 
5 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0011 1.665* 5662.0***   5 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0010 3.162*** 5303.0*** 
6 0.0014 0.0001 0.0013 1.818* 5590.0***   6 0.0008 0.0001 0.0007 1.637 4990.5** 
7 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0006 1.075 5194.0*   7 0.0005 -0.0004 0.0010 2.834*** 4974.0** 
8 0.0002 -0.0006 0.0008 1.107 5423.0**   8 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0002 0.482 4295.0 
9 0.0001 -0.0010 0.0011 1.822* 5308.0**   9 -0.0001 -0.0006 0.0004 1.187 4785.0 
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5.4.4 The Impact of High Frequency Trading on Bid-Ask Spreads 
This section reports the results for test of hypothesis !|," . In particular, this section 
explains whether the increased level of high frequency trading leads to improved liquidity, 
measured in terms of bid-ask spread, in swap and futures markets around macroeconomic 
news releases.          
Table 5-4 reports the average bid-ask spreads for each five-minute interval around the 
release of macroeconomic information on both announcement days (Experimental sample) 
and non-announcement days (Control sample) for the periods before and after co-location. 
Results show that, before co-location, the difference in bid-ask spreads across 
announcement and non-announcement days for the futures market is statistically 
significant for up to 10 minutes leading to the release of information and 25 minutes 
following information releases. After co-location, the difference in bid-ask spreads across 
sub-periods is reduced to 10 minutes leading to the release of information and 10 minutes 
following information releases. These results demonstrate that the introduction of co-
location reduces the time required for bid-ask spreads to return to equilibrium in the 
futures market. Similarly, results for the swap market show that, before co-location, the 
difference in bid-ask spreads across announcement and non-announcement days is 
statistically significant for up to five minutes leading to the release of information and 
five minutes following information releases. After co-location, the difference in bid-ask 
spreads across sub-periods is reduced to only five minutes following information releases. 
These results demonstrate that the introduction of co-location not only reduces the time 
required for bid-ask spreads to return to equilibrium in the futures market, but also reduces 
the time required for adjustment in the swap market, in support of hypothesis !|,".  
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Table 5- 4  
Intraday Excess Bid-Ask Spreads for BABs Futures and One-Year SWAPs 
Note. Table 5-4 reports the intraday average excess quoted bid-ask spread for the “Pre Co-location” period from 2 March 2010 to 19 
February 2012 and the “Post Co-location” period from 21 February 2012 to 19 February 2014. The bid-ask spread is calculated for each 
five-minute interval using the difference between the best prevailing quotes for the 90-day Bank Accepted Bills Futures and 1-year interest 
rate swaps. Differences between announcement days (Experimental sample) and non- announcement days (Control sample), along with the 
t-statistics, are provided. The Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney (WMW) statistics are also reported for additional robustness. * p < 0.1, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Pre Co-location  Post Co-location 
  Exp. Sample 
Control 
Sample Diff. T-stat WMW   
  Exp.  Sample 
Control 
Sample Diff. T-stat WMW 
Panel A. Futures                 
                          
-3 0.008 -0.002 0.009 0.622 4046.0   -3 0.011 -0.002 0.013 1.324 3910.0 
-2 0.045 -0.001 0.047 2.384** 4985.5**   -2 0.009 -0.006 0.014 2.096** 3745.0 
-1 0.210 -0.003 0.213 4.938*** 6226.5***   -1 0.110 0.003 0.107 3.261*** 4795.5*** 
0 0.268 0.015 0.254 4.852*** 6487.5***   0 0.088 0.001 0.087 5.331*** 5632.0*** 
1 0.016 -0.002 0.017 1.118 5138.5***   1 0.023 -0.006 0.029 3.122*** 4362.0* 
2 0.023 -0.006 0.029 1.763* 4591.5*   2 0.014 0.003 0.010 0.935 4070.0 
3 -0.008 -0.002 -0.006 -0.346 4037.0   3 0.008 0.014 -0.006 -0.134 3235.5 
4 0.056 -0.008 0.064 2.664*** 4628.0   4 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.167 3830.0 
5 0.075 -0.014 0.089 2.239** 4765.5*   5 0.009 -0.007 0.017 1.708 4051.5 
6 -0.020 -0.009 -0.011 -0.621 4500.5   6 -0.015 -0.003 -0.012 -1.515 3331.0 
7 -0.021 -0.009 -0.011 -0.523 4071.0   7 -0.015 -0.001 -0.014 -1.257 3259.0 
8 -0.026 -0.017 -0.008 -0.455 4422.0   8 -0.007 -0.005 -0.002 0.063 3256.0 
9 -0.031 -0.013 -0.019 -1.080 4315.0   9 -0.009 -0.005 -0.004 -0.224 3003.0 
                          
Panel B. Swaps                  
                          
-3 -0.141 0.068 -0.208 -0.788 2194.0   -3 -0.009 0.042 -0.051 -0.847 1441.0 
-2 -0.145 -0.167 0.021 0.447 2524.0   -2 0.079 0.028 0.051 0.187 1493.0 
-1 0.123 -0.117 0.241 1.713* 2630.0*   -1 -0.060 0.008 -0.068 -0.902 1362.0 
0 0.051 -0.214 0.265 2.078** 3253.0*   0 0.155 -0.016 0.171 1.957* 1873.0** 
1 0.064 0.016 0.048 0.694 2613.5   1 0.087 0.092 -0.005 0.292 1978.0 
2 -0.062 -0.149 0.087 0.901 2262.0   2 -0.070 0.080 -0.151 -1.507 1572.0 
3 -0.080 0.014 -0.094 0.047 2466.0   3 -0.067 0.069 -0.136 -1.021 1644.0 
4 0.172 -0.017 0.189 1.363 2276.0   4 -0.028 0.067 -0.095 -1.412 1546.0 
5 0.107 0.133 -0.027 0.088 2302.0   5 -0.071 0.002 -0.073 -0.904 1662.0 
6 -0.187 -0.002 -0.185 -0.580 2338.0   6 -0.130 -0.006 -0.124 -1.533 2027.0 
7 -0.373 -0.191 -0.181 -0.542 2122.0   7 0.054 -0.002 0.056 0.970 1833.0 
8 0.356 -0.107 0.463 0.908 1854.0   8 0.054 0.072 -0.018 -0.750 1385.0 
9 -0.027 -0.112 0.085 1.614 2028.0   9 0.024 0.152 -0.128 -0.586 1401.0 
 
 140 
5.4.5 The Impact of High Frequency Trading on Price Discovery 
This section reports the results for test of hypothesis !|,8 . In particular, this section 
explains whether the lead role of the futures market on days with macroeconomic 
information releases increases given the heightened level of high frequency trading in the 
interest rate market.          
Table 5-5 shows that when the lead-lag model is estimated on announcement days during 
the two-years period before co-location, four lagged futures prices (k=-1 to k=-4) are 
significantly positive, which implies that the futures market leads the swap market by up 
to four minutes.  Additionally, coefficients on two lead futures prices (k=+1 to k=+2) are 
significantly positive at the 0.01 level, suggesting a two minutes feedback from the swap 
market to the futures market. These results demonstrate that the futures market leads price 
discovery on announcement days during the period before co-location. When the lead-lag 
model is estimated on announcement days during the two-years period after co-location, 
two additional lag futures prices (k=-5 and k=-6) become significantly positive, implying 
that the lead of the futures market increases after co-location. These findings indicate that 
co-location increases the speed at which information is incorporated into the futures 
markets, and therefore, strengthening the lead of the futures market on macroeconomic 
information releases, in support of !|,8.  
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Table 5- 5  
Price Discovery in the Interest Rate Market Before and After Co-location 
Note. Table 5-5 reports the regression coefficients of the lead/lag model for the pre and post 
colocation periods implemented using an OLS regression with one-minute intraday observations 
where the dependent and independent variables are the change in the swap price and nearby 
futures contract price, respectively.  ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
    Pre Co-location   Post Co-location 
    Coefficient   T-statistic   Coefficient   T-statistic 
Intercept   0.0000   0.00   0.0000   0.09 
9 t+10   -0.0051   -0.42   0.0089   1.15 
9 t+9   -0.0063   -0.52   0.0061   0.78 
9 t+8   0.0009   0.08   0.0061   0.79 
9 t+7   -0.0091   -0.76   -0.0013   -0.17 
9 t+6   0.0131   1.09   0.0135   1.74 
9 t+5   0.0153   1.28   0.0140   1.81 
9 t+4   0.0215   1.79   -0.0012   -0.16 
9 t+3   -0.0095   -0.79   0.0030   0.21 
9 t+2   0.0356   2.97***   0.0200   2.58*** 
9 t+1   0.0673   5.56***   0.0522   6.73*** 
9 t   0.4144   34.30***   0.3152   40.68*** 
9 t-1   0.1877   15.53***   0.2176   28.09*** 
9 t-2   0.0769   6.36***   0.0457   5.90*** 
9 t-3   0.0588   4.87***   0.0340   4.39*** 
9 t-4   0.0523   4.38***   0.0158   2.04** 
9 t-5   0.0078   0.65   0.0166   2.13** 
9 t-6   0.0213   1.78   0.0249   3.22*** 
9 t-7   0.0000   0.00   0.0121   1.57 
9 t-8   0.0166   1.39   0.0115   1.49 
9 t-9   0.0024   0.20   0.0106   1.37 






The introduction of co-location in Australia on 20 February 2012 creates a natural 
experiment in which it is possible to test the impact of HFT on the speed of adjustment 
to new information. Frino, Mollica and Webb (2014) presents the first Australian 
evidence on the impact of co-location on High Frequency Trading and market quality in 
the futures market on normal trading days. This chapter extends their work by 
investigating the impact of co-location on HFT on days with macroeconomic information 
releases, and not only in the futures market, but also in the swap market. Announcement 
periods represent a different informational environment which increases information 
asymmetry in the market. Therefore, it is important to determine whether co-location 
mitigates the damage to market quality and price discovery.    
Results based on hypotheses !|,$, !|,%, and !|," find that following the introduction of 
co-location, there is an improvement in the speed at which volatility and bid-ask spread 
return to equilibrium for both interest futures and swaps. Furthermore, results based on 
hypothesis !|,8	show that HFT increases the speed at which information is incorporated 
into the futures market, therefore strengthening the lead effects of futures on scheduled 











This thesis examines information asymmetry in modern derivatives markets. In particular, 
it investigates the formation of information asymmetry in the market when 
macroeconomic information is released, the impact of news announcements on market 
quality, and the role of High Frequency Traders around the release of information. The 
three topics discussed in this thesis provide a better understanding of the causes and 
consequences of the breadth component of information asymmetry in derivatives 
markets. More specifically, this thesis considers the role of trading breaks in containing 
market quality deterioration, the price discovery relationship between the swap and 
futures markets when macroeconomic information is released, and the impact of HFT on 
market quality and price discovery around information releases. An understanding of the 
causes and consequences of asymmetric information in derivatives markets is relevant to 
market participants, exchanges and, in particular, regulators who need to ensure a healthy 
and liquid financial market.    
The volume of literature review presented in Chapter 2 highlights different important 
topics which are currently understudied and exposes gaps in the existing literature. First, 
Chapter 2 explains that there are contradictory predictions for determining whether 
information should be released before trading breaks or during continuous trading. 
Advocates of trading halts argue that they provide an opportunity for information to be 
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disseminated which reduces uncertainty, thereby reducing price volatility and improving 
liquidity (IOSCO [International Organization of Securities Commissions], 2002). In 
contrast, others argue that trading halts deprive the market of the ability of “learning 
through trading”, thereby increasing uncertainty, exacerbating price volatility and 
reducing liquidity (see Lee, Ready and Seguin, 1994). Second, although the negative 
impact of trading halts on market quality is notorious in studies implemented in the equity 
market (Lee et al., 1994; Christie, Corwin and Harris ,2002; Frino, Lecce and Segara, 
2011), Chapter 2 demonstrate that these results should not be generalisable to 
macroeconomic information and futures markets since the release time of macroeconomic 
information is typically scheduled many months in advance and is well known by all 
market participants and easy for them to discover, unlike company-specific information 
which occurs more randomly through time. In addition, macroeconomic information 
influences a large number of traded securities, including over-the-counter (OTC), off-
market and overseas-traded securities, unlike information released by companies which 
is more likely to be stock-specific and influence only the security to which it relates. 
Third, although there is extensive literature examining the relationship between stock and 
stock index futures markets (e.g. Grunbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz, 1994; Min and 
Najand, 1999; Shyy, Vijayraghavan and Scott-Quinn, 1996), stock and stock option 
markets (e.g. O’Connor, 1999; Stephan and Whaley, 1990; Chan, Chung and Johnson, 
1993), and interest rate and interest rate futures markets (e.g. Scalia, 1998; Poskitt, 1999), 
Chapter 2 identifies limited research on the price discovery relationship across different 
types of interest rate derivatives markets. Fourth, Chapter 2 indicates that the two main 
theories for the location of price discovery (Grunbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz ,1994; 
Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley, 1996) produce conflicting predictions about whether the 
swap market is expected to lead the futures market at the short end of the yield curve. 
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Fifth, Chapter 2 identifies a lack of research that examine the location of price discovery 
in short-term interest rate markets during periods of highly informed trading. These 
particular periods are important since macroeconomic information releases have an 
impact on prices of interest rate futures (Ederington and Lee, 1993), and are therefore 
likely to create information asymmetries and informed trading around the time that they 
are released. Sixth, Chapter 2 indicates that macroeconomic announcement days represent 
a different informational environment compared to normal trading days (Frino and Hill, 
2001; Ederington and Lee, 1993, 1995; Cai, Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998; Cheung and 
Wong, 2001) and provides evidence of the debate over the advantages and disadvantages 
of increased HFT activity. Given the importance of co-location in recent years and its 
impact on HFT activity in the market, it is important to understand the impact of HFT on 
market quality and price discovery when macroeconomic information is released for both 
interest rate swaps and futures.   
Chapter 3 extends the analysis of Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) by examining the role of 
trading breaks in the futures market around macroeconomic information announcements, 
in particular, the impact of trading halts on market quality. Chapter 3 compares an 
experimental sample of days with information releases with a control sample of non-
announcement days, and builds on work from Martens and Van Dijk (2007), McInish and 
Wood (1992), and Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) to measure the impact of imposing 
trading breaks on volatility, bid-ask spreads and depth. Chapter 3 examines the behaviour 
of different market quality measures following WASDE report releases for soybean and 
corn futures contracts every 1 and 10-minute intervals. The release of the report is 
assumed to affect information asymmetry in the market since different market 
participants incorporate macroeconomic news at different speeds. In support of 
hypothesis !",$ , Chapter 3 demonstrates that trading breaks provide enough time for 
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investors to analyse the information contained in the report, thus preventing the 
deterioration of the market in terms of volatility and liquidity. This result agrees with the 
current view of market regulators which supports the implementation of trading breaks 
as it is considered beneficial for the liquidity and quality of the market. Regarding 
hypothesis !",% , further analysis on market quality using bid-ask spreads and depth 
indicates that information asymmetry increases around WASDE announcements and 
liquidity declines significantly without a trading halt. In general, Chapter 3 suggests that 
trading halts are beneficial in reducing information asymmetry and price volatility, and 
improving market liquidity. As a suggestion to market regulators, it is recommended to 
consider moving the release time of the WASDE report from 11 am CT to the trading 
break period before market opens at 8:30 am CT. It is important to mention that, although 
this change might improve market quality, it might not be beneficial for all market 
participants, especially, high frequency traders who take advantage of the high volatility 
to profit in the market. These results improve the understanding of the role of trading halts 
in the futures market around the release of information.    
The second set of results presented in Chapter 4 examines price discovery between 
interest rate swaps and futures by comparing macroeconomic announcement and non-
announcement days. Macroeconomic announcement days have an impact on prices of 
interest rate futures (see Ederington and Lee, 1993), and therefore are likely to create 
information asymmetries and informed trading around the time that they are released. In 
addition, Chapter 4 also tests the price discovery relationship between the swap and 
futures markets in overnight markets. The overnight market is particularly interesting in 
Australia, as it is punctuated by the opening of both U.S. and U.K. markets, which creates 
price volatility (Frino and Hill, 2000; Zou, Rose and Pinfold, 2006).  This is likely to 
create information asymmetry and informed trading, and therefore provides another 
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natural laboratory experiment for testing the location of price discovery in the presence 
of higher informed trading. In support of hypothesis !8,$, Chapter 4 finds evidence of a 
strong bi-directional flow of information between the swap and futures markets during 
daytime trading sessions. This result implicates that the OTC market provides an 
important source of price discovery for derivatives markets. However, the lead/lag 
relationship between interest rate swap and futures contracts is influenced by 
macroeconomic information releases and overnight trading sessions. Specifically, 
Chapter 4 finds that futures market prices lead the transmission of information during 
macroeconomic information releases when transaction costs are relatively lower in the 
futures market relative to the swap market, in support of hypothesis H8,%. This result 
agrees with the current view that information is incorporated first in the futures markets 
around the release of substantial information, and therefore, the lit market still provides 
an important source of price discovery. In addition, Chapter 4 finds that the swap market 
prices lead price discovery during overnight trading after midnight, which are likely to be 
driven by an increase in transactions costs for futures markets, in support of hypothesis 
!8,". This finding should be considered by the ASX as overnight markets are an important 
source of price discovery for some market participants. Similarly, regulators should 
follow in more details these markets as they can have an impact on prices in the lit market. 
These results are consistent with the theory that price discovery is driven by transaction 
costs and liquidity. The results reported in Chapter 4 improve the understanding of price 
discovery around macroeconomic announcements in the interest rate derivatives market.   
The final set of results presented in Chapter 5 focus on an important topic related to the 
debate on High Frequency Trading, and its impact on market quality and price discovery. 
Chapter 5 uses the introduction of co-location in the Australian market to investigate the 
role of algorithmic traders and their impact on market quality, liquidity and price 
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discovery around macroeconomic information releases. Chapter 5 compares futures and 
swaps markets responses to macroeconomic information releases across the pre-and-post 
periods. Chapter 5 extends previous intraday studies in equity markets to interest rate 
derivatives markets. Interest rate futures have a number of unique features that may lead 
to differences in the speed of adjustment to new information, relative to equities, as 
futures are more sensitive to new information and tend to lead the underlying spot market 
(Frino and West, 2003), and the intraday patterns in interest rate futures are more 
responsive to macroeconomic announcements (Ederington and Lee, 1995) compared to 
equities (Andersen, et al., 2000). In support of hypothesis !|,$, Chapter 5 shows that co-
location increases HFT activity around information releases. This result should be study 
in more detail by the exchange and regulators since new technologies might have an 
unexpected impact on the market. In addition, Chapter 5 finds that following the 
introduction of co-location, there is an improvement in the speed at which volatility, bid-
ask spread and depth return to equilibrium for both interest futures and swaps, which 
agrees with hypotheses !|,% and !|,". This result extends the current literature on whether 
HFT is beneficial for derivatives markets.  In addition, this study finds that HFT increases 
the speed at which information is incorporated into the futures market, and therefore, 
strengthens the lead effects of futures on scheduled news release days. This result 
supports hypothesis !|,8  and implicates that the introduction of co-location provides 
more benefits to the futures markets compared the swap market in terms of price 
discovery. Therefore, the exchange should promote the reduction of latency with new 
technologies.  
Some limitations and directions for futures research can be derived from each chapter. 
Results in Chapter 3 are particular to the agricultural futures markets, therefore, it is 
important to investigate in future research whether the impact of trading breaks on market 
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quality around the release of macroeconomic information is also significant for other 
futures markets such as currency or fixed income. In addition, the type of report (WASDE 
releases) is a particular and focused report for agricultural markets, however, other futures 
markets do not have a complete report that provides price discovery. In future research, 
it would be important to investigate whether trading breaks imposed in times of high 
volatility in futures markets behave different to pre-scheduled trading breaks. Results in 
Chapter 4 can be enhanced in future research by using different models of price discovery 
that control for the noise in the market. In addition, it would be important to replicate the 
results in Chapter 4 by incorporating more macroeconomic announcements such as the 
release of the BBSW. In future research, it is possible to investigate how information 
flows from other markets to the Australian market during overnight trading. In Chapter 
5, it would be important to control for the amount of information release across 
experimental and control samples, as well as, across sub-periods. Future research can 
implement a matching methodology as a robustness test to the current results. In addition, 
an Information Leadership Model can be implemented as a measure of price discovery to 
improve the accuracy of the price discovery model. Results in Chapter 5 are limited to 
the introduction of co-location in the Australian market, future research can explore the 
impact of co-location in other markets, such as U.S. and European markets. It is also 
possible to measure how HFT can be affected by other technologies and its impact on 
market quality.       
This thesis discusses the determinants and consequences of information asymmetry in 
modern derivatives markets, and demonstrates that: (1) trading breaks are beneficial for 
the futures markets since they improve market quality around the release of substantial 
information; (2) the futures markets leads price discovery around macroeconomic 
information releases and overnight trading; (3) High Frequency Traders have a positive 
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impact on market quality around information releases, and enhance the lead effect of the 
futures market on price discovery.    
 
 151 
Appendix A  
Robustness Tests for the Role of Trading Breaks in the Futures Market    
A.1 Additional Measures of Volatility for Soybeans Futures Contracts  
Two additional measures of volatility, price volatility and frequency of price changes, are 
estimated as a robustness test. 54   Table A-1 and A-2 present the results for the 
aforementioned two metrics for soybeans contracts, and suggest that with a trading halt 
for market participants to process the information from the reports, excess volatility on 
WASDE days persists for 20 minutes following the release of the WASDE reports.55  On 
the contrary, once the trading halt is removed during the “Continuous Trading” period, 
high volatility on WASDE days persists for approximately 70 minutes. This analysis 
concludes that releasing the WASDE report during the trading halt significantly reduces 
market volatility since it provides enough time to investors to analyze the information 
contained in the reports.  
 










    
(A.1) 
where ~i,(>  is the price i in interval t of the day d, ~i,( is the mean price in interval t of the day d and i,( 
the number of price changes in interval t of day d. The frequency of price changes in an interval, is obtained 
by counting the number of price changes in each interval t on day d. 
55 During the “Trading Break” period, WASDE reports are released at 7:30 am and the day session opens 
at 9:30 am, hence there is a 2-hour trading break prior to the commencement of trading. 
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Table A- 1  
Intraday Standard Deviation of Prices for Soybeans Contracts 
Note. Table A-1 reports intraday average standard deviation of prices for the Trading Break period where WASDE reports are released at 7:30 am, and the Continuous Trading period where 
WASDE reports are released at 11:00 am. The standard deviation of prices is estimated for soybean contracts each ten-minute interval. Differences between WASDE days (Experimental sample) 
and non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample), along with the t-statistics are provided. Due to the small size of the two sample periods, the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney statistics are also 
reported for additional robustness. The number of observations in the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. ***, **, and * represents statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
"Trading Break" Period  "Continuous Trading" Period 
Time Experimental Sample 
Matched Control 
Sample Difference T-statistics WMW  
Time Experimental Sample 
Matched Control 
Sample Difference T-statistics WMW 
6:30 0.345 0.274 0.1 1.626 784*  10:20 0.589 0.625 0.0 -0.493 594.0 
6:40 0.373 0.374 0.0 -0.017 628.0  10:30 0.615 0.715 -0.1 -1.187 533.0 
6:50 0.432 0.431 0.0 0.017 626.0  10:40 0.637 0.688 -0.1 -0.572 621.0 
7:00 0.559 0.403 0.2 2.694*** 861.0***  10:50 0.951 0.841 0.1 0.714 762.0* 
7:10 0.457 0.362 0.1 1.877* 775.0*  11:00 4.518 0.739 3.8 11.223*** 1215.0*** 
9:30 3.157 1.900 1.3 4.282*** 928.0***  11:10 1.883 0.795 1.1 6.755*** 1090.0*** 
9:40 1.900 1.420 0.5 1.935* 817.0**  11:20 1.419 0.754 0.7 4.458*** 984.0*** 
9:50 1.327 1.310 0.0 0.101 598.0  11:30 1.212 0.679 0.5 4.817*** 972.0*** 
10:00 1.149 1.055 0.1 0.651 685.0  11:40 1.116 0.603 0.5 3.759*** 940.0*** 
10:10 1.093 1.076 0.0 0.115 629.0  11:50 1.062 0.552 0.5 5.367*** 1029.0*** 
10:20 0.956 0.996 0.0 -0.266 681.0  12:00 0.896 0.722 0.2 1.646 765.0* 
10:30 0.954 0.840 0.1 1.021 760.0  12:10 0.823 0.686 0.1 1.466 738.0 
10:40 0.834 0.897 -0.1 -0.650 585.0  12:20 0.829 0.650 0.2 1.971* 748.0 
10:50 0.862 0.717 0.1 1.445 693.0  12:30 0.773 0.627 0.1 1.569 720.0 
11:00 0.680 0.817 -0.1 -1.565 469.0  12:40 0.721 0.686 0.0 0.378 644.0 
11:10 0.726 0.836 -0.1 -0.883 594.0  12:50 0.795 0.699 0.1 0.870 708.0 
11:20 0.732 0.785 -0.1 -0.490 578.0  13:00 0.849 0.748 0.1 1.031 711.0 
11:30 0.776 0.739 0.0 0.358 628.0  13:10 0.826 0.949 -0.1 -1.243 539.0 
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Table A- 2  
Intraday Frequency of Price Changes for Soybeans Contracts 
Note. Table A-2 reports intraday average frequency of prices changes for the Trading Break period where WASDE reports are released at 7:30 am, and the Continuous Trading period where 
WASDE reports are released at 11:00 am. Frequency of price changes is estimated for soybeans during each ten-minute interval. Differences between WASDE days (Experimental sample) and 
non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample), along with the t-statistics are provided. Due to the small size of the two sample periods, the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney statistics are also reported 
for additional robustness. The number of observations in the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. ***, **, and * represents statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
"Trading Break" Period  "Continuous Trading" Period 
Time Experimental Sample 
Matched Control 
Sample Difference T-statistics WMW  
Time Experimental Sample 
Matched Control 
Sample Difference T-statistics WMW 
6:30 14.514 12.382 2.1 0.779 786.5*  10:20 117.686 116.543 1.1 0.086 626.0 
6:40 19.400 15.571 3.8 1.569 748.5  10:30 125.829 130.286 -4.5 -0.368 595.0 
6:50 25.600 21.200 4.4 1.210 798.5**  10:40 134.829 114.057 20.8 1.591 770.5* 
7:00 39.800 31.286 8.5 1.491 820.0**  10:50 240.057 159.800 80.3 2.755*** 944.5*** 
7:10 36.343 21.629 14.7 4.103*** 925.5***  11:00 2549.143 154.486 2394.7 11.778*** 1225.0*** 
9:30 1573.629 936.543 637.1 4.138*** 922.0***  11:10 823.971 150.857 673.1 6.68*** 1189.0*** 
9:40 652.714 511.400 141.3 1.962* 820.5**  11:20 444.800 137.857 306.9 6.743*** 1095.0*** 
9:50 438.714 369.600 69.1 1.419 736.5  11:30 305.514 127.686 177.8 5.497*** 1076.5*** 
10:00 324.629 313.771 10.9 0.268 695.0  11:40 267.886 97.629 170.3 4.853*** 1090.5*** 
10:10 263.086 252.886 10.2 0.306 672.0  11:50 245.686 93.571 152.1 6.63*** 1063.5*** 
10:20 232.086 262.400 -30.3 -0.628 736.5  12:00 196.286 119.600 76.7 3.112*** 909.5*** 
10:30 212.029 232.229 -20.2 -0.551 684.0  12:10 156.257 116.429 39.8 1.993* 808.0** 
10:40 168.600 188.629 -20.0 -0.924 564.5  12:20 186.571 122.571 64.0 2.539** 823.5** 
10:50 158.629 151.600 7.0 0.377 661.0  12:30 166.714 130.886 35.8 1.622 775.5* 
11:00 154.114 177.686 -23.6 -1.018 537.5  12:40 165.800 130.600 35.2 1.486 743.0 
11:10 147.086 169.486 -22.4 -1.003 552.0  12:50 164.714 140.829 23.9 1.240 764.0* 
11:20 135.886 149.086 -13.2 -0.642 534.0  13:00 234.486 188.600 45.9 1.578 728.0 
11:30 152.343 173.429 -21.1 -0.651 646.0  13:10 476.914 437.971 38.9 0.808 706.0 




A.2 Additional Control of Information Content for Soybeans Futures 
Contracts  
Although it has been demonstrated that the information content of the WASDE report has 
not changed significantly over the sample period,56  This study additionally controls for 
any small difference in the size of the information released across the two sub-periods.  
To control for this, each WASDE day in the “Trading Break” period is matched with the 
closest in return WASDE day in the “Continuous Trading” sample, any matched returns 
that exceed a 1% difference between the two periods are eliminated.57   The final sample 
consists of 60 WASDE reports: 30 reports for the “Trading Break” period and 30 reports 
for the “Continuous Trading” period.   Each of these WASDE days is matched to a non-
WASDE day observation as it was previously done for each sub-period.58  This matching 
procedure controls for any significant change in the size of information content across 
and within sample periods.  
Table A-3 presents intraday price range, bid-ask spread and depth for the two sub-periods 
after tightly controlling for any small difference in the size of the information content of 
the WASDE reports. 59   The results confirm that, with a trading break for market 
participants to process the information from the reports, excess volatility on WASDE 
 
56 Table 3-1 (Part A) shows that the information content has not changed significantly over the study’s 
sample period by comparing the average return on WASDE days for the two sub-samples.  
57 After implementing the matching mechanism across periods, 5 (five) WASDE day observations were 
eliminated from each sub-period, and the difference in mean absolute returns between these two samples is 
approximately zero (0.1%) and insignificant.  
58 This study matches each WASDE day in a sub-period with the non-WASDE day with the closest return 
on the same day of the week and time of the day within the sub-period.  
59 Table A-3 presents the difference in means between the WASDE and non-WASDE samples for the 
volatility and liquidity measures, along with t-statistics.  
 
 155 
days persists for just 20 minutes after the release of the report, and there is no significant 
impact on bid-ask spread and depth. On the contrary, if the report is released during 
continuous trading, high volatility and bid-ask spread on WASDE days persist for 60 and 
70 minutes, respectively. Moreover, depth is lower on WASDE days for at least 40 
minutes after the release of the report. These results confirm previous findings in Chapter 
3 that releasing substantial information during trading halts reduces market volatility and 







Table A- 3  
Volatility and Liquidity Measures for Soybeans Contracts 
Note. Table A-3 reports the difference in Price Range, Bid-Ask Spread and Depth between WASDE (Experimental sample) and non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample) for the Trading 
Break and Continuous Trading periods. For each 10-minute interval, Price Range is measured using the difference between the highest and lowest price, Bid-ask Spread is calculated using the 
difference between the best prevailing quotes, and Depth is measured using all available quotes at the best level in the market for soybeans. The number of observations in each of the sample 
periods is 30. ***, **, and * represents statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
"Trading Break" Period    "Continuous Trading" Period  




  Difference 
T-
statistics 
  Difference 
T-
statistics   Time Difference 
T- 
statistics 
  Difference 
T-  
statistics 
  Difference 
T- 
statistics 
6:30 0.08 0.533   3.67 1.315   -1365.9 -0.717   10:20 0.13 0.397   -0.18 -0.469   -7088.9 -1.560 
6:40 0.02 0.092   1.89 0.795   -1242.3 -0.539   10:30 -0.28 -0.871   -0.43 -1.123   -5310.0 -0.982 
6:50 -0.11 -0.618   1.32 0.403   -10805.7 -1.938*   10:40 -0.18 -0.516   -0.33 -0.727   -9086.3 -1.565 
7:00 0.68 2.913***   3.11 1.016   -1075.4 -0.348   10:50 0.46 0.846   2.79 3.696***   -17312.3 -3.097*** 
7:10 0.28 1.408   -0.07 -0.023   -1138.8 -0.356   11:00 15.13 12.811***   11.48 8.874***   -21261.3 -6.103*** 
9:30 4.01 3.665***   0.72 0.698   -2717.2 -0.871   11:10 4.65 6.759***   2.66 3.759***   -15139.5 -3.653*** 
9:40 2.62 3.856***   -0.59 -0.604   -2391.4 -0.621   11:20 2.93 4.784***   2.77 4.332***   -10171.8 -3.296*** 
9:50 0.62 1.008   -0.13 -0.160   -4707.5 -1.258   11:30 2.33 5.786***   1.36 2.551**   -7973.3 -1.872* 
10:00 0.63 1.230   -0.52 -0.671   -563.9 -0.124   11:40 1.85 3.693***   1.07 2.122**   -8502.6 -1.527 
10:10 0.06 0.107   -0.72 -0.890   -2504.7 -0.565   11:50 1.93 5.751***   1.19 2.475**   -6596.2 -1.155 
10:20 0.42 0.922   -1.20 -1.385   1246.2 0.276   12:00 0.76 1.964*   0.97 2.074**   -8436.9 -2.15** 
10:30 0.40 0.863   -0.80 -0.966   -1486.4 -0.264   12:10 0.50 1.289   0.71 1.461   -4877.4 -1.200 
10:40 -0.11 -0.307   -0.93 -1.168   -7138.5 -1.293   12:20 0.80 2.073**   0.78 1.643   -9063.1 -1.936* 
10:50 0.83 2.172**   -1.44 -1.734*   -2563.1 -0.499   12:30 0.68 2.018**   0.53 1.352   -4632.9 -1.332 
11:00 -0.21 -0.579   -1.20 -1.417   -3698.0 -0.664   12:40 0.10 0.287   -0.17 -0.360   -3199.9 -0.830 
11:10 0.21 0.492   -1.28 -1.389   -53.5 -0.010   12:50 0.45 1.313   0.26 0.520   -5647.5 -1.286 
11:20 0.30 0.859   -0.30 -0.333   -180.7 -0.041   13:00 0.47 1.299   -0.07 -0.139   -5753.6 -1.291 






A.3 Volatility and Liquidity Measures for Soybeans Contracts Using One-
minute Intervals  
As an additional robustness test for soybeans contracts, this study estimates the impact of 
trading halts on volatility and liquidity using one-minutes intervals. Table A-4 presents 
the average price range (price volatility) for each one-minute interval around the release 
time of WASDE reports on both WASDE and non-WASDE days for the two sub-
periods.60  During the “Trading Break” period, the difference in price volatility across 
WASDE and non-WASDE intervals is statistically significant for up to 20 minutes 
following the release of the WASDE reports. During the “Continuous Trading” period, 
WASDE reports are released at 11:00 am and the announcements occur during continuous 
trading.  The results reported in Table A-4 imply that price volatility for WASDE days is 
significantly greater than non-WASDE days for up to 60 minutes at the 0.05 level or 
better when results are released during continuous trading. The adjustment time during 
this period is greater than that reported for the “Trading Break” sub-period and suggests 
that releasing WASDE reports during continuous trading increases the trading time it 
takes for price volatility to return to equilibrium. These findings confirm previous results 
found when using 10-minute intervals that price volatility deteriorates during the 
continuous trading period.  
Table A-5 presents the results for bid-ask spreads on WASDE and non-WASDE days for 
the two sub-periods using one-minutes intervals. For the “Trading Break” period when 
WASDE reports are released during a trading break, bid-ask spreads for the WASDE 
 
60 For readability, tables showing intraday measures estimated using 1-minute intervals, report only t-
statistics. A positive t-statistic means that the average value of the WASDE sample is significantly higher 
than mean value of the non-WASDE sample. Similarly, a negative t-statistic means that the average value 
of the WASDE sample is significantly lower than the mean value of the non-WASDE sample.  
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sample are significantly greater than for the non-WASDE sample only for the first 10 
minutes following the resumption of trading after the release.61  In contrast, during the 
“Continuous Trading” period when WASDE reports are released during continuous 
trading, bid-ask spreads are significantly higher for the WASDE sample for up to 60 
minutes immediately following the release of the report.  When compared to the results 
for the “Trading Break” sub-period, these results confirm that releasing WASDE reports 
during continuous trading increases the trading time it takes for bid-ask spreads to return 
to equilibrium following the information release. These findings confirm previous results 
found when using 10-minute intervals that bid-ask spreads deteriorate during the 
continuous trading period.  
Table A-6 presents intraday market depth on WASDE and non-WASDE days for the two 
sub-periods using one-minutes intervals. During the “Trading Break” period, the 
difference in depth between WASDE release days and non-WASDE days is not 
significant for any of the time intervals immediately after the market resumes trading.   In 
sharp contrast, during the “Continuous Trading” period, there is evidence that market 
depth is lower on WASDE days for at least 40 minutes of trading immediately following 
the release of the report. Again, this confirms the notion that releasing WASDE reports 
during continuous trading exacerbates market depth and increases the trading time it takes 
for market depth to return to equilibrium following the information release. These 
findings confirm previous results found when using 10-minute intervals that depth 
deteriorates during the continuous trading period.  
Table A-7 and A-8 present the results for the price volatility and frequency of price 
changes measures, respectively. These tables suggest that with a trading halt for market 
 
61 The difference in bid-ask spreads between the two samples is significant at the 10% level.  
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participants to process the information from the reports, excess volatility on WASDE 
days persists for 20 minutes following the release of the WASDE reports. On the contrary, 
once the trading halt is removed during the “Continuous Trading” period, high volatility 
on WASDE days persists for approximately 70 minutes. These findings confirm the 
previous results found when using 10-minute intervals and suggest that releasing the 
WASDE report during the trading halt significantly reduces market volatility since it 





Table A- 4 
Intraday Price Range for Soybeans Contracts Each One-Minute Interval 
Note. Table A-4 reports the t-statistics of the difference in Price Range between WASDE (Experimental sample) and non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample) for the Trading Break (Panel 
A) and Continuous Trading periods (Panel B). For each one-minute interval, Price range is measured using the difference between the highest and lowest price. The number of observations in 
the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. ***, **, and * represents statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: "Trading Break" Period                              
Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat 
7:00 0.906 9:30 2.588** 9:41 1.795* 9:52 0.779 10:03 0.258 10:14 0.093 10:25 0.036 10:36 1.045 10:47 -0.709 10:58 -0.920 
7:01 2.161** 9:31 2.659*** 9:42 1.307 9:53 0.470 10:04 1.297 10:15 -0.189 10:26 -1.208 10:37 0.233 10:48 0.596 10:59 1.245 
7:02 0.040 9:32 3.507*** 9:43 0.860 9:54 -0.041 10:05 0.681 10:16 0.000 10:27 -0.402 10:38 0.534 10:49 -0.110 11:00 0.000 
7:03 -0.197 9:33 3.651*** 9:44 0.784 9:55 -0.911 10:06 1.436 10:17 -0.809 10:28 0.580 10:39 1.525 10:50 1.073 11:01 -1.205 
7:04 0.641 9:34 2.938*** 9:45 2.45** 9:56 1.444 10:07 0.170 10:18 -0.624 10:29 0.150 10:40 -0.823 10:51 1.119 11:02 0.205 
7:05 0.634 9:35 3.168*** 9:46 0.772 9:57 1.001 10:08 -0.464 10:19 -0.106 10:30 -1.365 10:41 0.770 10:52 1.324 11:03 0.731 
7:06 1.100 9:36 3.29*** 9:47 0.947 9:58 0.998 10:09 -0.258 10:20 -0.109 10:31 0.037 10:42 -1.110 10:53 0.565 11:04 -0.531 
7:07 3.124*** 9:37 2.57** 9:48 3.051*** 9:59 0.367 10:10 0.769 10:21 0.203 10:32 -0.140 10:43 0.420 10:54 -0.286 11:05 -0.206 
7:08 1.129 9:38 3.576*** 9:49 2.533** 10:00 -0.531 10:11 0.443 10:22 -0.308 10:33 -1.394 10:44 -0.741 10:55 -0.783 11:06 -0.064 
7:09 1.559 9:39 2.208** 9:50 1.878* 10:01 0.194 10:12 0.242 10:23 -0.766 10:34 0.493 10:45 -0.592 10:56 -0.353 11:07 -0.443 
7:10 2.116** 9:40 0.870 9:51 2.292** 10:02 0.995 10:13 -1.342 10:24 -0.324 10:35 0.234 10:46 -0.346 10:57 -0.455 11:08 -0.877 
Panel B: "Continuous Trading" Period                              
Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat 
10:20 0.951 10:31 -0.067 10:42 0.079 10:53 1.068 11:04 8.983*** 11:15 5.315*** 11:26 5.464*** 11:37 5.171*** 11:48 3.477*** 11:59 2.49** 
10:21 0.616 10:32 -0.529 10:43 -0.214 10:54 1.206 11:05 8.153*** 11:16 5.379*** 11:27 4.197*** 11:38 3.657*** 11:49 3.274*** 12:00 1.835* 
10:22 0.000 10:33 0.530 10:44 1.753* 10:55 3.176*** 11:06 6.155*** 11:17 6.523*** 11:28 4.736*** 11:39 5.074*** 11:50 4.832*** 12:01 3.176*** 
10:23 0.093 10:34 -0.902 10:45 2.003** 10:56 1.200 11:07 7.148*** 11:18 5.313*** 11:29 4.676*** 11:40 3.7*** 11:51 4.064*** 12:02 2.223** 
10:24 -0.424 10:35 -0.402 10:46 1.905* 10:57 1.729* 11:08 8.586*** 11:19 7.139*** 11:30 7.185*** 11:41 4.555*** 11:52 3.832*** 12:03 1.038 
10:25 0.000 10:36 -0.302 10:47 1.689* 10:58 3.789*** 11:09 6.755*** 11:20 5.203*** 11:31 2.828*** 11:42 2.517** 11:53 3.447*** 12:04 -0.554 
10:26 0.066 10:37 -1.201 10:48 0.313 10:59 5.57*** 11:10 6.657*** 11:21 4.702*** 11:32 4.379*** 11:43 3.604*** 11:54 4.804*** 12:05 1.433 
10:27 -1.140 10:38 -0.340 10:49 -0.167 11:00 11.223*** 11:11 7.904*** 11:22 5.629*** 11:33 3.705*** 11:44 3.542*** 11:55 3.887*** 12:06 3.608*** 
10:28 0.627 10:39 0.132 10:50 1.289 11:01 13.667*** 11:12 6.531*** 11:23 5.06*** 11:34 2.395** 11:45 3.994*** 11:56 2.63** 12:07 3.318*** 
10:29 -0.602 10:40 -0.767 10:51 -0.706 11:02 9.048*** 11:13 5.559*** 11:24 5.098*** 11:35 2.817*** 11:46 2.363** 11:57 5.129*** 12:08 3.561*** 





Table A- 5  
Intraday Bid-Ask Spreads for Soybeans Contracts Each One-Minute Interval 
Note. Table A-5 reports the t-statistics of the difference in Bid-Ask Spreads between WASDE (Experimental sample) and non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample) for the Trading Break 
(Panel A) and Continuous Trading periods (Panel B). For each one-minute interval, Bid-ask Spread is calculated using the difference between the best prevailing quotes. The number of 
observations in the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. ***, **, and * represents statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: "Trading Break" Period                              
Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat 
7:00 0.4240 9:30 2.575** 9:41 -0.376 9:52 0.810 10:03 -0.922 10:14 0.400 10:25 -1.363 10:36 0.685 10:47 -1.150 10:58 -0.314 
7:01 -0.0280 9:31 1.81* 9:42 0.167 9:53 0.717 10:04 -0.742 10:15 -0.357 10:26 -1.233 10:37 -0.059 10:48 -0.453 10:59 -1.071 
7:02 0.7240 9:32 1.795* 9:43 -0.462 9:54 0.414 10:05 -1.023 10:16 -1.639 10:27 -1.455 10:38 -0.485 10:49 -1.582 11:00 -0.148 
7:03 -0.9080 9:33 1.600 9:44 0.868 9:55 0.566 10:06 -0.284 10:17 -0.619 10:28 -0.397 10:39 -1.155 10:50 -1.451 11:01 -0.782 
7:04 -0.2250 9:34 1.556 9:45 1.776* 9:56 -0.305 10:07 0.192 10:18 -1.299 10:29 -1.019 10:40 -0.825 10:51 -1.493 11:02 -1.151 
7:05 -1.0790 9:35 1.486 9:46 0.554 9:57 -0.045 10:08 0.095 10:19 -1.071 10:30 -1.511 10:41 0.007 10:52 -1.432 11:03 -1.299 
7:06 0.6970 9:36 1.114 9:47 1.373 9:58 -1.046 10:09 0.533 10:20 -0.152 10:31 -1.335 10:42 -0.586 10:53 0.166 11:04 -1.325 
7:07 1.706* 9:37 0.596 9:48 -0.144 9:59 0.443 10:10 0.619 10:21 -0.568 10:32 -1.604 10:43 -1.363 10:54 -1.216 11:05 -1.271 
7:08 -0.8590 9:38 1.669* 9:49 0.087 10:00 0.014 10:11 -1.149 10:22 -0.353 10:33 -0.815 10:44 -1.344 10:55 -0.558 11:06 -0.797 
7:09 -0.2320 9:39 2.278** 9:50 0.522 10:01 -0.687 10:12 -0.258 10:23 -1.094 10:34 -1.536 10:45 -1.976* 10:56 -0.417 11:07 -0.213 
7:10 0.6720 9:40 1.985* 9:51 0.776 10:02 -0.040 10:13 -0.137 10:24 -1.266 10:35 -0.140 10:46 -0.504 10:57 -1.299 11:08 -0.821 
Panel B: "Continuous Trading" Period                              
Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat 
10:20 0.466 10:31 -1.487 10:42 -0.474 10:53 0.135 11:04 5.368*** 11:15 3.691*** 11:26 2.845*** 11:37 3.349*** 11:48 1.608 11:59 2.034** 
10:21 1.121 10:32 -0.778 10:43 -0.591 10:54 0.523 11:05 5.712*** 11:16 3.144*** 11:27 4.824*** 11:38 2.334** 11:49 1.047 12:00 0.268 
10:22 0.900 10:33 -0.451 10:44 -0.072 10:55 0.246 11:06 6.361*** 11:17 2.54** 11:28 3.292*** 11:39 2.982*** 11:50 2.493** 12:01 2.161** 
10:23 -0.734 10:34 -0.673 10:45 -0.442 10:56 0.683 11:07 4.941*** 11:18 3.311*** 11:29 3.779*** 11:40 0.670 11:51 1.931* 12:02 1.786* 
10:24 -1.294 10:35 -0.489 10:46 0.285 10:57 5.907*** 11:08 3.341*** 11:19 3.967*** 11:30 3.114*** 11:41 1.252 11:52 1.693* 12:03 2.588** 
10:25 -1.108 10:36 0.428 10:47 -0.611 10:58 7.82*** 11:09 4.177*** 11:20 3.521*** 11:31 2.357** 11:42 1.831* 11:53 1.426 12:04 1.981* 
10:26 1.891* 10:37 -0.708 10:48 0.357 10:59 7.905*** 11:10 4.335*** 11:21 4.25*** 11:32 2.773*** 11:43 1.672* 11:54 0.821 12:05 1.137 
10:27 0.151 10:38 0.283 10:49 0.998 11:00 12.246*** 11:11 4.756*** 11:22 2.456** 11:33 0.965 11:44 2.538** 11:55 0.857 12:06 1.414 
10:28 1.208 10:39 -0.832 10:50 1.828* 11:01 6.892*** 11:12 4.038*** 11:23 3.067*** 11:34 1.364 11:45 2.894*** 11:56 0.732 12:07 1.345 
10:29 -1.591 10:40 -0.766 10:51 0.072 11:02 6.382*** 11:13 4.509*** 11:24 3.496*** 11:35 0.823 11:46 1.953* 11:57 3.278*** 12:08 0.463 




Table A- 6 
Intraday Depth for Soybeans Contracts Each One-Minute Interval 
Note. Table A-6 reports the t-statistics of the difference in Depth between WASDE (Experimental sample) and non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample) for the Trading Break (Panel A) 
and Continuous Trading periods (Panel B). For each one-minute interval, Depth is measured using all available quotes at the best level in the market for soybeans. The number of observations 
in the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. ***, **, and * represents statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: "Trading Break" Period                              
Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat 
7:00 -1.093 9:30 0.454 9:41 1.088 9:52 -0.690 10:03 1.472 10:14 -0.203 10:25 1.533 10:36 1.610 10:47 -0.509 10:57 0.363 
7:01 -0.409 9:31 -0.411 9:42 1.014 9:53 -1.178 10:04 0.765 10:15 -0.241 10:26 1.614 10:37 -0.221 10:48 -0.059 10:58 0.913 
7:02 -1.854* 9:32 -0.799 9:43 1.376 9:54 -0.505 10:05 1.635 10:16 0.855 10:27 1.289 10:38 -1.039 10:49 -0.453 10:59 0.358 
7:03 -0.115 9:33 -1.365 9:44 -0.256 9:55 0.493 10:06 -1.125 10:17 0.760 10:28 0.253 10:39 -0.467 10:50 -0.491 11:00 1.185 
7:04 -0.075 9:34 1.172 9:45 -0.503 9:56 0.836 10:07 0.193 10:18 0.473 10:29 1.637 10:40 0.434 10:51 -0.073 11:01 -0.650 
7:05 -0.920 9:35 0.587 9:46 -0.235 9:57 -0.671 10:08 0.279 10:19 0.778 10:30 1.573 10:41 -0.157 10:52 0.228 11:02 0.263 
7:06 0.037 9:36 0.756 9:47 -0.255 9:58 0.488 10:09 -0.179 10:20 0.863 10:31 1.319 10:42 0.865 10:53 0.509 11:03 0.377 
7:07 -0.564 9:37 0.144 9:48 0.161 9:59 0.072 10:10 0.886 10:21 -0.145 10:32 0.069 10:43 -0.611 10:54 -0.409 11:04 -0.265 
7:08 -0.378 9:38 0.801 9:49 -0.169 10:00 0.205 10:11 -1.081 10:22 0.605 10:33 0.422 10:44 -0.207 10:55 0.650 11:05 1.138 
7:09 -1.295 9:39 -0.695 9:50 -1.164 10:01 0.800 10:12 0.107 10:23 -0.276 10:34 1.257 10:45 -0.082 10:56 -0.088 11:06 0.344 
7:10 -1.73* 9:40 0.711 9:51 0.098 10:02 1.151 10:13 0.976 10:24 0.790 10:35 0.939 10:46 -0.464 10:57 0.802 11:07 -0.676 
Panel B: "Continuous Trading" Period                              
Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat 
10:20 -1.443 10:31 -1.237 10:42 -1.97* 10:53 -2.234** 11:04 -5.835*** 11:15 -4.09*** 11:26 -3.837*** 11:37 -2.564** 11:48 -1.213 11:59 -2.815*** 
10:21 -0.337 10:32 -0.756 10:43 -0.892 10:54 -2.073** 11:05 -3.093*** 11:16 -2.5** 11:27 -3.923*** 11:38 -2.656*** 11:49 -1.254 12:00 -1.721* 
10:22 -1.106 10:33 -0.437 10:44 -0.996 10:55 -3.161*** 11:06 -3.601*** 11:17 -2.899*** 11:28 -3.584*** 11:39 -1.211 11:50 0.291 12:01 -0.863 
10:23 -1.189 10:34 -0.679 10:45 -1.899* 10:56 -2.863*** 11:07 -3.852*** 11:18 -2.02** 11:29 -2.796*** 11:40 -1.166 11:51 0.459 12:02 -2.871*** 
10:24 -1.927* 10:35 -1.244 10:46 -1.955* 10:57 -4.239*** 11:08 -3.926*** 11:19 -2.909*** 11:30 -1.009 11:41 -1.237 11:52 -2.509** 12:03 -1.402 
10:25 -2.353** 10:36 0.041 10:47 -2.005** 10:58 -5.895*** 11:09 -5.057*** 11:20 -2.461** 11:31 -3.06*** 11:42 -0.937 11:53 -1.979* 12:04 -0.760 
10:26 -1.053 10:37 -0.683 10:48 -2.019** 10:59 -6.96*** 11:10 -4.119*** 11:21 -2.693*** 11:32 -2.837*** 11:43 -0.700 11:54 -1.276 12:05 -1.655 
10:27 -0.860 10:38 -0.568 10:49 -1.924* 11:00 -4.526*** 11:11 -3.862*** 11:22 -2.874*** 11:33 -1.871* 11:44 -0.221 11:55 -1.192 12:06 -0.539 
10:28 -0.496 10:39 -0.526 10:50 -2.625** 11:01 -4.227*** 11:12 -4.243*** 11:23 -3.108*** 11:34 -1.806* 11:45 -2.384** 11:56 -1.241 12:07 -0.677 
10:29 -0.850 10:40 0.296 10:51 -2.903*** 11:02 -3.876*** 11:13 -4.185*** 11:24 -2.752*** 11:35 -2.801*** 11:46 -1.897* 11:57 -1.729* 12:08 -1.929* 
10:30 -1.193 10:41 -0.716 10:52 -2.966*** 11:03 -3.98*** 11:14 -3.815*** 11:25 -3.646*** 11:36 -1.498 11:47 -2.121** 11:58 -1.777* 12:09 -1.955* 
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Table A- 7 
Intraday Standard Deviation of Prices for Soybeans Contracts Each One-Minute Interval 
Note. Table A-7 reports the t-statistics of the difference in Standard Deviation of Prices between WASDE (Experimental sample) and non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample) for the 
Trading Break (Panel A) and Continuous Trading periods (Panel B). For each one-minute interval, the standard deviation of prices is estimated for soybean contracts. The number of observations 
in the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. ***, **, and * represents statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: "Trading Break" Period                              
Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat 
7:00 1.512 9:30 2.427** 9:41 1.630 9:52 0.602 10:03 -0.145 10:14 0.426 10:25 -0.264 10:36 1.139 10:47 -0.553 10:57 -1.365 
7:01 2.912*** 9:31 2.285** 9:42 1.419 9:53 0.500 10:04 1.336 10:15 -0.011 10:26 -1.060 10:37 -0.306 10:48 1.097 10:58 -0.168 
7:02 -0.072 9:32 3.44*** 9:43 0.932 9:54 -0.172 10:05 0.112 10:16 0.004 10:27 -0.446 10:38 0.394 10:49 -0.208 10:59 -0.259 
7:03 -0.664 9:33 3.196*** 9:44 0.899 9:55 -0.569 10:06 1.588 10:17 -0.588 10:28 -0.087 10:39 1.345 10:50 0.837 11:00 -1.332 
7:04 0.858 9:34 3.03*** 9:45 1.792* 9:56 1.358 10:07 -0.034 10:18 -0.547 10:29 0.324 10:40 -0.913 10:51 1.049 11:01 0.170 
7:05 0.918 9:35 2.932*** 9:46 1.103 9:57 1.266 10:08 -0.426 10:19 0.586 10:30 -1.374 10:41 0.822 10:52 1.497 11:02 0.913 
7:06 0.729 9:36 2.863*** 9:47 1.033 9:58 0.954 10:09 0.022 10:20 0.167 10:31 0.005 10:42 -1.357 10:53 0.243 11:03 -0.573 
7:07 2.839*** 9:37 1.96* 9:48 2.95*** 9:59 -0.121 10:10 0.740 10:21 0.492 10:32 0.222 10:43 0.241 10:54 -0.762 11:04 -0.193 
7:08 1.001 9:38 3.249*** 9:49 2.492** 10:00 -1.098 10:11 0.233 10:22 -0.515 10:33 -1.279 10:44 -1.088 10:55 -0.486 11:05 -0.375 
7:09 1.394 9:39 1.928* 9:50 2.178** 10:01 0.046 10:12 0.005 10:23 -0.698 10:34 0.357 10:45 -0.491 10:56 -0.059 11:06 -0.340 
7:10 2.426** 9:40 0.534 9:51 2.176** 10:02 1.589 10:13 -1.423 10:24 -0.247 10:35 -0.092 10:46 -0.500 10:57 -0.156 11:07 -0.481 
Panel B: "Continuous Trading" Period                              
Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat 
10:20 0.759 10:31 -0.253 10:42 0.221 10:53 1.738* 11:04 9.679*** 11:15 5.0*** 11:26 5.737*** 11:37 4.087*** 11:48 2.606** 11:59 2.363** 
10:21 0.491 10:32 -0.294 10:43 -0.089 10:54 1.597 11:05 8.289*** 11:16 5.013*** 11:27 3.785*** 11:38 2.669*** 11:49 2.959*** 12:00 1.702* 
10:22 0.143 10:33 0.830 10:44 1.764* 10:55 2.909*** 11:06 5.384*** 11:17 6.043*** 11:28 4.602*** 11:39 4.654*** 11:50 4.084*** 12:01 3.221*** 
10:23 -0.357 10:34 -0.995 10:45 1.238 10:56 1.223 11:07 6.93*** 11:18 4.278*** 11:29 4.543*** 11:40 3.407*** 11:51 4.285*** 12:02 2.274** 
10:24 -0.924 10:35 -0.532 10:46 0.801 10:57 1.236 11:08 7.948*** 11:19 6.019*** 11:30 7.124*** 11:41 4.701*** 11:52 4.436*** 12:03 1.054 
10:25 -0.187 10:36 -0.694 10:47 1.678* 10:58 3.53*** 11:09 6.533*** 11:20 4.769*** 11:31 2.657*** 11:42 2.667*** 11:53 3.575*** 12:04 -1.086 
10:26 0.172 10:37 -1.156 10:48 -0.087 10:59 5.227*** 11:10 5.737*** 11:21 4.255*** 11:32 4.218*** 11:43 3.719*** 11:54 4.115*** 12:05 1.008 
10:27 -0.732 10:38 -1.312 10:49 -0.362 11:00 10.428*** 11:11 7.865*** 11:22 5.139*** 11:33 2.836*** 11:44 2.815*** 11:55 3.426*** 12:06 4.041*** 
10:28 0.427 10:39 0.151 10:50 2.057** 11:01 14.483*** 11:12 5.607*** 11:23 4.812*** 11:34 2.329** 11:45 3.316*** 11:56 2.683*** 12:07 3.351*** 
10:29 -0.553 10:40 -1.287 10:51 -1.304 11:02 7.539*** 11:13 5.384*** 11:24 4.98*** 11:35 2.131** 11:46 1.85* 11:57 4.284*** 12:08 2.524** 
10:30 -0.928 10:41 0.722 10:52 0.427 11:03 7.377*** 11:14 4.933*** 11:25 4.973*** 11:36 4.289*** 11:47 2.346** 11:58 4.388*** 12:09 2.192** 
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Table A- 8  
Intraday Frequency of Price Changes for Soybeans Contracts Each One-Minute Interval 
Note. Table A-8 reports the t-statistics of the difference in Frequency of Price Changes between WASDE (Experimental sample) and non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample) for the 
Trading Break (Panel A) and Continuous Trading periods (Panel B). For each one-minute interval, Frequency of price changes is estimated for soybeans contracts. The number of observations 
in the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. ***, **, and * represents statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: "Trading Break" Period                              
Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat 
7:00 0.374 9:30 3.534*** 9:41 1.331 9:52 1.510 10:03 0.742 10:14 -0.028 10:25 0.081 10:36 0.747 10:47 -1.324 10:57 -0.070 
7:01 0.537 9:31 2.853*** 9:42 1.208 9:53 0.123 10:04 -0.094 10:15 0.364 10:26 -0.928 10:37 0.083 10:48 -0.030 10:58 1.228 
7:02 0.288 9:32 3.59*** 9:43 0.550 9:54 1.446 10:05 1.281 10:16 -0.543 10:27 -0.285 10:38 0.698 10:49 0.356 10:59 -0.529 
7:03 0.016 9:33 4.049*** 9:44 1.057 9:55 0.101 10:06 1.253 10:17 0.249 10:28 0.648 10:39 1.025 10:50 0.530 11:00 -0.535 
7:04 0.457 9:34 3.034*** 9:45 3.208*** 9:56 -0.263 10:07 -0.579 10:18 -0.711 10:29 0.169 10:40 -0.130 10:51 1.066 11:01 -0.668 
7:05 0.050 9:35 4.138*** 9:46 1.242 9:57 1.133 10:08 -0.209 10:19 -0.435 10:30 -1.068 10:41 0.717 10:52 0.636 11:02 0.098 
7:06 0.282 9:36 4.472*** 9:47 0.444 9:58 1.286 10:09 0.222 10:20 -0.065 10:31 -0.764 10:42 -1.295 10:53 -0.395 11:03 -1.212 
7:07 3.226*** 9:37 3.531*** 9:48 1.465 9:59 0.927 10:10 0.399 10:21 -0.246 10:32 -1.217 10:43 0.036 10:54 0.000 11:04 -0.937 
7:08 1.914* 9:38 3.723*** 9:49 3.319*** 10:00 0.586 10:11 0.533 10:22 -0.640 10:33 -1.320 10:44 -0.508 10:55 -1.378 11:05 0.862 
7:09 2.862*** 9:39 3.319*** 9:50 2.391** 10:01 0.674 10:12 0.204 10:23 -1.013 10:34 -0.618 10:45 -0.918 10:56 -0.751 11:06 0.274 
7:10 1.455 9:40 1.464 9:51 1.246 10:02 0.612 10:13 -1.654 10:24 -0.782 10:35 -0.622 10:46 -0.801 10:57 0.022 11:07 -1.082 
Panel B: "Continuous Trading" Period                              
Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat 
10:20 0.195 10:31 0.358 10:42 0.812 10:53 -0.082 11:04 7.18*** 11:15 5.938*** 11:26 4.958*** 11:37 4.945*** 11:48 4.022*** 11:59 3.236*** 
10:21 0.741 10:32 -0.958 10:43 -0.142 10:54 -0.345 11:05 7.995*** 11:16 6.359*** 11:27 5.158*** 11:38 3.941*** 11:49 4.621*** 12:00 2.877*** 
10:22 0.366 10:33 -0.472 10:44 0.997 10:55 2.907*** 11:06 6.476*** 11:17 5.879*** 11:28 5.03*** 11:39 5.506*** 11:50 4.532*** 12:01 2.179** 
10:23 0.688 10:34 -1.050 10:45 2.315** 10:56 1.8* 11:07 6.934*** 11:18 5.663*** 11:29 3.987*** 11:40 5.007*** 11:51 4.3*** 12:02 3.502*** 
10:24 -1.549 10:35 -1.771* 10:46 2.0** 10:57 4.103*** 11:08 6.883*** 11:19 8.472*** 11:30 6.287*** 11:41 4.888*** 11:52 4.929*** 12:03 0.808 
10:25 -0.360 10:36 0.032 10:47 1.906* 10:58 4.243*** 11:09 6.226*** 11:20 6.727*** 11:31 5.001*** 11:42 3.656*** 11:53 4.199*** 12:04 0.810 
10:26 0.515 10:37 -0.579 10:48 1.182 10:59 5.83*** 11:10 5.908*** 11:21 5.717*** 11:32 4.042*** 11:43 4.387*** 11:54 3.896*** 12:05 2.227** 
10:27 -1.092 10:38 1.444 10:49 0.176 11:00 10.759*** 11:11 6.725*** 11:22 4.98*** 11:33 3.427*** 11:44 4.344*** 11:55 4.746*** 12:06 4.095*** 
10:28 0.170 10:39 0.000 10:50 0.142 11:01 11.598*** 11:12 6.329*** 11:23 5.044*** 11:34 3.077*** 11:45 3.001*** 11:56 3.366*** 12:07 3.745*** 
10:29 -0.763 10:40 1.097 10:51 -0.976 11:02 8.94*** 11:13 4.336*** 11:24 6.01*** 11:35 4.141*** 11:46 2.707*** 11:57 4.269*** 12:08 1.874* 
10:30 -0.362 10:41 1.186 10:52 -0.446 11:03 9.578*** 11:14 4.792*** 11:25 6.215*** 11:36 4.03*** 11:47 3.527*** 11:58 5.481*** 12:09 2.558** 
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A.4 Robustness Tests for Corn Futures Contracts Using 10-minute Intervals 
In order to understand whether the results are similar to other agricultural futures 
contracts, all findings are replicated for corn futures contracts (the second most liquid 
agricultural futures contract traded at CME). Using 10-minute intervals, Table A-9 
presents the average price range (price volatility) for corn contracts around the release 
time of WASDE reports on both WASDE and non-WASDE days for the two sub-periods. 
During the “Trading Break” period, the difference in price volatility across WASDE and 
non-WASDE intervals is statistically significant for up to 10 minutes following the 
release of the WASDE reports. During the “Continuous Trading” period, the results 
reported in Table A-9 imply that price volatility for WASDE days are significantly greater 
than non-WASDE days for up to 130 minutes at the 0.05 level or better when results are 
released during continuous trading. The adjustment time during this period is greater than 
that reported for the “Trading Break” sub-period and suggests that releasing WASDE 
reports during continuous trading increases the trading time it takes for price volatility to 
return to equilibrium. These findings confirm previous results for soybeans contracts 
using 10-minute intervals which explain that price range deteriorates during the 
continuous trading period.  
Table A-10 presents the results for bid-ask spreads on WASDE and non-WASDE days 
for the two sub-periods using 10-minutes intervals. For the “Trading Break” period when 
WASDE reports are released during a trading break, bid-ask spreads for the WASDE 
sample are not greater than the non-WASDE sample following the resumption of trading 
after the release. In contrast, during the “Continuous Trading” period when WASDE 
reports are released during continuous trading, bid-ask spreads are significantly higher for 
the WASDE sample for up to 70 minutes immediately following the release of the report.  
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When compared to the results for the “Trading Break” sub-period, these results confirm 
that releasing WASDE reports during continuous trading increases the trading time it 
takes for bid-ask spreads to return to equilibrium following the information release. These 
findings confirm previous results for soybeans contracts using 10-minute intervals that 
bid-ask spreads deteriorate during the continuous trading period.  
Table A-11 presents intraday market depth on WASDE and non-WASDE days for the 
two sub-periods using 10-minutes intervals. During the “Trading Break” period, the 
difference in depth between WASDE release days and non-WASDE days is not 
significant for any of the time intervals immediately after the market resumes trading.   In 
sharp contrast, during the “Continuous Trading” period, there is evidence that market 
depth is lower on WASDE days for at least 100 minutes of trading immediately following 
the release of the report. Again, this confirms the notion that releasing WASDE reports 
during continuous trading exacerbates market depth and increases the trading time it takes 
for market depth to return to equilibrium following the information release. These findings 
confirm previous results for soybeans contracts using 10-minute intervals that depth 
deteriorates during the continuous trading period.  
Table A-12 and A-13 present the results for the price volatility and frequency of price 
changes measures, respectively. These tables suggest that with a trading halt for market 
participants to process the information from the reports, excess volatility on WASDE days 
persists between 10 and 20 minutes following the release of the WASDE reports. On the 
contrary, once the trading halt is removed during the “Continuous Trading” period, high 
volatility on WASDE days persists for approximately 130 minutes. These findings 
confirm previous results for soybeans contracts using 10-minute intervals and suggest that 
releasing the WASDE report during the trading halt significantly reduces market volatility 
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Table A- 9  
Intraday Price Range for Corn Contracts 
Note. Table A-9 reports intraday average Price Range for the Trading Break period where WASDE reports are released at 7:30 am, and the Continuous Trading period where WASDE reports 
are released at 11:00 am. Price range is measured using the difference between the highest and lowest price for corn during each ten-minute interval. Differences between WASDE days 
(Experimental sample) and non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample), along with the t-statistics are provided. Due to the small size of the two sample periods, the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney 
statistics are also reported for additional robustness. The number of observations in the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. ***, **, and * represents 

















Difference T-statistics WMW 
6:30 0.979 0.864 0.1 0.668 643.5  10:20 1.329 1.293 0.0 0.248 642.5 
6:40 1.029 1.136 -0.1 -0.627 589.5 
 
10:30 1.386 2.021 -0.6 -1.507 461.0 
6:50 1.029 1.043 0.0 -0.095 593.5  10:40 1.350 1.650 -0.3 -1.261 571.0 
7:00 1.386 1.114 0.3 1.610 802.0**  10:50 1.829 1.350 0.5 2.262** 830.5** 
7:10 1.321 0.993 0.3 2.369** 795.5** 
 
11:00 11.486 1.229 10.3 8.55*** 1225.0*** 
9:30 6.779 4.950 1.8 2.871*** 828.5**  11:10 4.800 1.321 3.5 8.327*** 1213.0*** 
9:40 4.536 3.529 1.0 2.02** 804.5**  11:20 3.007 1.293 1.7 7.293*** 1122.0*** 
9:50 3.350 3.314 0.0 0.071 609.5 
 
11:30 2.836 1.136 1.7 7.103*** 1100.5*** 
10:00 2.721 2.664 0.1 0.169 691.0  11:40 2.307 1.214 1.1 4.653*** 1005.0*** 
10:10 2.514 2.329 0.2 0.629 656.5  11:50 2.257 1.129 1.1 5.324*** 1015.5*** 
10:20 2.186 2.286 -0.1 -0.405 580.5 
 
12:00 1.657 1.071 0.6 3.676*** 908.0*** 
10:30 2.343 2.450 -0.1 -0.309 602.0  12:10 1.707 1.293 0.4 2.076** 751.5* 
10:40 2.079 2.129 -0.1 -0.196 612.5  12:20 1.671 1.136 0.5 3.821*** 919.5*** 
10:50 2.179 1.950 0.2 0.729 728.0 
 
12:30 1.814 1.307 0.5 2.544** 882.5*** 
11:00 2.079 2.186 -0.1 -0.305 540.0  12:40 1.507 1.100 0.4 2.997*** 837.0*** 
11:10 1.614 2.064 -0.5 -1.570 408.0  12:50 1.650 1.229 0.4 2.376** 760.0* 
11:20 1.586 2.050 -0.5 -1.546 495.5 
 
13:00 1.829 1.357 0.5 2.744*** 834.5*** 
11:30 1.800 2.143 -0.3 -1.143 541.5  13:10 2.271 2.293 0.0 -0.092 669.5 
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Table A- 10 
Intraday Bid-Ask Spreads for Corn Contracts 
Note. Table A-10 reports intraday average quoted Bid-ask Spreads (cents) for the Trading Break period where WASDE reports are released at 7:30 am, and the Continuous Trading period 
where WASDE reports are released at 11:00 am. Bid-ask Spread is calculated for each ten-minute interval using the difference between the best prevailing quotes in the market for corn. 
Differences between WASDE (Experimental sample) and non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample), along with the t-statistics are provided. Due to the small size of the two sample periods, 
the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney statistics are also reported for additional robustness. The number of observations in the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. 
***, **, and * represents statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 













Difference T-statistics WMW 
9:30 30.418 29.311 1.11 1.666 516.0   10:10 26.592 27.343 -0.75 -1.661 261.0 
9:40 28.767 28.206 0.56 1.064 513.0   10:20 26.556 26.950 -0.39 -1.069 344.0 
9:50 28.671 28.117 0.55 1.135 505.0   10:30 26.370 27.044 -0.67 -1.682 269.0 
10:00 28.405 28.564 -0.16 -0.269 432.0   10:40 26.718 26.686 0.03 0.091 422.0 
10:10 28.399 28.663 -0.26 -0.458 403.0   10:50 28.536 26.311 2.22 4.788*** 656.0*** 
10:20 28.493 28.549 -0.06 -0.103 415.0   11:00 32.660 26.614 6.05 6.565*** 766.0*** 
10:30 28.373 28.489 -0.12 -0.233 407.0   11:10 28.164 26.931 1.23 3.294*** 573.0*** 
10:40 28.368 28.538 -0.17 -0.304 421.0   11:20 27.509 26.988 0.52 1.460 503.0* 
10:50 28.362 28.476 -0.11 -0.226 409.0   11:30 27.540 26.868 0.67 2.307** 539.0** 
11:00 28.305 28.459 -0.15 -0.308 381.0   11:40 27.356 27.075 0.28 0.848 452.0 
11:10 28.292 28.331 -0.04 -0.079 419.0   11:50 27.757 26.851 0.91 2.884*** 546.0** 
11:20 28.392 28.140 0.25 0.470 460.0   12:00 27.450 26.767 0.68 2.171** 515.0** 
11:30 28.400 28.406 -0.01 -0.012 407.0   12:10 26.910 26.965 -0.05 -0.177 382.0 
11:40 28.462 28.281 0.18 0.348 431.0   12:20 26.852 26.963 -0.11 -0.334 389.0 
11:50 28.613 28.556 0.06 0.122 428.0   12:30 27.300 27.220 0.08 0.220 416.0 
12:00 28.385 28.282 0.10 0.230 445.0   12:40 27.035 27.239 -0.20 -0.598 376.0 
12:10 28.138 27.957 0.18 0.379 443.0   12:50 27.200 27.338 -0.14 -0.399 386.0 
12:20 28.698 28.435 0.26 0.531 463.0   13:00 27.436 26.895 0.54 1.702* 472.0 
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Table A- 11  
Intraday Depth for Corn Contracts 
Note. Table A-11 reports intraday average Depth for the Trading Break period where WASDE reports are released at 7:30 am, and the Continuous Trading period where WASDE reports are 
released at 11:00 am. Depth is measured using all available quotes at the best level for corn during each ten-minute interval. Differences between WASDE (Experimental sample) and non-
WASDE days (Matched Control sample), along with the t-statistics are provided. Due to the small size of the two sample periods, the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney statistics are also reported 
for additional robustness. The number of observations in the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. ***, **, and * represents statistical significance at the 


















Difference T-statistics WMW 
9:30 54254.638 61330.752 -7076.11 -1.151 388.0   10:10 115791.535 113977.640 1813.90 0.141 389.0 
9:40 62498.110 64730.961 -2232.85 -0.404 391.0   10:20 112603.222 108711.680 3891.54 0.310 398.0 
9:50 59875.199 67541.430 -7666.23 -1.207 365.0   10:30 102015.839 110061.764 -8045.93 -0.645 349.0 
10:00 64129.315 62559.025 1570.29 0.308 440.0   10:40 103159.791 113944.725 -10784.93 -0.843 331.0 
10:10 62564.895 61512.408 1052.49 0.198 414.0   10:50 81873.299 124634.662 -42761.36 -2.794*** 202.0*** 
10:20 67341.676 60292.547 7049.13 1.421 505.0   11:00 38859.422 111234.109 -72374.69 -7.567*** 38.0*** 
10:30 63496.518 57497.734 5998.78 1.183 509.0   11:10 57450.354 113762.190 -56311.84 -5.684*** 91.0*** 
10:40 66712.042 56920.704 9791.34 1.672 519.0   11:20 67757.890 103882.374 -36124.48 -3.854*** 185.0*** 
10:50 67975.674 62749.642 5226.03 0.804 480.0   11:30 67191.384 98348.180 -31156.80 -3.804*** 205.0*** 
11:00 71473.697 61098.524 10375.17 1.567 518.0   11:40 71875.403 100615.849 -28740.45 -2.911*** 214.0*** 
11:10 62326.550 62621.581 -295.03 -0.048 421.0   11:50 72070.971 103096.374 -31025.40 -3.552*** 194.0*** 
11:20 60915.516 56328.506 4587.01 0.793 460.0   12:00 75344.403 100635.189 -25290.79 -3.046*** 223.0*** 
11:30 67983.827 57247.301 10736.53 1.544 496.0   12:10 81192.212 116094.184 -34901.97 -2.926*** 244.0** 
11:40 63481.602 58671.965 4809.64 0.855 463.0   12:20 87397.531 113404.068 -26006.54 -1.956* 311.0 
11:50 63861.794 53577.303 10284.49 1.652 503.0   12:30 81101.422 104516.118 -23414.70 -2.015** 303.0 
12:00 65195.015 55704.818 9490.20 1.641 506.0   12:40 84031.974 96577.534 -12545.56 -1.180 334.0 
12:10 61542.850 55086.500 6456.35 1.036 481.0   12:50 86750.807 98628.705 -11877.90 -1.109 338.0 
12:20 65533.045 63716.820 1816.22 0.259 423.0   13:00 89011.309 100566.925 -11555.62 -1.017 359.0 
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Table A- 12  
Intraday Standard Deviation of Prices for Corn Contracts 
Note. Table A-12 reports intraday average standard deviation of prices for the Trading Break period where WASDE reports are released at 7:30 am, and the Continuous Trading period where 
WASDE reports are released at 11:00 am. The standard deviation of prices is estimated for corn contracts each ten-minute interval. Differences between WASDE days (Experimental sample) 
and non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample), along with the t-statistics are provided. Due to the small size of the two sample periods, the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney statistics are also 
reported for additional robustness. The number of observations in the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. ***, **, and * represents statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 













Difference T-statistics WMW 
6:30 0.272 0.240 0.03 0.729 616.0  10:20 0.334 0.310 0.02 0.611 648.0 
6:40 0.273 0.298 -0.03 -0.617 583.0 
 
10:30 0.390 0.490 -0.10 -1.679 427.0 
6:50 0.271 0.273 0.00 -0.078 569.0  10:40 0.303 0.358 -0.05 -1.223 514.0 
7:00 0.377 0.288 0.09 2.321** 850.0***  10:50 0.415 0.330 0.08 1.445 761.0* 
7:10 0.324 0.271 0.05 1.486 751.0 
 
11:00 2.483 0.279 2.20 9.554*** 1225.0*** 
9:30 1.690 1.200 0.49 2.864*** 838.0***  11:10 1.227 0.306 0.92 8.405*** 1219.0*** 
9:40 1.123 0.866 0.26 1.797* 771.0*  11:20 0.716 0.303 0.41 6.727*** 1097.0*** 
9:50 0.828 0.832 0.00 -0.023 576.0 
 
11:30 0.693 0.266 0.43 6.69*** 1107.0*** 
10:00 0.684 0.647 0.04 0.388 695.0  11:40 0.562 0.300 0.26 4.429*** 968.0*** 
10:10 0.633 0.595 0.04 0.482 626.0  11:50 0.569 0.286 0.28 4.662*** 980.0*** 
10:20 0.536 0.584 -0.05 -0.671 571.0 
 
12:00 0.412 0.268 0.14 3.259*** 859.0*** 
10:30 0.581 0.596 -0.02 -0.180 611.0  12:10 0.401 0.320 0.08 1.514 714.0 
10:40 0.535 0.525 0.01 0.142 621.0  12:20 0.395 0.279 0.12 3.396*** 892.0*** 
10:50 0.549 0.484 0.07 0.765 712.0 
 
12:30 0.455 0.315 0.14 2.858*** 878.0*** 
11:00 0.543 0.557 -0.01 -0.137 554.0  12:40 0.381 0.249 0.13 3.289*** 875.0*** 
11:10 0.472 0.570 -0.10 -1.587 389.0  12:50 0.417 0.296 0.12 2.659*** 783.0** 
11:20 0.401 0.506 -0.11 -1.627 532.0 
 
13:00 0.456 0.312 0.14 2.966*** 866.0*** 
11:30 0.451 0.544 -0.09 -1.084 544.0  13:10 0.533 0.568 -0.03 -0.521 618.0 
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Table A- 13  
Intraday Frequency of Price Changes for Corn Contracts 
Note. Table A-13 reports intraday average frequency of prices changes for the Trading Break period where WASDE reports are released at 7:30 am, and the Continuous Trading period where 
WASDE reports are released at 11:00 am. Frequency of price changes is estimated for corn during each ten-minute interval. Differences between WASDE days (Experimental sample) and non-
WASDE days (Matched Control sample), along with the t-statistics are provided. Due to the small size of the two sample periods, the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney statistics are also reported for 
additional robustness. The number of observations in the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. ***, **, and * represents statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 













Difference T-statistics WMW 
6:30 6:30 17.486 13.514 3.97 1.402  10:20 104.800 89.829 14.97 1.427 752.5 
6:40 6:40 28.457 23.057 5.40 0.741 
 
10:30 106.600 102.314 4.29 0.325 620.5 
6:50 6:50 30.486 22.286 8.20 1.378  10:40 113.514 93.514 20.00 1.795* 823.0** 
7:00 7:00 45.314 26.943 18.37 2.999***  10:50 181.486 85.343 96.14 6.526*** 1096.5*** 
7:10 7:10 43.429 24.171 19.26 3.27*** 
 
11:00 1789.257 83.429 1705.83 8.862*** 1225.0*** 
9:30 9:30 1143.114 726.257 416.86 3.082***  11:10 468.886 72.686 396.20 7.77*** 1219.0*** 
9:40 9:40 446.314 400.571 45.74 0.769  11:20 268.629 82.686 185.94 6.202*** 1119.5*** 
9:50 9:50 320.771 303.000 17.77 0.343 
 
11:30 217.086 74.629 142.46 5.75*** 1114.5*** 
10:00 10:00 243.486 261.743 -18.26 -0.537  11:40 181.543 70.171 111.37 4.433*** 1030.0*** 
10:10 10:10 206.657 200.914 5.74 0.168  11:50 155.714 72.057 83.66 4.888*** 1041.5*** 
10:20 10:20 171.686 184.914 -13.23 -0.529 
 
12:00 125.800 67.714 58.09 4.137*** 953.0*** 
10:30 10:30 170.971 186.771 -15.80 -0.628  12:10 102.600 69.086 33.51 2.764*** 831.0** 
10:40 10:40 137.000 160.286 -23.29 -1.146  12:20 98.771 68.800 29.97 2.96*** 873.0*** 
10:50 10:50 122.686 133.200 -10.51 -0.593 
 
12:30 100.514 83.514 17.00 1.171 868.0*** 
11:00 11:00 126.029 152.629 -26.60 -1.320  12:40 100.286 80.400 19.89 1.632 794.0** 
11:10 11:10 110.057 137.143 -27.09 -1.262  12:50 119.943 92.400 27.54 1.982* 740.5 
11:20 11:20 109.543 127.486 -17.94 -0.908 
 
13:00 179.429 126.343 53.09 3.055*** 844.0*** 
11:30 11:30 115.257 150.486 -35.23 -1.396  13:10 555.800 472.114 83.69 1.488 763.0* 
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A.5 Robustness Tests for Corn Futures Contracts Using 1-minute Intervals 
The results for corn contracts are also replicated using one-minute intervals as a 
robustness test, Table A-14 presents the average price range (price volatility) for corn 
contracts around the release time of WASDE reports on both WASDE and non-WASDE 
days for the two sub-periods. During the “Trading Break” period, the difference in price 
volatility across WASDE and non-WASDE intervals is statistically significant for up to 
10 minutes following the release of the WASDE reports. During the “Continuous Trading” 
period, the results reported in Table A-14 imply that price volatility for WASDE days is 
significantly greater than non-WASDE days for up to 110 minutes at the 0.05 level or 
better when results are released during continuous trading. The adjustment time during 
this period is greater than that reported for the “Trading Break” sub-period and suggests 
that releasing WASDE reports during continuous trading increases the trading time it 
takes for price volatility to return to equilibrium. These findings confirm previous results 
for soybeans and corn contracts which explain that price range deteriorates during the 
continuous trading period.  
Table A-15 and A-16 present the results for the price volatility and frequency of price 
changes measures, respectively. These tables suggest that with a trading halt for market 
participants to process the information from the reports, excess volatility on WASDE 
days persists between 5 and 10 minutes following the release of the WASDE reports. On 
the contrary, once the trading halt is removed during the “Continuous Trading” period, 
high volatility on WASDE days persists for approximately 10 minutes. These findings 
confirm previous results for soybeans and corn contracts, and suggest that releasing the 
WASDE report during the trading halt significantly reduces market volatility since it 
provides enough time to investors to analyze the information contained in the reports. 
 
 174 
In summary, Chapter 3’s central finding that trading halts reduce market volatility and 
improve liquidity in the market for soybean and corn, is robust to the sample control 
method and size of the intervals for soybean and corn contracts. In addition, results for 
soybeans and corn contracts are consistent across the two securities.   
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Table A- 14 
Intraday Price Range for Corn Contracts Each One-Minute Interval 
Note. Table A-14 reports the t-statistics of the difference in Price Range between WASDE (Experimental sample) and non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample) for the Trading Break 
(Panel A) and Continuous Trading periods (Panel B). For each one-minute interval, Price range is measured using the difference between the highest and lowest price in the market for corn. 
The number of observations in the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. ***, **, and * represents statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A: "Trading Break" Period                              
Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat 
7:00 2.286** 9:30 2.79*** 9:41 0.764 9:52 -1.130 10:03 -1.575 10:14 -0.389 10:25 -0.673 10:36 0.301 10:47 -0.081 10:58 0.410 
7:01 2.465** 9:31 1.963* 9:42 0.963 9:53 -0.625 10:04 0.699 10:15 0.936 10:26 -0.346 10:37 -0.080 10:48 0.929 10:59 -1.423 
7:02 0.777 9:32 1.455 9:43 0.320 9:54 -1.387 10:05 -1.352 10:16 -1.125 10:27 -0.140 10:38 -0.559 10:49 -0.779 11:00 0.102 
7:03 2.002** 9:33 1.665 9:44 1.517 9:55 -0.298 10:06 1.496 10:17 -0.148 10:28 0.152 10:39 0.073 10:50 -0.302 11:01 1.077 
7:04 3.061*** 9:34 1.579 9:45 0.770 9:56 0.406 10:07 -0.513 10:18 -0.562 10:29 -1.366 10:40 -1.116 10:51 0.000 11:02 -0.273 
7:05 3.082*** 9:35 1.552 9:46 0.196 9:57 0.959 10:08 -0.134 10:19 0.150 10:30 -0.933 10:41 0.000 10:52 0.157 11:03 -0.082 
7:06 1.099 9:36 2.438** 9:47 0.511 9:58 1.189 10:09 0.397 10:20 0.000 10:31 0.255 10:42 -0.590 10:53 -0.812 11:04 -1.090 
7:07 4.098*** 9:37 1.686* 9:48 0.305 9:59 -0.432 10:10 1.050 10:21 -0.617 10:32 0.612 10:43 -1.072 10:54 -0.270 11:05 0.104 
7:08 4.048*** 9:38 1.802* 9:49 1.395 10:00 -1.523 10:11 -0.135 10:22 -0.922 10:33 -1.663 10:44 -1.459 10:55 -0.261 11:06 -0.371 
7:09 0.802 9:39 0.740 9:50 1.314 10:01 -1.596 10:12 0.877 10:23 -0.880 10:34 -1.431 10:45 0.209 10:56 0.732 11:07 1.040 
7:10 2.73*** 9:40 0.630 9:51 -0.183 10:02 -0.191 10:13 -0.628 10:24 -0.075 10:35 0.833 10:46 0.160 10:57 1.652 11:08 -1.244 
Panel B: "Continuous Trading" Period                              
Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat 
10:20 -0.227 10:31 0.000 10:42 0.303 10:53 1.712* 11:04 7.81*** 11:15 6.43*** 11:26 3.388*** 11:37 4.37*** 11:48 3.783*** 11:59 2.369** 
10:21 0.463 10:32 -1.088 10:43 -0.224 10:54 0.325 11:05 8.631*** 11:16 7.212*** 11:27 4.107*** 11:38 4.81*** 11:49 4.705*** 12:00 2.343** 
10:22 -0.685 10:33 1.191 10:44 -0.193 10:55 1.526 11:06 7.355*** 11:17 7.262*** 11:28 6.281*** 11:39 5.252*** 11:50 5.312*** 12:01 4.158*** 
10:23 0.552 10:34 -1.510 10:45 -0.635 10:56 2.609** 11:07 8.897*** 11:18 7.765*** 11:29 4.608*** 11:40 3.096*** 11:51 3.696*** 12:02 4.155*** 
10:24 -0.341 10:35 -0.343 10:46 1.399 10:57 5.73*** 11:08 8.401*** 11:19 6.115*** 11:30 4.918*** 11:41 4.414*** 11:52 4.791*** 12:03 2.451** 
10:25 -0.129 10:36 -0.433 10:47 1.98* 10:58 4.367*** 11:09 8.876*** 11:20 5.504*** 11:31 3.706*** 11:42 3.4*** 11:53 4.254*** 12:04 1.679* 
10:26 1.258 10:37 -0.272 10:48 0.526 10:59 6.105*** 11:10 5.915*** 11:21 6.056*** 11:32 3.179*** 11:43 3.293*** 11:54 4.139*** 12:05 3.084*** 
10:27 -1.018 10:38 -0.100 10:49 0.724 11:00 8.445*** 11:11 6.787*** 11:22 5.838*** 11:33 5.045*** 11:44 3.367*** 11:55 4.263*** 12:06 2.73*** 
10:28 -0.125 10:39 0.378 10:50 1.474 11:01 9.591*** 11:12 6.768*** 11:23 4.923*** 11:34 5.833*** 11:45 3.426*** 11:56 2.937*** 12:07 3.876*** 
10:29 -0.831 10:40 0.326 10:51 0.548 11:02 9.827*** 11:13 5.837*** 11:24 5.222*** 11:35 4.037*** 11:46 4.148*** 11:57 3.808*** 12:08 1.496 





Table A- 15  
Intraday Standard Deviation of Prices for Corn Contracts Each One-Minute Interval 
Note. Table A-15 reports the t-statistics of the difference in Standard Deviation of Prices between WASDE (Experimental sample) and non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample) for the 
Trading Break (Panel A) and Continuous Trading periods (Panel B). For each one-minute interval, the standard deviation of prices is estimated for corn contracts. The number of observations 
in the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. ***, **, and * represents statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: "Trading Break" Period                              
Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat 
7:00 1.87* 9:30 2.621** 9:41 0.883 9:52 -1.144 10:03 -1.178 10:14 -0.174 10:25 -0.378 10:36 -0.268 10:47 0.006 10:58 0.307 
7:01 2.682*** 9:31 1.438 9:42 0.580 9:53 -0.702 10:04 0.629 10:15 1.216 10:26 -0.464 10:37 0.013 10:48 0.620 10:59 -1.203 
7:02 0.904 9:32 1.326 9:43 0.278 9:54 -1.369 10:05 -1.307 10:16 -1.353 10:27 0.638 10:38 -0.969 10:49 -0.653 11:00 -0.695 
7:03 2.268** 9:33 1.99* 9:44 1.634 9:55 -0.272 10:06 1.170 10:17 -0.377 10:28 -0.464 10:39 -0.169 10:50 -0.641 11:01 1.148 
7:04 2.75*** 9:34 2.028** 9:45 0.588 9:56 0.844 10:07 -0.597 10:18 -0.382 10:29 -1.622 10:40 -1.518 10:51 -0.085 11:02 0.611 
7:05 3.311*** 9:35 1.713* 9:46 0.570 9:57 0.669 10:08 0.055 10:19 -0.045 10:30 -0.756 10:41 -0.389 10:52 0.646 11:03 0.024 
7:06 0.793 9:36 2.645** 9:47 0.879 9:58 0.791 10:09 0.190 10:20 -0.328 10:31 0.764 10:42 -0.120 10:53 -0.784 11:04 -1.208 
7:07 3.034*** 9:37 1.636 9:48 0.917 9:59 -0.559 10:10 0.787 10:21 -0.501 10:32 0.673 10:43 -1.571 10:54 -0.234 11:05 0.516 
7:08 4.232*** 9:38 1.605 9:49 1.302 10:00 -0.940 10:11 -0.256 10:22 -0.483 10:33 -1.659 10:44 -1.357 10:55 -0.135 11:06 -0.540 
7:09 0.506 9:39 0.300 9:50 0.999 10:01 -1.567 10:12 1.187 10:23 -1.422 10:34 -0.903 10:45 0.291 10:56 0.242 11:07 0.664 
7:10 3.001*** 9:40 0.826 9:51 -0.479 10:02 -0.358 10:13 -0.846 10:24 -0.019 10:35 1.253 10:46 -0.059 10:57 0.681 11:08 -1.445 
Panel B: "Continuous Trading" Period                              
Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat 
10:20 0.608 10:31 -0.235 10:42 -0.557 10:53 2.036** 11:04 7.22*** 11:15 5.763*** 11:26 3.322*** 11:37 3.946*** 11:48 2.728*** 11:59 2.403** 
10:21 -0.010 10:32 -1.428 10:43 -1.157 10:54 0.101 11:05 7.814*** 11:16 6.61*** 11:27 4.271*** 11:38 4.392*** 11:49 4.223*** 12:00 3.006*** 
10:22 -0.312 10:33 0.004 10:44 -1.286 10:55 1.404 11:06 7.37*** 11:17 6.44*** 11:28 5.259*** 11:39 5.306*** 11:50 4.491*** 12:01 4.403*** 
10:23 1.164 10:34 -1.097 10:45 -0.039 10:56 3.352*** 11:07 8.932*** 11:18 6.191*** 11:29 4.259*** 11:40 3.054*** 11:51 3.411*** 12:02 4.053*** 
10:24 -0.798 10:35 -0.641 10:46 1.018 10:57 4.35*** 11:08 7.636*** 11:19 5.463*** 11:30 4.532*** 11:41 5.032*** 11:52 4.259*** 12:03 2.448** 
10:25 0.670 10:36 -1.021 10:47 0.731 10:58 4.883*** 11:09 7.685*** 11:20 4.599*** 11:31 3.764*** 11:42 2.998*** 11:53 3.087*** 12:04 2.25** 
10:26 1.024 10:37 -0.744 10:48 0.860 10:59 5.729*** 11:10 6.284*** 11:21 5.572*** 11:32 2.764*** 11:43 2.76*** 11:54 3.721*** 12:05 2.658*** 
10:27 -0.135 10:38 -0.891 10:49 1.458 11:00 8.395*** 11:11 6.513*** 11:22 5.522*** 11:33 5.31*** 11:44 2.916*** 11:55 4.172*** 12:06 1.562 
10:28 0.790 10:39 0.004 10:50 1.059 11:01 7.966*** 11:12 5.853*** 11:23 4.069*** 11:34 5.461*** 11:45 3.112*** 11:56 2.752*** 12:07 4.12*** 
10:29 -0.814 10:40 0.149 10:51 -0.038 11:02 8.958*** 11:13 5.564*** 11:24 4.459*** 11:35 3.594*** 11:46 3.938*** 11:57 3.38*** 12:08 0.907 
10:30 -0.724 10:41 -1.155 10:52 1.644 11:03 7.331*** 11:14 7.217*** 11:25 4.293*** 11:36 5.22*** 11:47 3.685*** 11:58 3.651*** 12:09 1.663 
 
 177 
Table A- 16  
Intraday Frequency of Price Changes for Corn Contracts Each One-Minute Interval 
Note. Table A-16 reports the t-statistics of the difference in Frequency of Price Changes between WASDE (Experimental sample) and non-WASDE days (Matched Control sample) for the 
Trading Break (Panel A) and Continuous Trading periods (Panel B). For each one-minute interval, Frequency of price changes is estimated for corn contracts. The number of observations in 
the Trading Break and Continuous Trading sample is 34 and 32, respectively. ***, **, and * represents statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: "Trading Break" Period                              
Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat 
7:00 2.06** 9:30 4.232*** 9:41 0.004 9:52 -0.539 10:03 -0.592 10:14 -0.442 10:25 1.099 10:36 0.000 10:47 -1.765* 10:58 1.229 
7:01 2.242** 9:31 1.994* 9:42 0.501 9:53 -1.028 10:04 -1.180 10:15 -0.501 10:26 0.743 10:37 -0.600 10:48 0.025 10:59 0.045 
7:02 0.450 9:32 2.613** 9:43 0.464 9:54 -0.323 10:05 -0.120 10:16 0.504 10:27 -0.414 10:38 -0.210 10:49 -0.812 11:00 -1.036 
7:03 2.224** 9:33 2.497** 9:44 0.836 9:55 0.338 10:06 0.913 10:17 0.265 10:28 -0.743 10:39 0.274 10:50 -1.631 11:01 0.014 
7:04 3.576*** 9:34 1.786* 9:45 0.097 9:56 0.141 10:07 -0.505 10:18 0.380 10:29 -1.231 10:40 -1.629 10:51 -0.029 11:02 -0.581 
7:05 3.265*** 9:35 1.422 9:46 0.412 9:57 0.907 10:08 0.674 10:19 0.507 10:30 -1.097 10:41 -1.049 10:52 -0.154 11:03 -1.238 
7:06 1.916* 9:36 2.352** 9:47 0.875 9:58 1.497 10:09 0.981 10:20 -0.479 10:31 -0.692 10:42 -0.800 10:53 -0.977 11:04 -1.297 
7:07 2.958*** 9:37 1.712* 9:48 0.382 9:59 -0.195 10:10 1.473 10:21 -0.338 10:32 -1.190 10:43 -1.550 10:54 -0.185 11:05 -0.882 
7:08 3.117*** 9:38 2.131** 9:49 1.696* 10:00 -1.158 10:11 0.248 10:22 0.362 10:33 -1.473 10:44 -1.309 10:55 -1.224 11:06 -1.204 
7:09 0.062 9:39 1.98* 9:50 1.871* 10:01 -1.542 10:12 -0.161 10:23 1.446 10:34 -1.437 10:45 0.336 10:56 -0.234 11:07 -0.505 
7:10 2.213** 9:40 0.075 9:51 -0.021 10:02 -0.742 10:13 -0.404 10:24 0.078 10:35 -0.233 10:46 -1.305 10:57 0.670 11:08 -0.600 
Panel B: "Continuous Trading" Period                              
Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat Time T-stat 
10:20 1.151 10:31 -0.578 10:42 0.233 10:53 3.513*** 11:04 6.89*** 11:15 7.068*** 11:26 4.791*** 11:37 4.265*** 11:48 3.303*** 11:59 1.395 
10:21 0.622 10:32 0.351 10:43 0.211 10:54 2.649** 11:05 5.79*** 11:16 5.444*** 11:27 4.309*** 11:38 4.981*** 11:49 4.574*** 12:00 3.086*** 
10:22 0.937 10:33 1.631 10:44 0.830 10:55 2.66*** 11:06 6.264*** 11:17 5.956*** 11:28 5.302*** 11:39 4.584*** 11:50 5.189*** 12:01 4.29*** 
10:23 0.738 10:34 0.414 10:45 1.875* 10:56 3.83*** 11:07 6.449*** 11:18 7.133*** 11:29 3.558*** 11:40 5.253*** 11:51 3.649*** 12:02 3.601*** 
10:24 0.491 10:35 -0.589 10:46 3.196*** 10:57 5.699*** 11:08 6.261*** 11:19 7.562*** 11:30 5.677*** 11:41 4.626*** 11:52 4.155*** 12:03 3.288*** 
10:25 1.496 10:36 0.811 10:47 2.269** 10:58 6.199*** 11:09 7.423*** 11:20 5.95*** 11:31 4.494*** 11:42 3.042*** 11:53 3.367*** 12:04 2.538** 
10:26 1.034 10:37 1.517 10:48 1.821* 10:59 8.931*** 11:10 5.706*** 11:21 5.83*** 11:32 3.76*** 11:43 3.08*** 11:54 3.796*** 12:05 2.983*** 
10:27 0.513 10:38 -0.700 10:49 2.335** 11:00 10.06*** 11:11 6.071*** 11:22 5.854*** 11:33 5.243*** 11:44 3.629*** 11:55 3.559*** 12:06 4.191*** 
10:28 -0.446 10:39 -0.592 10:50 2.759*** 11:01 8.876*** 11:12 6.39*** 11:23 5.275*** 11:34 4.895*** 11:45 3.136*** 11:56 3.486*** 12:07 3.688*** 
10:29 1.127 10:40 -1.280 10:51 2.752*** 11:02 7.174*** 11:13 5.228*** 11:24 3.888*** 11:35 3.878*** 11:46 1.293 11:57 3.104*** 12:08 2.419** 
10:30 -0.244 10:41 -1.255 10:52 4.201*** 11:03 7.802*** 11:14 5.72*** 11:25 3.984*** 11:36 4.831*** 11:47 3.108*** 11:58 3.986*** 12:09 3.22*** 
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Appendix B  
Price Leadership in the Interest Rate Swap Market   
 
 
This appendix presents additional work completed during my PhD studies, and examines 
price leadership amongst market participants in the interest rate swap market. 
Specifically, this analysis measures the flow of information for lead participants in the 
Australian swap market and compares the role of local and foreign banks at providing 




B.1 Introduction   
This study investigates the source of price discovery between local and foreign banks in 
the Australian interest rate swap market around macroeconomic announcements. 
Previous literature suggests that information asymmetry amongst market participants is 
created around news announcement, as some traders are able to position themselves well 
in the market to become price leaders, which causes others to follow their lead (Goodhart, 
1988). Therefore, this study tests whether some of the banks, local or foreign, become 
price leaders in the Australian interest rate swap market around information releases. This 
analysis is conducted using Granger-type regressions on time-buckets prior-and-post 
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announcements across all banks, as well as, a lead-lag model on a pooled sample of local 
and foreign banks.   
Although there is an extent literature on informational asymmetry on the equity market 
(O’Hara, 1995), studies on price leadership in the derivatives market are limited. This 
study aims to fill this gap by examining price discovery in interest rate swap markets.  
According to Lyons (1997), market participants can be classified into two main categories, 
speculative traders (also known as informed traders) and liquidity traders (also known as 
uninformed traders). Informed traders are able to distinguish orders that are liquidity-
based, and orders that have superior information about the fundamentals of the security. 
Therefore, informed traders are able to use this knowledge to profit from these short-term 
opportunities. On the other hand, liquidity or uninformed traders, have the need for 
financing corporate transactions, and their main strategy is to avoid losing money when 
trading with informed participants. This appendix aims to examine the relationship across 
informed and uninformed traders in the interest rate swap market around macroeconomic 
information releases.  
The data used in this study allows for the classification of the banks into two categories, 
local and foreign banks. In order to measure the impact on price discovery for each bank 
group, this study examines whether local banks are more informed than foreign banks. 
Hsieh and Kleidon (1996) suggest that local and foreign markets are not well integrated 
and trading activity does not transmit across markets, even when both markets are 
simultaneously open for trading. Hence, quotes of market participants based on different 
location might differ in information content. This appendix contributes to the current 
literature by examining the interaction between local and foreign banks in the Australian 
interest rate market.  
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The reminder of this appendix is structured as follows. Section B.2 explains the data 
implemented in this study and presents the macroeconomic information announcements 
used in this study. Section B.3 explains the lead-lag model and Error Correction Model 
used to measure the flow of information between local and foreign banks in the swap 
market. In addition, Section B.3 provides descriptive statistics for the top banks trading 
in the swap market. Section B.4 demonstrates the empirical evidence of how information 
flows between local and foreign banks in the interest rate swap market around 
macroeconomic information releases. Section B.5 concludes the chapter.  
B.2 Data  
The data for this study are sourced from the Thomson Reuters Tick History Data Base 
(TRTH) maintained by the Securities Industries Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA).  
From this dataset, it is collected indicative bid and ask quotes for the Australian 1-year 
interest rate swap traded Over-the-Counter (OTC) from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 
2016. The data includes the date and time of each quote, along with the name of the bank 
that submitted the quote. This study calculates the mid-quote for the swaps as the average 
of the best bid and ask quotes for every quote update.62  Mid-quotes reduce the effect of 
bid-ask bounce as explained in Hauptfleisch, Putnins and Lucey (2016).     
Australian macroeconomic announcements are collected from Bloomberg for the period 
1 January 2010 – 31 December 2016. These data include the date, announcement content 
and time stamp for major macroeconomic announcements such as Average Weekly 
Wages, Current Account Balance, Building Approvals, Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
 
62 Indicative quotes in the OTC swap markets are expressed in yields. This analysis converts the quotes to 
prices by deducting the yield from 100. 
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Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and Unemployment. 63   These announcement types 
significantly impact the interest rate market as outlined in Frino and Hill (2001) and Frino, 
Walter and West (2000). 
B.3 Method 
This section presents descriptive statistics of quote revisions for the top banks by quotes 
contribution. In addition, it presents the lead-lag model used to estimate how information 
flows between local and foreign banks, and the Error Correction Model used to 
investigate price leadership amongst individual banks in the interest rate swap market.  
B.3.1 Top Quoting Banks in the Interest Rate Swap Market 
Table B-1 presents the seven commercial banks with the largest number of bid-ask quotes 
posted in the interest rate swap market during the sample period from 1 January 2010 to 
31 December 2016. Westpac, a local bank, is the largest contributor of quotes in the swap 
market. The next four banks are Credit Suisse, Macquarie Bank, Commonwealth bank 
(CBA), and Lloyds. Quote activities are more active amongst local banks, both in terms 








63 All announcements are released at 11:30 am when the swap market is open for trading. The sample period 
from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2016 contains a total of 262 announcements.   
64 Following Frino, Jarnecic, Tan and Stevenson (2006), this study identifies the following four banks as 
local banks: Westpac, Macquarie bank, Commonwealth bank (CBA), and Australian and New Zealand 
Banking Group (ANZ), and as foreign banks: Credit Suisse, Lloyds bank, and Citibank (CITI).  
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Table B- 1  
Descriptive Statistics of Quotes Revisions for Banks in the                               
Interest Rate Swap Market 
Note. Table B-1 reports descriptive statistics for the seven banks with the largest quotes contribution 
posted during the sample period from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2016. These banks are Westpac 
Banking Corporation (WEST), Credit Suisse (CS), Macquarie Group (MACQ), Commonwealth Bank 
of Australia (CBA), Lloyds Bank (LLOY), Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ), and 
Citibank (CITI). The total number of quotes updates, average number of daily quotes and average bid-
ask spread in basis points are presented for each bank.      
Bank Bank Code Total Number of Quotes  
Percentage of 
Total 
Avg. Number of 
Daily Quotes 
WESTPAC WEST 727039 69.37% 42.75 
CREDIT SUISSE CS 123862 11.82% 38.88 
MACQUARIE MACQ 93353 8.91% 23.07 
CBA CBA 32475 3.10% 21.22 
LLOYDS LLOY 30432 2.90% 24.47 
ANZ ANZ 28314 2.70% 18.00 
CITI CITI 12594 1.20% 23.36 
 
Two methods of price discovery are implemented to analyze how information is 
transmitted between local and foreign banks in the interest rate swap market, namely Sims 
(1972) and Error Correction Granger Causality (ECM). The former includes a level in the 
regression to test for the bi-directional flow of information after aggregating local and 
foreign banks into two separate time-series, whereas the latter explains how information 
flows across individual banks. 
B.3.2 Lead/lag Model 
Based on prior research, the method implements a lead/lad model similar to Sims (1972) 
and Frino, Walter and West (2000) to investigate the price discovery relationship between 
local and foreign banks in the interest rate swap market on announcement and non-
announcement days.65  Coefficients of the lead/lag model are estimated by regressing 
 
65 For the lead/lag model, this study combines the local bank quotes by taking an average of the prices 
across the four local banks (Westpac, CBA, ANZ, and Macquarie). Similarly, it is calculated the pooled 
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various measures of one-minute foreign bank quoted prices against lagged, 
contemporaneous and leading one-minute local banks quoted prices as follows: 






where ∆"#$ is the change in the foreign bank price over interval t, ∆"0$ is the change in 
the local bank price over interval t, and 2$ is the random error term.66  Under Equation 
(B.1), local banks quotes lead foreign bank quotes when coefficients of lagged local bank 
quoted prices (k < 0) are significant while coefficients of lead local bank quoted prices 
(k > 0) are insignificant. Alternatively, foreign banks quotes lead local banks quotes, 
when coefficients of lagged local banks quoted prices (k < 0) are insignificant while 
coefficients of lead local banks quoted prices (k > 0) are significant. In addition, using a 
Wald test, Test-1 (T1) examines that the sum of the first ten lead coefficients (i.e., k=+1 
to k=+10) are equal to zero (T1: ∑ )$*+4-+.4 = 0). The rejection of Test-1 indicates that 
information is transmitted from foreign banks to local banks. Similarly, Test-2 (T2) 
examines that the sum of the first ten lag coefficients (i.e., k=-1 to k=-10) are equal to 
zero (T2: ∑ )$*+/4-+./4 = 0). The rejection of Test-2 implies that information is transmitted 
from local banks to foreign banks.  
B.3.3 Error Correction Model 
ECM Granger causality provides a measure of intercorrelations across banks which 
explains how information flows across individual banks in the interest rate swap market. 
 
price for foreign banks by taking an average of the prices across the three foreign banks (Credit Suisse, 
Lloyds, and Citibank). This procedure creates two times series used in the lead/lag model, one time-series 
for local banks and another for foreign banks.  
66 This analysis ignores the 20 minutes before and after trading breaks to avoid comparing prices across 
market breaks as in Frino, Walter and West (2000).    
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Following Granger (1969) and Peiers (1997), a necessary requirement for price leadership 
by bank (y) is that its current change in quoted price is uncorrelated to past quotes updates 
by other banks (x). Therefore, Bank y is considered an important source of information 
in the swap market if lagged values of bank x do not affect contemporaneous observations 
in bank y. In addition, as an important condition for price leadership, lagged values of 
bank y have a significant impact on the contemporaneous price changes of bank x. Under 
the ECM Granger causality, if two time series are cointegrated of order (1,1), the residuals 
from the cointegrating regression can be used to estimate the error correction model as: 









where ∆"6	is the change in bank j price , ∆"+	is the change in bank k price, and 2$/4 is 
the lagged residual from the cointegrating regression.67  Equation (B.2) infers that current 
changes in bank j prices are determined by the lagged values of ∆"6	and ∆"+, therefore, 
changes in bank k prices Granger cause changes in bank j prices, if some of the 78+ in 
Equation (B.2) are nonzero.68  
B.4 Results 
B.4.1 Volatility Around Macroeconomic Announcements 
 
67 Before undertaking the cointegration test, it is evaluated whether the time series associated to a pair of 
banks are integrated of the same order. Using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF), it is possible to 
infer the number of unit roots in each time series to determine whether both variables are integrated of order 
I (1). If both time series are integrated of order I (1), it is possible to measure whether the series are 
cointegrated by estimating the long run equilibrium between the two variables using OLS at price levels 
and testing the regression residuals for the presence of a unit root with an ADF test. If the residuals are 
stationary, it is possible to conclude that the two series are cointegrated of order (1,1) and the residuals from 
the equilibrium regression can be incorporated into equation 2 to estimate the ECM granger causality model.  
68 The optimal lag length for the ECM model is estimated using the Schwarz criterion.  
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Figure B-1 presents market volatility around macroeconomic announcements based on 
five-minute standard deviation of mid-point quoted prices. The time period covers 25 
minutes prior and post the release of a particular announcement at time zero. The results 
demonstrate that the swap market reacts to the release of macroeconomic information 
since there is a significant increase in volatility during the five minutes after information 
releases. The increase in volatility lasts for around 10 minutes after announcements. 
Similarly, there is an increase in volatility during the 10 minutes prior announcement 
releases which shows that information leaks to the market before official news is reported 
(Ederington and Lee, 1993; DeGennaro and Shrieves, 1995; Ross, 1989).    
Figure B- 1 
Volatility of Midpoint Quotes around Macroeconomic 
Announcements 
Note. Figure B-1 presents average volatility of midpoint quotes every five minutes around 
macroeconomic announcements during the sample period from 1 January 2010 to 31 
December 2016. Volatility is estimated as the standard deviations of midpoint quotes for 
each five minutes intervals around the release of information at time zero.  
 
 
B.4.2 Price Discovery Between Local and Foreign Banks   
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Panel A of Table B-2 reports that, when the lead-lag model is estimated on non-
announcement days, six lagged local banks prices (k=-1 to k=-6) are significantly 
positive, which implies that local banks lead foreign banks by up to six minutes.69  In 
addition, coefficients on nine lead foreign banks prices (k=+1 to k=+9) are significantly 
positive at the 0.01 level, suggesting a nine minutes feedback from foreign banks to local 
banks.  These results demonstrate that the price discovery relationship between locals and 
foreign banks is highly contemporaneous on non-announcement days.  When the lead-lag 
model is estimated on macroeconomic announcement days, eight lead foreign bank prices 
(k=+2 to k=+9) become insignificant, implying that local banks becomes the source of 
price discovery in the interest rate swap market on announcement days.  The lead of local 
banks is also evidence in the magnitude of the significant lead and lag coefficients on 
announcement days.  The sum of the significant lag coefficients (k=-1 to k=-3) is 0.0043, 
twenty times the size of the significant lead coefficients (k=+1) of 0.090.  These findings 
indicate that local banks lead price discovery on days with macroeconomic information 
releases.  
B.4.3 Price Leadership in the Interest Rate Swap Market   
Table B-3 presents the estimation results for the ECM Granger Causality test.70  This table 
shows the number of significant bank k coefficients (78+  ) in Equation (B.2). The results 
demonstrate that amongst all local banks, Macquarie and Commonwealth banks dominate 
 
69 For simplicity, it is reported the first ten leads and lags coefficients, however, the lead/lag model is 
estimated using twenty leads and lags as explained in Equation (B.1). 
70 Before implementing the ECM Granger Causality model, it needs to be tested whether each pair of bank 
series is cointegrated. Following a two steps process, this analysis first confirms that all pairs of bank series 
are integrated of order I (1) using ADF test. Given that this analysis finds all series to be I (1), the residuals 
from the long-run relationship between bank j and bank k are tested using ADF. This test confirms that all 
series are cointegrated. Since the time-series are cointegrated, the ECM granger causality model can be 
used to estimate information flows across all banks.    
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price discovery in the 30 minutes before the release of the announcement. During the 30 
minutes post announcement release, there is a contemporaneous flow of information 
across all local and some foreign banks. Finally, Macquarie bank dominates price 
discovery over the 120 minutes around the release of information. These findings 
demonstrate that, although local banks dominate price discovery on announcement days 
as it was previous demonstrated using a lead/lag model, two of the local banks appear to 
be the main source of price discovery in the interest rate swap market. In addition, it is 
confirmed that foreign banks do not contribute to the price discovery process on 




Table B- 2  
The Lead/Lag Relationship Between Local and Foreign Banks on 
Announcement and Non-Announcement Days 
Note. Table B-2 reports the regression coefficients of the lead/lag model on announcement and non-
announcement days for the period 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2016. Panel A presents the 
coefficients estimated using an OLS regression with one-minute intraday observations where the 
dependent variable is the change in the foreign banks price and the independent variable is the change 
in the local banks price. Panel B reports the F-statistics of Wald tests on coefficient restrictions for the 
two tests (T1 and T2). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Panel A: Coefficients from lead/lag OLS regression         
    Announcement Days    Non-Announcement Days  
    Coefficient   T-statistic   Coefficient   T-statistic 
Intercept   0.0000   -0.35   0.0000   0.73 
< t+10   0.0000   0.00   0.0004   1.60 
< t+9   0.0002   0.62   0.0078   35.02*** 
< t+8   0.0004   0.99   0.0012   5.19*** 
< t+7   0.0000   0.11   0.0008   3.60*** 
< t+6   0.0001   0.35   0.0050   22.07*** 
< t+5   0.0002   0.47   0.0020   9.00*** 
< t+4   0.0004   1.05   0.0035   15.28*** 
< t+3   0.0005   1.40   0.0012   5.10*** 
< t+2   0.0004   1.12   0.0036   15.56*** 
< t+1   0.0009   2.47***   0.0157   67.70*** 
< t   0.1080   294.79***   0.0746   321.09*** 
< t-1   0.0023   6.31***   0.0291   125.01*** 
< t-2   0.0012   3.17***   0.0134   63.43*** 
< t-3   0.0008   2.17***   0.0024   10.18*** 
< t-4   0.0001   0.30   0.0074   31.48*** 
< t-5   0.0000   -0.12   0.0029   12.09*** 
< t-6   0.0000   -0.05   0.0054   22.75*** 
< t-7   0.0000   -0.11   0.0003   1.20 
< t-8   0.0000   0.04   -0.0002   -0.77 
< t-9   0.0000   0.08   0.0002   0.76 
< t-10   0.0001   0.16   0.0022   9.37 
                  
Panel B: Hypothesis tests (F-test)         
T1: < t+10 = 0   7.29***       75.37*** 
T2: < t-10 = 0   14.15***       70.51*** 
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Table B- 3  
Summary of ECM Granger Causality for Local and Foreign Banks Price Leadership 
Note. Table B-3 reports interbank dependencies in quoting patterns around macroeconomic information releases. Results are estimated 
using an error correction Granger causality test where quotes updates of bank j are regressed on two lagged one-minute quote update 
by bank k and two own lags. -60/-30, -30/0, 0/+30, and +30/+60 are time periods in minutes that represent subsamples around 
macroeconomic announcements. L1 (L2) indicates that the first (second) lag of bank k Granger-causes quote updates by bank j. A blank 
in any of the columns indicates that bank k does not Granger-causes quotes revisions by bank j.  
  -60/-30 Minutes -30/0 Minutes 
Bank j  ANZ CBA CITI CS LLOY MACQ WEST ANZ CBA CITI CS LLOY MACQ WEST 
ANZ           L1     L1 L1     L1   
CBA L1         L1 L1          L1   
CITI L1                           
CS                             
LLOY L1 L1       L1 L2     L1       L1 L2   
MACQ L1           L1 L2   L1           
WEST           L1     L1 L2     L1 L2   
  0/+30 Minutes +30/+60 Minutes 
  ANZ CBA CITI CS LLOY MACQ WEST ANZ CBA CITI CS LLOY MACQ WEST 
ANZ   L1 L2       L1 L2 L1     L2     L1 L2   
CBA L1       L1 L1 L2             L1   
CITI L1 L2         L1 L1 L2 L1         L1 L1 
CS                             
LLOY           L1 L2   L1 L2         L1 L2   
MACQ L2 L1     L1 L2       L2           





This study investigates the source of price discovery between local and foreign banks in 
the Australian interest rate swap market around macroeconomic announcements. Results 
demonstrate that local banks lead price discovery on days when macroeconomic 
information is released, however, there is a contemporaneous flow of information 
between local and foreign banks on non-announcement days. In addition, this study 
confirms the hypothesis that macroeconomic information announcements associated with 
asymmetric information, and identifies that amongst all local banks, Macquarie bank and 
Commonwealth bank (CBA) act as price leaders in the 30 minutes period before the 
announcement. These results suggest that information is released to the market in stages: 
first to the local price leaders, then to others local banks and lastly to the public. Similarly, 
these findings demonstrate that local desks provide significant price discovery in the 
Australian interest rate swap market during macroeconomic information releases. Overall, 
the findings on this appendix confirm previous microstructure theories that explain how 
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